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THE
CHRISTIANITY OF STOICISM :
OR,
SELECTIONS
FROM
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES
OF
EPICTETUS.

TRANSLATED BY MRS. CARTER, WITH HER NOTES.

TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED

The Contents of the Enchiridion ; Chronological and Alphabetical Tables of ancient Philosophers, and a Vindication of the Stoic Philosophy from some common misrepresentations of its principles.

BY THE BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S.

Carmarthen :

PRINTED BY J. EVANS ;

AND,

1822.

[NOT PUBLISHED.]

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Mrs. F. P. Bowles

HIERONYMUS in Isaiam C. XI.

Stoici nostro dogmati in plerisque concordant.

24-30
114

TO
MRS. KENNICOTT,
MRS. H. MORE,
MRS. H. BOWDLER,
WHO ENJOYED THE FRIENDSHIP,
AND COULD APPRECIATE THE TALENTS
AND VIRTUES
OF THE EXCELLENT TRANSLATOR
OF ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS,
THE FOLLOWING SELECTIONS
FROM HER TRANSLATION
ARE INSCRIBED
BY THEIR AFFECTIONATE
AND FAITHFUL SERVANT,
T. ST. DAVID'S.

ASBOWWILLY PALACE,
SEPT. 30, 1822. }



EXTRACT
FROM
MONTESQUIEU'S SPIRIT OF LAWS,

Book XXIV. Ch. X.

OF THE SECT OF STOICS.

THE several Sects of Philosophy amongst the ancients, were a species of Religion. Never were any principles more worthy of human nature, and more proper to form the good man, than those of the Stoics; and if I could for a moment cease to think that I am a Christian, I should not be able to hinder myself from ranking the destruction of the Sect of Zeno among the misfortunes that have befallen the human race.

It carried to excess only those things in which there is true greatness, the contempt of pleasure and of pain.

It was this Sect alone that made citizens; this alone that made great men; this alone, great emperors.

Laying aside for a moment revealed truths, let us search through all nature, and we shall not find a nobler object than the Antoninus's: even Julian himself, Julian, (a commendation thus wrested from me, will not render me an accomplice of his Apostacy,) no, there has not been a Prince since his reign more worthy to govern mankind.

While the Stoics looked upon riches, human grandeur, grief, disquietudes, and pleasure, as vanity; they were entirely employed in labouring for the happiness of mankind, and exercising the duties of society. It seems as if they regarded that sacred spirit, which they believed to dwell within them, as a kind of favourable providence watchful over the human race.

Born for society, they all believed that it was their destiny to labour for it; with so much the less fatigue, as *their rewards were all within themselves*.* Happy by

* Highly as Montesquieu estimated the philosophy of the Stoics, he has not done them justice, in stating

their *philosophy alone*, it seemed as if only the happiness of others could increase theirs.

that their *rewards were all in themselves*, and that they were happy in their "*philosophy alone*." For though the government of temper and regulation of the passions was the great object of their philosophy, we find in the discourses of Epictetus the *approbation of God* proposed as their ultimate motive, and the hope of returning to God their *ultimate reward*. "When you call for hot water, and your servant doth not hear you, or, if he doth, brings it only warm; or, perhaps is not to be found at all; then not to be angry, or burst with passion: is not this *acceptable to the Gods?*"* They are directed by Epictetus † to look to God alone for ability to purify the corruptions of our nature. "These can be no otherwise expelled from the mind than by *looking up to God alone*, as your pattern, by attaching yourself to him alone, and being consecrated to his commands. If you wish for anything else, you will, with sighs and groans, follow what is stronger than you; always seeking tranquillity without, and never able to find it. For you seek it where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is." Their tranquillity arose from the most confident dependence on God's providence. "Shall kindred to Cæsar, or any of the great men at Rome enable a man to live secure, above contempt, and void of all fears

* Disc. Book I. ch. 13. § 1. (These references are to Mrs. Carter's Translation.) Selections, p. 82. † Disc. ii, 16. § 4. Selections, p. 71.

“whatsoever; and shall not the having God for our
 “Maker, and Father, and Guardian, free us from all
 “griefs and terrors;” † “Are we not relations of God,
 “and did we not come from him? My friends, wait for
 “God, till he shall give the signal, and dismiss you from
 “this service; then return to him. For the present, be
 “content to wait in this post, where he has placed
 “you.” ‥ Again, “Have no will but the will of God.” ‡
 It was this spirit of piety in the Stoics, and its practical effects on their lives, which made Gataker say: “Subit me certe subinde (ita, ista dum lego, affectum me sentio, et ingenue agnosco) non stupor duntaxat, sed horror etiam, serio apud me reputantem, quam longe in multis ab eo absim,” speaking of the philosophy and the life of Antoninus.

The rewards, then, of Epictetus's Stoic were not all within himself. His Philosophy taught him to look to the will of God, as his rule; to the goodness of God, as his hope; to the *approbation of God*, and the hope of *returning to Him*, as his motive and reward. But, with all this, his Philosophy wanted the sanctions of Christianity;—the *revealed will*, and *written word* of God;—nor could it provide an *atonement* for his sins. These are privileges, which distinguish Christianity from all other religions; and which “we have, as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast.” “Heb. vi, 19.” Of some common misrepresentations the philosophy of the Stoics more will be said below p. xxix—lxxiv.

T. ST. D.

† Disc. B. 1. ch. 9. § 1. Selections p. 35. ‥ B. I. ch. 9. § 3. 4. Selections, p. 39. 40. ‡ Book II. ch. 17. § 2. Selections p. 52.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Extracts from Mrs. Carter's Translation of Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus have been selected, as materials of instruction in a septennial course of studies for young men intended for Holy Orders. They are printed as a Manual introductory to Logic and Ethics. The purport of Epictetus in these Extracts is to shew the relation, which Logic bears to Ethics, and how much, moral conduct depends on the acquisition of right principles, and both conduct and principle, on the due cultivation of the reasoning faculty.

Of the practical utility of Epictetus's moral principles, in their influence on temper in the daily concerns of life, we have an interesting evidence in the proof, which Miss Talbot has given of it in a Letter to Mrs. Carter, subjoined to this Advertisement.

The great Christian principles of temper, contentment, indifference to *things not in our own power*, patience, forbearance, endurance of evil; submission to Providence, and the whole moral warfare of life, are so strongly inculcated in his Enchiridion and Discourses, as to want nothing but the sanction of that divine authority which the Gospel supplies. The Stoicism of Epictetus grounded on Christian motives affords a powerful remedy against that "appetite for self-destruction," (as Smith calls it) in diseased and deranged minds, of which so many unhappy instances have occurred within these few years.

That the suicide is insane at the time that he perpetrates the act of self-murder, there seems to be no

doubt. The act is so contrary to nature and to instinct,—so repugnant to the great physical principles of our existence, the love of life and fear of death,—that the mind must be deprived of its natural guide, reason, before the hand can proceed to execute its unnatural purpose. It is not bravery, it is not courage that impels to it, it is impatience under the overwhelming pain of anxiety, pride, disappointment, fear of discredit with the world, a hasty succumbing under present evil, a weak surrender of life to an enemy, which, if “resisted,” we are assured, will always “flee away.”

The means of that resistance will be found in moral and spiritual discipline; and there is no merely human composition so calculated to supply the principles of that discipline, as the philosophy of Epictetus, regulated by Gospel sanctions. But it must be the discipline of education and habit; early, habitual, persevering study of right principles, supported and animated by the precepts and promises of the Gospel, especially those, which relate to the duty and efficacy of *prayer*, and the aid of the *Holy Spirit*. The effect of such discipline and exercise is to correct our false preconceptions of *things not in our own power*, and to fortify the mind with better views, and hopes, and consolations, and, so, to prevent the consequences of a pre-disposition to that state of mind which is too sensitively affected by external circumstances. FAITH and HOPE, with Prayer, are the surest means of a holy and a happy life; and CHARITY (in St. Paul’s large sense of the word) is the *end* and consummation of it. For “LOVE is the fulfilling of the law;” and the FAITH, which saves, is that, which “worketh by LOVE.” To

the active exercise of these *means* and *end* the rules of Epictetus's philosophy are eminently conducive.

The old Stoical principle was *contempt of all external*, which had a tendency to produce *contempt of life*; but Epictetus, on the contrary, teaches the resolute and patient *endurances* of evil by a dutiful submission to Providence. If in one or two passages of the Discourses he insists chiefly on the cowardice of Fear and Discontent under external evils, and too hastily (perhaps only apparently) suggests the old Stoical alternative, there are ten passages to one which afford a very different doctrine in which the Stoicism of Epictetus possesses in its own principles, an antidote to the abuse of them, as I have shewn in a note to page 36—41 of this Tract. The rational fortitude, and tranquillity of mind, which spring from habitual resignation to the will of God, are admirably illustrated by Epictetus in the following Selections. XIV. *How to struggle with difficulties.* XV. *On Contentment.* XVI. *How every thing may be performed acceptably to God.* XVII. *That all things are under the divine inspection.* XX. *That some advantage may be gained from every external circumstance.*

As Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus may be considered as a commentary on the principles of the Enchiridion, it may be useful to the younger reader to have before him a connected view of the grounds and arrangement of the Enchiridion. Such a view is accordingly subjoined to the Table of Contents of this volume; to which a few pages are added, as a tabular outline of the history of ancient Philosophy.

Extract From Miss Talbot's Letter to Mrs. Carter, Dec. 5, 1749.

"I LIKE your last packet of Epictetus better than any I have yet had. Not that it is without its difficulties; but a few difficulties which put one upon thinking, and which, thinking will get over, are surely infinitely preferable to a languid diffuse explicitness. What force, what life, what strength, and shortness of expression! what excellence of sentiment! what dignity and authority of reason, and common sense! and what an excellent reproof and lesson has the honest, plain old man given to me, (thank you a thousand times for transmitting it.) Whenever I am seized with an impertinent, untimely fit of reformation, or with a splenetic dissatisfaction either with the company, or tedious lowliness, methinks I hear his voice sounding in my ears*—"But you are wretched and discontented; be pleased, and make the best of every thing. Call society an entertainment and festival." You are right, most revered Epictetus. In society our hearts should be open to every cheerful, good-humoured, kind affection. 'Tis a time of festivity when our business is to delight and do good to one another. What an idea, and how does it brighten up London to me! I will no longer call it—I dare no longer sigh to myself in secret, that it is a tumult, a chaos, a confusion, vanity and vexation of spirit; but I begin to feel myself grow sociable and tolerating."—(Pennington's *Memoirs of the Life of Mrs. Carter*, p. 116.)

* Book I. Chap. 12, Sect. 2, Page 78, of these Selections.

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Tota Philosophorúm vita mortis commentatio est.

CICERO.

Θάνατος προ οφθαλμών εἶω σοι καθ' ἡμέραν,
καὶ οὐδεν οὐδεπότε ταπεινὸν ἐνδυμῆσιν, οὔτε ἀγαν
ἐπιδυμῆσεις τίνος. **ΕΠΙΚΤΕΤΟΣ, Ench. 28.**

Μιμνήσκου τὰ ἐσχάτα σου, καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα
οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεις. **ECCLRSIATICUS vii. 36.**

ὦ Θάνατε, ὡς πικρὸν ἐστὶ τὸ μνημοσύνην σου
ἀνδρὶ εἰρηνεύοντι ἐν τοῖς ὑπαρχουσιν αὐτοῦ,
ἀνδρὶ ἀπερισπαστῇ καὶ ευοδουμένῳ ἐν πάσιν. **EC-
CLESIATICUS xli. 1.**

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- I. ON SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND TRANQUILLITY OF MIND. §. 1—37.
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PART THE FIRST.

On Self-government, and tranquillity of mind,—depending on principle, and on the right use of our ideas of things.

*1.

- 1. Distinction of things in our power, and not in our power.
- 2. The different nature and condition of things, according as they are in our power, or not in our power.
- 3. Effects of true and false judgment of things.
- 4. Necessity of a due consideration and preparation of mind.—Virtue and ~~vain~~ vanity cannot be attended to at one and the same time.
- 5. We must suspend our judgment till things are duly examined.

* The Roman figures distinguish the sections, as they are divided by Upton and Mrs. Carter. The Arabic figures in the margin are according to Wolffius's edition, and Stanhope's translation of the Enchiridion, and of Simplicius's Commentary upon it.

II.

6. Our unhappiness proceeds from our anxiety to avoid things not in our own power.
7. Our aversions should be confined to things in our own power. Young beginners in philosophy should proceed, in their mental discipline, gently and gradually.
8. The *nature* of what we love, is a material and necessary consideration.

IV.

9. The circumstances and probable consequences of every undertaking should be well weighed before we undertake it.

V.

10. Our disquietudes are owing not to the things themselves, but to our ideas of them.—Wise men make no complaints.

VI.

11. Men ought not to value themselves upon the goods of fortune, but those of the mind. The right use and improvement of our ideas of things is our proper business and virtue.

VII.

12. We ought always to be so prepared to obey the calls of Providence, as not to be hindered by any worldly considerations.

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VIII.

13. We should not trouble ourselves with wishing that things may be just as we would have them.

IX.

- 13.* A well-disciplined mind is subject to no obstructions.



On Self-government, and tranquillity of mind, in our intercourse with the world.

X.

14. The powers of the mind must be opposed against all accidents and vicious desires.

XI.

15. What we part with, is not lost, but restored to God, the giver.

XII.

16. The improvement of the mind ought to be our chief care.
17. We must improve ourselves by rising from small things to greater. It is not to be expected

* The VIII. and IX. Sections of Mrs. Carter are contained in the 13th of Wolfins and Stanhope.

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ted, that every thing should be as we would wish.

XIII.

18. We must not be discouraged at other people's ill opinion of us. No man is capable of pursuing several ends at once.

XIV.

19. It is a vain thing to desire the securing to ourselves what nature hath put out of our own power.
20. Who is properly our master.

XV.

21. We must take thankfully what God gives us, and be content to want what he denies us.

XVI.

22. Good nature must be so restrained, as not to disturb the peace of our own mind.

XVII.

23. The part we must act in the drama of life depends upon God's appointment.

XVIII.

24. A wise man improves every accident and disaster of life.

XIX.

25. Nothing should be attempted, that is out of our reach, and not in our own power.

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27. The way to avoid envy.—Liberty is no way to be had, but by a contempt of things not in our own power.

XX.

27. No man is injured except by himself. The benefit of deliberation.

XXI.

28. Advantages of daily meditation on death.

XXII.

29. A philosopher must be above derision and censure. Perseverance conquers difficulties.

XXIII.

30. The consciousness of our own virtue ought to support and satisfy us.

XXIV.

31. A good man needs not the advantages of fortune, to render him useful to the public. The world more benefited by virtue than by wealth.

XXV.

32. We should rejoice with all men, and envy none. For the courtesies of the world you must pay their price.

XXVI.

33. We should pass the same judgement on our own misfortunes, that we do upon other people's.

XXVII.

34. No natural evil in the world.

XXVIII.

35. Early consideration prevents late shame and repentance.

XXIX.

36, 37.* The mischief and folly of rash attempts.

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On the Relative Duties.

XXX.

38. On the duties, which men owe to one another ; and that we must do what is right to others, though they do not discharge their duty towards us.

XXXI.

39. On God, and Providence, and the duties of religion.

XXXII.

39.† In what cases, and with what disposition, oracles should be consulted.

XXXIII.

40. On choice and consistency of character.

* The 36th, and 37th Sections of Stanhope are contained in the xxix. of Mrs. Carter.

† The 39th Section of Stanhope is twice numbered.

41. RULES OF CONVERSATION: silence, brevity, choice of subjects, censure, praise, invidious comparisons.
42. Becoming discourse, or silence.
43. Laughter.
44. Swearing.
45. On behaviour at public entertainments.
46. Use, not luxury, to be our rule in all provisions for the body.
47. On chastity without ostentation, and with lenity to the faults of others.
48. Calumnies should be despised.
49. On not frequenting the theatres; and on behaviour there.
50. On behaviour at rehearsals.
51. Socrates and Zeno to be our patterns in our intercourse with the great.
52. To be prepared for cold reception from great men.
53. Talking of ourselves to be avoided.
54. Of jokes and buffoonery.
55. Obscene discourse, how to be discouraged.

XXXIV.

56. Checks to be put upon the first thoughts of pleasure; the comforts of self-denial, and triumphs of a good conscience.

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XXXV.

57. A sense of duty, and not popular opinion, to be the rule of our actions.

XXXVI.

58. Selfishness contrary both to the common decencies of society, and to the general rights of mankind.

XXXVII.

59. Every man should consider his own abilities, and not aim at things above him.

XXXVIII.

60. The integrity of the mind should be our great care.

XXXIX.

61. Nature is soon satisfied, but extravagant desires never.

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62. What ought to be the chief objects of female accomplishments. Virtue, modesty, and innocence their most powerful attractions.

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63. Great attention to the body, a mark of a dull and abject mind.

XLII.

64. An injured person less hurt than he who

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injures him. This consideration, a source of patience and meekness under injuries.

XLIII.

65. Every thing has two handles. We should take every thing by the best handle.

XLIV.

66. Externals no evidence of real worth.

XLV.

67. Folly of judging from outward appearances:
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On the practical Use of Philosophy.

XLVI.

68. Not to boast of our knowledge or virtues, but to let them be seen in our example.
69. Not to talk with unlearned persons on subjects of philosophy, but rather to bear the imputation of ignorance. To bear such reproach is a proof of philosophy.

XLVII.

70. Against an ostentatious talking of our self-denial, and ascetic exercises.

XLVIII.

- 71. An undisciplined man expects good and evil from without, a philosopher expects both from within.
- 72. Marks of proficiency in philosophy.

XLIX.

- 73. Practice, the end of all moral knowledge.

L.

- 74. Our conduct to be governed by principle, not by the opinions of the world.
- 75. Knowledge to be reduced to practice; and the practice of a good life on no account to be deferred.

LI.

- 76. The theoretical part of philosophy subservient to the practical. The practice of virtue and a good life, the ultimate end of all study and instruction.

LII.

- 77, 78, 79. The duty of resignation and submission to the Divine will.

SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Seven Wise Men of Greece.

Thales, Solon, Chilo, Pittacus, Bion, Cleobulus, Periander.

The Ionic. B. C. 600.

Thales
Anaximander
Anaximenes
Anaxagoras
Archelaus

The Italic. B. C. 537.

Pythagoras
Empedocles
Epicharmus
Archytas
Alcmæon
Hippassus
Philolaus
Eudoxus

The Eleatic. B.C. 530.

Xenophanes
Parmenides
Melissus
Zeno Eleates
Leucippus
Democritus
Protagoras
Diagoras
Anaxarchus

The Heraclitean.

B. C. 502.

Heraclitus

The Socratic. B.C. 470.

Socrates
Xenophon
Æschines
Crito
Simon
Glauco
Simmias
Cebes

The Eliac & Eretriac.

B. C. 450.

Phædo
Plistanus
Menedemus

The Academic.

B. C. 428.

Plato
Speusippus
Xenocrates
Polemo

Crates
Crantor
Arcesilaus
Lacydes
Carneades
Clitomachus
Philo
Antiochus

The Cyrenaic.

B. C. 425.

Aristippus
Hegesias
Anniceris
Theodorus
Bion

The Megarit.

B. C. 404.

Euclides
Eubulides
Alexinus
Euphantus
Apollonius Cronus
Diodorus
Clinomachus
Stilpo

The Cynic. B. C. 390.

Antisthenes
Diogenes
Monimus
Onesicratus
Crates
Metrocles
Hipparchia
Menippus
Menedemus

The Peripatetic.

B. C. 360.

Aristotle
Theophrastus
Strato
Lyco
Aristo
Critolaus
Diodorus

The Epicurean.

B. C. 310.

Epicurus

The Sceptic. B. C. 306.

Pyrrho
Timon

The Stoic. B. C. 305.

Zeno Citticus
Cleanthes
Chrysippus
Zeno Tarsensis
Diogenes, the Babylo-
nian
Antipater
Panætius
Posidonius
Epictetus
Arrianus
M. A. Antoninus

The Eclectic. A. D. 200.

Potamo
Ammonius
Plotinus

CHRONOLOGY

OF THE

PRINCIPAL PHILOSOPHERS

From Thales to Simplicius.

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**B. C.**

**776 FIRST OLYMPIAD**

**753 ROME BUILT**

**600 Thales**

**537 Pythagoras**

**536 PERSIAN EMPIRE COMMENCED**

**530 Xenophanes**

**504 Heraclitus**

**496 Darius meditates the invasion of Greece.**

**470 Parmenides      490 Battle of Marathon.**

**470 Socrates.      480 Battle of Salamis.**

**460 Democritus      480 Battle of Thermopylæ.**

**450 Cebes.      460 Battle of Eurymedon.**

**442 Xenophon**

**437 Archytas**

**428 Plato.      431 Peloponnesian war began.**

**428 Æschines**

**425 Aristippus**

**404 Euclides, of Megara. Pelop. War ended.**

**390 Antisthenes**

**360 Aristoteles.      Intestine wars in**

**358 Theophrastus      Greece. 378—346.**

**355 Diogenes.      Alexander born.**

**339 Xenocrates**

**338 Liberties of Greece lost at the battle of Cha-  
rona**

**B. C.**

**333 MACEDONIAN EMPIRE COMMENCED**

**330 Polemo**

**328 Crates**

**320 Crantor**

**310 Epicurus**

**306 Pyrrho**

**305 Zeno, the founder of the Stoics**

**300 Cleanthes**

**283 Chrysippus**

**243 Panætius**

**184 Carneades**

**107 Cratippus**

**48 Liberties of Rome lost at the battle of Pharsalia**

**46 ROMAN EMPIRE COMMENCED**

**A. D.**

**94 Epictetus**

**123 Arrianus**

**150 Celsus**

**161 M. A. Antoninus**

**220 Ammonius**

**270 Porphyrius**

**425 Olympiodorus**

**450 Hierocles the Commentator on the Golden Verses**

**476 DESTRUCTION OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE**

**520 Damascius**

**520 Simplicius**

**530 Extinction of ancient philosophy at Athens,  
by a decree of Justinian.**

# ALPHABETICAL CATALOGUE

OF

## PHILOSOPHERS.

- |                                     |                                    |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <i>Æschines, Socratic</i>           | <i>Arrianus, Stoic</i>             |
| <i>Alcinus, Academic</i>            | <i>Atticus, Academic</i>           |
| <i>Alcmæon, Italic</i>              | <i>Bion, Cyrenaic</i>              |
| <i>Alexander Ægeus, Peripatetic</i> | <i>Boethius, Peripatetic</i>       |
| <i>Alexinus, Megaric</i>            | <i>Carneades, Academic</i>         |
| <i>Amelius, Eclectic</i>            | <i>Cebes, Socratic</i>             |
| <i>Ammonius Sacca, Peripatetic</i>  | <i>Celsus, Epicurean</i>           |
| <i>Ammonius, Eclectic</i>           | <i>Chæremón, Stoic</i>             |
| <i>Anaxagoras, Ionic</i>            | <i>Chrysippus, Stoic</i>           |
| <i>Anaxarchus, Eleatic</i>          | <i>Cicero, Academic</i>            |
| <i>Anaximander, Ionic</i>           | <i>Cleanthes, Stoic</i>            |
| <i>Anaximenes, Ionic</i>            | <i>Clinomachus, Megaric</i>        |
| <i>Anniceris, Cyrenaic</i>          | <i>Clitomachus, Academic</i>       |
| <i>Antiochus, Academic</i>          | <i>Cornutus, Stoic</i>             |
| <i>Antipater, Stoic</i>             | <i>Crates, Acad. Cyn.</i>          |
| <i>ANTISTHENES, Cynic</i>           | <i>Cratippus, Academic</i>         |
| <i>Antoninus, Stoic</i>             | <i>Crito, Socratic</i>             |
| <i>Apollonius, Megaric</i>          | <i>Critolaus, Peripatetic</i>      |
| <i>Apuleius, Academic</i>           | <i>Damascius, Eclectic</i>         |
| <i>Arcesilaus, Academic</i>         | <i>Democritus, Eleatic</i>         |
| <i>Archedemus, Stoic</i>            | <i>Diagoras, Eleatic</i>           |
| <i>Archelaus, Ionic</i>             | <i>Dio, Eliac</i>                  |
| <i>Archytas, Italic</i>             | <i>Diodorus, Megar. Perip.</i>     |
| <i>Athenæus, Peripatetic</i>        | <i>Diogenes, Cyn. It.</i>          |
| <i>Athenodorus, Stoic</i>           | <i>Diogenes Laertes, Epicurean</i> |
| <i>ARISTIPPUS, Cyrenaic</i>         | <i>Empedocles, Italic</i>          |
| <i>Aristo Ceus, Perip.</i>          | <i>Epicharmus, Italic</i>          |
| <i>Aristo Chius, Stoic</i>          | <i>Epictetus, Stoic</i>            |
| <i>ARISTOTELES, Perip.</i>          | <i>Epicurus, Epicurean</i>         |



|                                          |                                      |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Enbulides, <i>Megaric</i>                | Philolaus, <i>Italic</i>             |
| Euclides, <i>Megaric</i>                 | PLATO, <i>Academic</i>               |
| Eudoxus, <i>Italic</i>                   | Plinius Sec. <i>Epicurean</i>        |
| Euphantus, <i>Megaric</i>                | Plistanus, <i>Eliac</i>              |
| Euphrates, <i>Stoic</i>                  | Plotinus, <i>Eclectic</i>            |
| Glauco, <i>Socratic</i>                  | Plutarchus Chær. <i>Academic</i>     |
| Hegesias, <i>Cyrenaic</i>                | Plutarchus Nestorii, <i>Eclectic</i> |
| Heraclitus, <i>Heraclitean</i>           | Polemo, <i>Academic</i>              |
| Hierocles, <i>Eclectic</i>               | Porphyrius, <i>Eclectic</i>          |
| Herillus, <i>Stoic</i>                   | Posidonius, <i>Stoic</i>             |
| Hipparchia, <i>Cynic</i>                 | Potamo, <i>Eclectic</i>              |
| Hippasus, <i>Italic</i>                  | Proclus, <i>Eclectic</i>             |
| Iamblichus, <i>Eclectic</i>              | Protogoras, <i>Eleatic</i>           |
| Isidorus, <i>Eclectic</i>                | Pyrrho, <i>Sceptic</i>               |
| Lacydes, <i>Academic</i>                 | PYTHAGORAS, <i>Italic</i>            |
| Leucippus, <i>Eleatic</i>                | Seneca, <i>Stoic</i>                 |
| Lucianus, <i>Epicurean</i>               | Sextus Chæron, <i>Stoic</i>          |
| Lyeo, <i>Peripatetic</i>                 | Sextus Empir, <i>Sceptic</i>         |
| Marinus, <i>Eclectic</i>                 | Simmius, <i>Socratic</i>             |
| Maximus Tyrius, <i>Academic</i>          | Simplicius, <i>Stoic</i>             |
| Melissus, <i>Eleatic</i>                 | SOCRATES                             |
| Menippus, <i>Cynic</i>                   | Sosigenes, <i>Peripatetic</i>        |
| Menedemus, <i>Eliac, Cynic</i>           | Speusippus, <i>Academic</i>          |
| Metrocles, <i>Cynic</i>                  | Sphærus, <i>Stoic</i>                |
| Monimus <i>Cynic</i>                     | Stilpo, <i>Megaric</i>               |
| Musonius, <i>Stoic</i>                   | Strato, <i>Peripatetic</i>           |
| Nicholaus Damascenus, <i>Peripatetic</i> | Taurus, <i>Academic</i>              |
| Numenius, <i>Academic</i>                | THALES, <i>Ionic</i>                 |
| Olympiodorus, <i>Peripatetic</i>         | Theodorus, <i>Syrenaic</i>           |
| Panætius, <i>Stoic</i>                   | Thecon Smyrnæus, <i>Academic</i>     |
| Parmenides, <i>Eleatic</i>               | Theophrastus, <i>Perip.</i>          |
| Persæus, <i>Stoic</i>                    | Thrasyllus, <i>Academic</i>          |
| Phædo, <i>Eliac &amp; Ereat.</i>         | Timon, <i>Sceptic</i>                |
| Phavorinus, <i>Academic</i>              | Xenocrates, <i>Academic</i>          |
| Philo, <i>Academic</i>                   | Xenophanes, <i>Eleatic</i>           |
|                                          | Xenophon, <i>Socratic</i>            |
|                                          | ZENO, <i>Stoic, Eleat.</i>           |

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AFTER the preceding pages were printed, I met with the following passage in Sir Thomas Bernard's interesting and valuable tract, intitled **COMFORTS OF OLD AGE**. "Futile is that philosophy—(I speak "not of the disgusting sensuality of Epicurus, but of "the more elevated doctrine of the Portico)—which, "hopeless to *regulate* the passions and affections of "man has attempted to *extinguish* them ; and, instead "of purifying the human heart, has endeavoured to "deprive it of all its greatest and most valuable enjoy- "ments,—of LOVE, JOY, SYMPATHY, HOPE AND GRA- "TITUDE ; producing, not the beauty of order, or the "calm of tranquillity, but the solitude of inaction, and "the dreary stillness of death. The reverse of all this "is to be found in the PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION " (Page 190, 191. ed. 1820.)

It is difficult to account for this censure, concurring indeed with a commonly received opinion, but contrary to the principles of Stoicism, as we find them in the works *now extant* of the two great philosophers, Epictetus and the Emperor M. Antoninus ; and to the judgement of Origen and St. Jerome. The philosophy of Epictetus in his *Enchiridion* and *Discourses*, teaches us to *regulate* the affections, not to extirpate them ; to fix them on things intellectual and moral, and not on things of the earth ; to repress extravagant desires, and all anxiety about things not in our own power ; to

promote piety, brotherly kindness, and patriotism, humility, candour, contentment, resignation to the will of God, and gratitude for his bounties and blessings. Humility is a virtue the least of all to be expected from the presumptuous notion of human perfectibility ascribed to the Stoics. Yet, humility is a leading characteristic of the philosophy of Epictetus.

If the censure before adduced, were correct, the great defect of Stoicism would be its contrariety to Christian doctrine. Yet how different is this charge from the opinion of St. Jerome who says, *Stoici nostro dogmati in plerisque concordant*; and of the excellent translator of Epictetus. "Of all the philosophers," says Mrs Carter, "the Stoics were the clearest and most zealous assertors of a particular Providence: a belief, which was treated with the utmost contempt by the Epicureans. As this principle is, of all others, the most conducive to the interest of Virtue, and lays the foundation of all true Piety, the Stoics are intitled to the highest honour for their steady defence of it; and their utter rejection of the idle, and contemptible notion of Chance!" (Preface §: 16) Mr. Graves, in the Preface to his Translation of M. Antoninus says, "A Lady in private life equally distinguished by her piety and her ingenuity, assured me many years ago, that she had received more advantage in her youth from the morals of Epictetus, than from any book she had ever read,—except her Bible." See other testimonies, below, p. l.

But the value of Epictetus's philosophy will be best seen by a citation of some of its maxims.

**MAXIMS OF PIETY:** "Be assured that the essen-

tial property of Piety towards the Gods, is, to form right opinions concerning them as existing, and as governing the Universe with goodness and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect intelligence." (Enchirid. xxxi.)

"Whoever is careful to *regulate* his desires and aversions, as he ought, is, by the very same means, careful of piety likewise." (Enchirid. ibid.)

"Upon all occasions, we ought to have these maxims ready at hand :

Conduct me, Jove, and thou, O Destiny,  
Wherever your Decrees have fixed my station.  
I follow cheerfully ; and, did I not,  
Wicked and wretched I must follow still.

\* \* \*

Whoe'er yields properly to Fate, is deemed  
Wise among men, and knows the laws of Heaven.

\* \* \*

O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed : but hurt me they cannot." (Enchirid. liii.)

"If we had any understanding, ought we not both in public, and in private incessantly to sing hymns, and speak well of [bless] the Deity and rehearse his benefits ? ought we not, whether we are digging, or ploughing, or eating, to sing the hymn due to God ? Great is God, who has supplied us with these instruments to till the ground : Great is God who has given us hands, a power of swallowing, a stomach : who has given us to grow insensibly, to breathe in sleep.

These things we ought upon every occasion to celebrate ; but to make it the chief subject of the greatest, and most divine hymn, that He has given us the faculty of apprehending them and using them in a proper way.—What else can I, a lame old man, do, but sing hymns to God? If I was a nightingale, I would act the part of a nightingale ; if a swan, the part of a swan. But since I'm a reasonable creature, it is my duty to praise God. This is my business. I do it. Nor will I ever desert this post, as long as it is vouchsafed me : and I exhort you to join in the same song." (Disc. i. 16, 3.)

"Do not you know that both sickness and death must overtake us? At what employment? The husbandman, at his plough ; the sailor on his voyage ; —I would be found studying thus, that I may be able to say to God ; 'Have I transgressed thy commands ; Have I perverted the powers, the senses, the preconceptions which thou hast given me? Have I ever accused thee, or censured thy dispensations?' I have been sick, because it was thy pleasure ; and so have others ; but I willingly. I have been poor, it being thy will, but with joy. I have not been in power, because it was not thy will, and power I have never desired. Have I not always approached thee with a cheerful countenance prepared to execute thy commands, and the significations of thy will? Is it thy pleasure that I should depart from this assembly? I depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast thought me worthy to take a share in it with thee, to behold thy works, and to join with thee in comprehending thy administration. Let death overtake me while I am

thinking, while I am writing; while I am reading, such things as these." (Disc. iii. 5, 1.) \*

OF NATURAL AND PARENTAL AFFECTION. "At present the assistance I have to give you towards what you desire, is this. Doth affection seem to you to be a right and a natural thing? How should it be otherwise?"

Well : and is Affection natural and right, and Reason not so?

By no means.

Is there any Opposition then between Reason and Affection?

I think not.

If there was, of two opposites, if one be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural. Must it not?

It must.

What we find, then, at once affectionate and reasonable, *that* we may safely pronounce to be right and good.

Agreed.

Well, then : you will not dispute, but that to run away, and leave a sick child, is contrary to Reason. It remains for us to consider, whether it be consistent with affection.—Pray, if you were sick yourself, should you be willing to have your Family, and even your wife and children, so very affectionate, as to leave you helpless and alone?

By no means.

Or would you wish to be so loved by your friends, as from their excessive affection, always to be left alone when you were sick? Or would you not rather

\* See the Note p. xlviii.



wish, if it were possible, to have such a kind of affection from your enemies, as to make them always keep from you? If so, it remains, that your behaviour was by no means affectionate." (Disc. i. 11. 2.)

"The next topic regards the duties of life: For I am not to be [*απαθής, insensible*] undisturbed by passions, in the same manner as a statue is, but as one who preserves the rational and acquired relations, as a pious person, as a son, as a brother, as a father, as citizen." (Disc. iii. 2, 3.)

"Be exempt from grief; not like irrational creatures, from *insensibility*, (*απαθής*); nor from inconsiderateness, like fools; but like a man of Virtue, making Reason the remedy for grief." (Fragments, Second Series, 23.)

OF FILIAL AFFECTION. "Duties are universally measured by Relations. Is any one a Father? In this are implied, as due, Taking care of him; submitting to him in all things; patiently receiving his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad Father. Is your natural tie then to a *good* Father? No: but to a Father." (Enchirid. xxx.)

OF FRATERNAL AFFECTION. "Is a Brother unjust? Well: preserve your own situation towards him. Consider not what *he* doth; but what *you* are to do, to keep your own faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature." (Enchirid. xxx.)

"Every thing hath two handles; the one, by which it may be borne; the other, by which it cannot. If your Brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold on the action by the handle of his injustice; for by that it cannot be borne; but by the opposite, that he is *your*

Brother, that he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be borne." (Enchirid. xliii.)

OF PATRIOTISM, FRIENDSHIP, BENEVOLENCE, FORGIVENESS, HUMILITY, AND ACTIVE LIFE. "When it is our duty to share the danger of a Friend, or of our Country, we ought not to consult the oracle, whether we shall share it with them, or not. For though the diviner should forewarn you, that the Victims are unfavorable, this means no more, than that either death, or mutilation, or exile is portended. But we have Reason within us: and it directs, even with these hazards, to stand by our Friend and our Country." (Enchirid. xxxii.)

"A wise and good man, after examining these things, submits his mind to Him, who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the laws of the commonwealth." (Disc. i. 12. 1.)

"Let no wise man estrange himself from the government of the State; for it is both impious to withdraw from being useful to those that need it, and cowardly to give way to the worthless." (Fragment 126.)

OF FRIENDSHIP. "Instead of herds of oxen, endeavour to assemble flocks of Friends about your house." (Fragment 42.)

OF BENEVOLENCE. "No one who is a Lover of Money, a Lover of Pleasure, or a Lover of Glory, is likewise a Lover of Mankind: but only he who is a Lover of Virtue." (Fragment 10.)

"He is void of true taste, who strives to have his house admired, by decorating it with a showy outside; but to adorn our characters by the gentleness of



a communicative temper, is at once a proof of good taste, and good nature." (Fragment 44.)

"Nothing is meaner than the love of pleasure, the love of gain, and arrogance. Nothing is nobler than magnanimity, meekness, philanthropy, and benevolence." (Fragment 46.)

"If you have a mind to adorn your city by consecrated monuments, first consecrate in yourself the most beautiful monument of gentleness, and justice, and benevolence." (Fragment 75.)

"A person once brought clothes to a pirate, who had been cast ashore, and almost killed by the severity of the weather; then carried him to his house, and furnished him with other conveniences. Being reproached by some person, for doing good to bad people; 'I have paid this regard,' answered he, 'not to the man, but to human nature.'" (Fragment 104.)

OF FORGIVENESS. "Who among you do not admire the action of Lycurgus the Lacedemonian? For when he had been deprived of one of his eyes, by one of the Citizens, and the people had delivered the young man to him, to be punished in whatever manner he should think proper: Lycurgus forbore to give him any punishment. But having instructed and rendered him a good man, he brought him into the Theatre: and while the Lacedemonians were struck with admiration; "I received," says he, "this person from you, injurious and violent, and I restore him to you gentle, and a good Citizen." (Fragment 62.)

OF HUMILITY. "If you would be good, first believe that you are bad." (Fragment 2.)

"If any one tells you that such a person speaks ill of you, do not make excuses about what is said of you,

## XXXVII

but answer; 'He does not know my other faults; else he would not have mentioned only these.' " (Enchirid. xxxiii.)

"If you would improve, be content to be thought stupid and foolish with regard to externals." (Enchirid. xlii.)

"Do not wish to be thought to know any thing; and though you should appear to be somebody to others, distrust yourself." (Ibid.)

"Is any one preferred before you at an entertainment, or in a compliment, or in being admitted to a consultation? If these things are good, you ought to rejoice, that *he* hath got them: and, if they are evil, do not be grieved, that *you* have not got them." (Enchirid. xxv.)

Would you be of service to mankind, shew them by your own example what kind of men Philosophy makes: and be not a mere trifler. When you eat, be of service to those that eat; when you drink, to those who drink with you. Be of service to them by yielding to all, giving way to them, bearing with them; and do not offend or disgust them. (Disc. iii. 13. 3.)

"I am attentive to other men, what they say, and how they are affected; and that not from ill nature, nor that I may have an opportunity for censure or ridicule: But I turn to myself, and ask, am I also guilty of the same faults, and how shall I leave them off? Once I too was faulty, but, God be thanked, not now. Well: when you have done thus, and been employed in this manner, have not you done as good a work as if you had read a thousand lines, and written as many?" (Disc. iv. 4. 1.)

"Never call yourself a Philosopher; nor talk a great deal among the unlearned *about Theorems*: but act *conformably to them*. Thus at an entertainment, do not talk how persons ought to eat; but eat as you ought. For remember, that in this manner Socrates universally avoided all ostentation." (Enchir. xlvi.)

"When you have brought yourself to supply the necessities of your body at a small price: do not pique yourself upon it; nor if you drink water, be saying upon every occasion, "I drink water." But first consider how much more sparing and patient of hardship the poor are than we. (Euchir. xlvii.)

OF ACTIVE LIFE. "Can you say like Socrates, "If it so pleases God, so let it be." Do you think that Socrates, if he had fixed his desires on the leisure of the Lyceum, or the Academy, or the conversation of the Youth there, day after day, would have made so many campaigns, as he did so readily? Would not he have lamented and groaned, How wretched am I! now must I be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum.—How could he have been Socrates, if he had lamented thus? How could he after that have written pæans in a prison?" (Disc. iv. 4. 2.)

"If you light on a crowd, call it one of the public games, a grand assembly, a festival. Endeavour to share in the festival with the rest of the world. For what sight is more pleasant to a lover of mankind, than a number of men."

"Do but remember the general rules: *What is mine? What not mine? What is allotted me?*

*What is the will of God that I should do now? What is not his will?* A little while ago it was His will that you should be at leisure, to talk with yourself, write about these things, read, hear, prepare yourself. You have had sufficient time for this. At present he says to you, "Come now to the combat. Shew what you have learned; how you have wrestled." How long would you exercise by yourself? it is now the time to shew, whether you are of the number of those champions who merit victory, or of those who go about the world conquered in all games round." (Disc. iv. 4. 3.)

"If any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory, or disgrace be set before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off; and that, by once being worsted, and giving way, proficiency is lost, or, on the contrary preserved. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by every thing; attending to nothing but reason. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought however to live, as one desirous of becoming a Socrates." (Enchir. L.)

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In the censure of the Stoic philosophy, before quoted, it is said: "Futile is that philosophy, which, instead of purifying the human heart, has endeavoured to deprive it of all its greatest and most valuable enjoyments,—of LOVE, JOY, SYMPATHY, HOPE, and GRATITUDE." No man's heart can be destitute of the

purest sources of *Love, Joy, and Hope*, which is devotedly submissive to the will of God, thankful for all his benefits, and joyful under all his dispensations, as the preceding passages shew that the philosophy of Epictetus requires him to be. And he that is truly grateful to God, will not be wanting in *gratitude* to man. Nor, can that philosophy be an enemy to *sympathy*, which inculcates the duties of natural, parental, filial, and fraternal affection. A single fragment before quoted might secure it from such a charge. " Nothing is meaner than the love of pleasure, the love of gain, and arrogance ; nothing is nobler than magnanimity, meekness, philanthropy, and benevolence." To this philosophy, chiefly, is our language indebted for the term *philanthropy*. But there is one term φιλαλληλος, and its relative φιλαλληλία, expressive of *mutual* kindness and sympathy, which our language unfortunately will not admit ; and which, if I mistake not, is peculiar to the Greek language and to this philosophy, which shews by its very definitions, that it is no friend to "*the solitude of inaction, and the dreary stillness of death ;*" denominating man, ζῶν ἡμερον και ΦΙΛΑΔΔΗΛΟΝ, and his nature, ἡμερος και ΦΙΛΑΔΔΗΛΟΟΣ ; and ascribing to him, as natural and inherent principles, *mutual* kindness, and the love of social intercourse."

There is a chapter on Friendship in the second book of the *Discourses* (ch. xxii ) which will in a few words shew the true tendency of Epictetus's philosophy. He had before said, " Whenever any one makes his interest to consist in the same thing with Sanctity, Virtue, his Country, Parents, and Friends, all these

are secured : But wherever they are made to interfere, Friends, and Country, and Family, and Justice itself, all give way, borne down by the weight of self-interest :” and he sums up his subject with this conclusion : “ Whosoever among you, studies to be, or to gain a friend, let him cut up all these principles of self-interest by the root ; hate them, drive them utterly out of his soul. Thus, in the first place, he will be secure from inward reproaches, and conflicts ; from change of mind and self-torment. Then, with respect to others ; to every one, like himself, he will be unreservedly friendly ; to such as are unlike, he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as being under some great delusion ; but severe to none, being fully convinced of Plato’s doctrine, “ That the soul is never willingly in error.” Without all this, you may, in many respects, live as friends : and drink and lodge and travel together, and be born of the same parents ; and so may serpents too ; but neither they nor you can ever be friends, while you have those brutal and execrable principles” [of self-interest, avarice, love of pleasure, ambition.]

Again, the tendency of Epictetus’s Philosophy is most truly to “ *produce the beauty of order, and the calm of tranquility,*” by inculcating *temperance* with the *decencies, charities, and public duties* of life, and the exercise of the *passive virtues*. “ Let it be your business to do something like this : Eat, as becomes a man ; drink, as becomes a man ; dress, as becomes a man ; marry, have children, engage in the public duties of the state ; bear reproach, bear with an unreasonable Brother ;



bear with a Father ; bear with a Son, a neighbour, a companion. Shew us these things, that we may see that you have really learnt somewhat from the Philosophers. (Discourses, iii. 21. 1.)

This is, surely, not to *extirpate* the affections, but to *regulate* them, in such a manner, as not only “ becomes a man,” but a Christian. It might be useful to pursue the observation of St. Jerome, and exemplify the *Stoicism of Christianity*, as well as the *Christianity of Stoicism*. It would shew, that, even under the Christian dispensation, there may be great and severe restraint without extirpation of any thing but what is unsound and noxious. When our Saviour said, “ If thine hand offend thee, cut it off ; if thine eye, pluck it out ;” and “ If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother, and wife and children, and brothers and sisters, yea and his own life also, for my name sake, he cannot be my disciple ;” he did not mean to *extirpate* our affections, but to *regulate* them. Epic-tetus’s method of *purifying the mind and extirpating* all evil affections, may be illustrated by the following most Christianlike passage. “ In obedience to God, Hercules went about extirpating injustice and lawless force. But you are not Hercules, able to extirpate the evils of others ; nor even Theseus, to extirpate the evils of Attica. Extirpate your own then. Expel, instead of Procrustes and Seiron, grief, fear, desire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance, (from your mind.) But these can be no otherwise expelled, than by *looking up to God alone* as your pattern (*αποβλεπών προς τον Θεον*) ; by attaching

yourself to him alone, and being consecrated to his commands. If you wish for any thing else, you will, with sighs and groans, follow what is stronger than you; always seeking prosperity [*εὐπορία, tranquillity*] without, and never able to find it. For you seek it where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is." (Disc. ii, 16, 4.) St. Paul recommends the same method. "Let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which does so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, *looking unto Jesus* (*ἀποβλέψας ἡμᾶς τὸν Ἰησοῦν*) the author and finisher of our faith." (Heb. xii. 1, 2.)

Truth gains nothing by depreciating the philosophy of heathen writers, especially of the later Stoics. The nearer we find the morality of heathens approaching to the perfection of Christian doctrine, the stronger proof we obtain of the necessity of a *Redeemer*, to do that for man, which the Law of nature and of Moses could not do for him, (Acts 13, 39,) by making that *atonement* for sin, to which his best works are wholly insufficient.

In proof of the piety, benevolence and patriotism of the Stoic philosophy, I have hitherto confined myself to the writings of one great philosopher, of *private life*, indeed, but no friend to the "inaction of solitude," nor, as we have seen, a stranger to the sympathies, charities, and common duties of humanity.\*

\* Epictetus having passed a great part of his life without any



We will now appeal to two great Stoic authorities of *public life*; one, a minister of state and preceptor to an Emperor; the other an Emperor himself. Seneca was preceptor to Nero, and during the celebrated *quinquennium*, bore an important part in the supreme government of the empire. "I know," says Seneca," that the sect of the Stoics is ill spoken of, by persons not conversant with the Stoic philosophy, as too severe, and giving bad counsel to Princes and Kings; for it is objected to it, that it maintains that a wise man never pities nor forgives. These positions if taken by themselves are odious; for they seem to leave no hope to human error, but to condemn all faults to punishment. But, if this be so, how happens it that this sect, does not, in practice, teach men to divest themselves of all humanity? But [so far is this from being true that] no sect is kinder or gentler, none more humane, or more attentive to the general interests of society. And, by its principles of mutual assistance, it affords the surest refuge against adverse fortune." (De Clem.)

The Emperor Marcus Antoninus, though he had in his youth, preceptors in every branch of learning, devoted himself chiefly to the Stoic philosophy, because he thought the principles of that sect, above all others, conducive to the public interest.\*

inmate in his house, at last took a poor woman to live with him, as a nurse to a child which (one of his friends being about to abandon it on account of his poverty,) he took and maintained at his own expence. (Simplicius Comm. Ad Enchirid. § 46.)

\* Cum hanc sectam reipublicæ præ cæteris inservire melius crederet. (Brucker. Instit. Hist. Phil. p. 360, Ed. 1790.)

The following is the testimony, which he bears to the character of his two Stoic preceptors, and to the moral efficacy of their instructions. "From RUSTICUS I received the first intimation, that the general disposition of my mind needed some correction and cure. He prevented me from entering with warmth into the disputes, or indulging in the vanity of the Sophists; writing upon their speculative points, or perpetually haranguing on moral subjects; or making any ostentatious display of my philosophical austerities, or courtlag applause by my activity and patience under toil and fatigue."—"From his admonitions, I learned to be easily reconciled to those who had injured or offended me, the moment they seemed inclined to return to their duty:"—"It was Rusticus also who made me acquainted with [*quod legerim*, Gataker.] Epictetus's works, which he sent me from his own library."\*

"From Sextus I learnt benevolence towards others; and in him I had a model of paternal family government; from him too, I derived the idea of living according to nature, and with unaffected gravity; and of attention to the interests of my friends; to bear with the ignorance of the multitude and of inconsiderate persons; and to accommodate myself to all men, like Sextus himself, whose behaviour and conversation, while it had a charm above all flattery, was, at the same time respected by every one. From him also I learnt, to form and methodize with brevity and perspicuity maxims of morality; never to betray any symptoms of

\* Graves's Translation of the Meditations of Marcus Antoninus.  
Book. I. § 7.

anger or any other perturbation, but to unite with the greatest apathy the most benevolent affection.”\*

The principles of the Stoic philosophy must be determined by its own definitions, and the usage of its own writers; not by the popular use of its terms in a modern language. *Απαθια*, *apathy*, in its primary sense, meant *freedom from perturbation*; in a secondary sense, *absence of all feeling*. And in this latter sense, it is chiefly, if not solely current in our language. Pope says,

“In *lazy apathy* let Stoics boast.”

The poet was undoubtedly deceived by the popular meaning of the term apathy; an error, which his learned commentator, if he had not been engaged in a defence of the poet, might have corrected. Instead of that, he adopts the popular language in calling a “Stoical apathy, a *lifeless-calm*.”†

In the line which follows the preceding, Pope says,

“Their virtue fixed, was fixed as in a frost.”‡

This was not the apathy of the Stoics. Such unfeeling apathy is expressly condemned by Epictetus in the passages before quoted, p. xxxiv. and by the distinction between the *σοφος απαθης* and the *φαιδρος απαθης*, preserved by Laertius,|| which shews that the apathy, which was cold, and hard, and fixed, (*σκληρὰ καὶ ἀσπικτος*) was not the virtue of a Stoic, even of the ancient Portico. I have indeed had the later Stoics

\* Ibid. §. 9.

† Commentary on Pope's Essay on Man. p. 24, ed. 1753.

‡ Ep. II. verse. 101.

|| De Vitis Phil. L. VII. § 117.

in view, whose Ethics were, without doubt, greatly improved by the light of Christianity then pervading the Roman Empire. But we know from Cicero that the virtue of the ancient Stoics, was not that *unfeeling selfish* apathy, which is commonly imputed to them. Stoicis placet, quæ in terris gignuntur, ad usum hominum omnia creari: homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prædesse possint.\* “It is the opinion of the Stoics that all the productions of the earth were created for the use of men: but that men were formed for the sake of men, that they might be of mutual service to each other.” And so much did their common character differ from that imputed to them and their philosophy by Pope, Warburton, and the excellent person whose remark on the philosophy of the Portico gave occasion to these observations, that the urbanity, which the Emperor admired in his preceptor Sextus, was held by the Stoics (most justly, says Cicero) to be a virtue. Rec-tissime putant [Stoici] urbanitatem esse virtutem.†

As to the later Stoics, the active lives, the public services, and pre-eminent virtues of Athenodorus,‡ Musonius, Thræseas, Helvidius, Seneca, Dio Prusæensis, Euphrates, Epictetus, Arrian, Sextus, and Marcus Antoninus, will be the best panegyrist of the philosophy, which they professed.

\* De Orat. L. III.

† Cicero de Fln. L. 3.

‡ See the Section de Secta Stoica subjoined to the Testimonies.

NOTE TO P. XXXII.

In this scrutiny of a life governed by his own excellent maxims we see the real difference, between the philosophy of Epictetus, and the doctrines of the Gospel. His philosophy had done, all that human wisdom could do. In this scrutiny we find the sum of a practically pious life as governed by the unassisted law of reason. We see the affections regulated, the mind purified, the heart resigned to the will of God and grateful for his blessings; but unconscious of its imperfection, and its utterly lost state without a Redeemer. It seems \* therefore to trust too confidently to its own moral discipline for the attainment of such proficiency in virtue, as should *entitle* it to the approbation and favor of God, to whom the philosopher addresses himself.

The evidence of a virtuous life implied in this scrutiny, and the tenor of the maxims before quoted, shew the tendency of Epictetus's philosophy to *purify* the mind from self-interest, avarice, ambition, arrogance, ostentation, malevolence, &c.—to *animate* it with affection towards our natural and acquired relations, and with the most enlarged and active benevolence; to *tranquillize* it by humility, patience, resignation, and freedom from solicitude about externals;

\* I say it *seems*, because the language of the passage before quoted, in which he directs his scholar to *look up to God* as the *only* effectual means of succeeding in the expulsion of evil affections from the mind, is any thing but the language of self-confidence.

and to inspire it with *gratitude* to Providence, and with the most implicit submission to its dispensations.

The wish, which Epictetus expresses in this scrutiny, that whenever Death should overtake him, he might be found in some such act of moral vigilance as he has here prescribed, is in entire conformity to the rule of the Gospel: "Watch and pray; for ye know not when the time is."—"Watch therefore; for ye know not the day, nor the hour wherein the Son of man cometh."

One of the greatest paradoxes of the *old* Stoics was, that *all crimes are equal*; (I do not find it in Epictetus;) yet this perhaps meant no more than that they are *all* transgressions of right reason; nearly in the spirit of what St. James says: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law" [all the rest of the law] "and yet shall offend in *one* \* point, he is guilty of *all*."

An ample comparison of the doctrines of the Gospel and of Epictetus would afford a most useful illustration of his philosophy, and its best defence.

\* In quo peccatur, id potest aliud alio majus esse, aut minus; ipsum quidem illud peccare, quoquo verteris, unum est.—Peccare certe licet nemini. Quod autem non licet, id hoc uno tenetur, ut arguitur non licere. (Cicero Parad. iii.)

*Testimonies concerning Epictetus, and  
the Stoic philosophy.*

MARCUS ANTONINUS.

Παρα Ρουστικού ὅτι ἐντυχίῃ Ἐπικτητίῳ ἐνομιμασιν: To  
Rusticus I owe, that I have read the commentaries of  
Epictetus. (Meditations, I. 7.)

ORIGENES, *adv. Celsum*, L. VI. p. 275.

Εἰ χρεὶ γὰρ τολμησάντα εἰπῆν, ὀλίγους μὲν ὥρῃσι (ἢ γὰρ ὥρῃσι)  
ἢ περικαλλῆς καὶ ἐπιτετηδευμένη Πλάτωνος καὶ τῶν παρὰ Πλά-  
τωνος φερασάντων λαξί;· πλείους δὲ ἢ τῶν εὐτελειστῶν ἄμα καὶ  
πραγματικῶν; καὶ εὐτοχασμῶς τῶν πολλῶν διδασκάλων καὶ  
παραγάντων. Ἐστὶ γοῦν ἰδίῃ τοι μὲν Πλάτωνι ἢ χρεὶ τῶν δι-  
κουπτῶν εἰ καὶ φιλολογῶν μοῦνον τοι δὲ Ἐπικτήτῳ καὶ ὕπο τῶν τυχῶν  
όντων καὶ ῥοπήν πρὸς τὸ ἀφιλοδοχεῖν ἔχοντων θαυμάζομενοι, πο-  
θοῦμεν τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ βελτιώσεις. To say the  
truth, the elegant and highly polished language of  
Plato and other fine writers, has profited (if it can  
be said to have profited) few: whereas others, who  
have employed an humbler style, but popular and  
intelligible to common readers, have benefited many by  
their doctrine and writings. It is for this reason we  
see Plato in the hands of the learned only; but Epic-  
tetus is admired even by the unlearned, who are  
desirous of improvement; because they feel that they  
are better for his discourses.

ANTHOLOGIA. Brunchii Analect. T. III. p. 272.

Μῆτιν Ἐπικτητίου τῶν ἐνκατὰ θεοῦ θυμῶν,

Ὀφρα καὶ εἰσαφικηαὶ εἰς οὐρανίους κενώνας,

Ψυχὴν ἐψικιλευδὸν ἐλαφρίζων ἀπὸ γαίης.

Treasure the counsels of Epictetus in your mind,  
that you may reach the heavenly regions, elevating  
your soul high above the earth.

**IBID.**

Ὅσων Ἐπικτητοῦ σοφὴν τέλεισιν μεριμένη,  
Μυδιαί, βιοτοῖο γαλήνῳ ἐν πορτῇ  
Καὶ μετὰ ναυτικῇ βιοτήσιν ἰσαφικάνει  
Οὐρανῇ ἀψίδα, καὶ ἀστέρων περιώπην.

Whoever practices the wise counsels of Epictetus,  
smiles, calm amidst the storms of life; and after the  
voyage of this life, enters the vault of heaven, and the  
starry dome.

**PARAPHRASES CHRISTIANÆ ENCHIRIDII.**

The pains, which were taken by Nilus, and others,  
in the fifth Century, to accommodate the Enchiridion  
to the use of Christians, afford an honourable testimo-  
ny to the value, which the Christian Church then put  
upon it, and its usefulness in a course of Christian  
education.

**HENRICI STEPHANI**

*Testimonium de Enchiridio.*

Verum ut rari sunt aures istius libelli lectores; sic  
certe rari sunt, qui melioresse quam doctiores esse ma-  
lint. (PRÆFAT. ad Diogenem Laertium.)



JUSTI LIPSII

*Testimonium de Epicteto.*

Ego senecionem illum numquam lego, nisi cum interno animi motu: et quod Homero proprium, plaris facio, cum relego semper ut novum, et cum repetivi repetendum. (*Manuduct. ad Stoicam. Phil.*)

THOMÆ GATAKERI

*Testimonium de Epicteto.*

Subit me certe subinde (ita ista dum lego, affectum me sentio, et ingenue agnosco,) non stupor duntaxat, sed horror etiam, cum arcani divini admiratione vehementissima cojunctus, serio apud me reputantem, quam longe in multis ab eo absim, quod de se Vir iste, veri ad salutem perducentis tramitis ignarus, de se profitetur,\* nec quin vere et ingenue, ambigi posse videtur. (*Præloquio ad M. Antoninum.*)

EJUSDEM

*Testimonium de Stoica Philosophia.*

Stoicam disciplinam, præ cæteris Philosophorum priscorum Sectis, ad dogma Christianum proxime accessisse, e nostris qui censuerint, non desunt. Et Josephus quidem Judæus, ubi vitæ suæ rationem denarrat, de Pharisæorum, (quam apud suos αἰγιον ἀρετῆς τῆς, fuisse Paulus pronunciat, quamque horum uterque, et Josephus et Paulus, aliquando sectatus fuerat,)

\* Gataker alludes to Epictetus's Discourses I. 16, 3. and III. 5, 1, quoted above p. xxxi. xxxii.

ἡ Φαρισαίων, inquit, αἵρεσις παραπλησίως ἐστὶ τῇ παρ' Ἑλλήσι  
 Στωικῇ λεγομένῃ, *Pharisæorum Secta ei est affinis, quæ  
 Græcis Stoica muncipatur.* Hieronymus vero noster  
 verbis plane disertis; Stoici, inquit, nostro dogmati in  
 plerisque concordant. Et in multis quidem convenire,  
 ambigi non potest, si quis instituti utriusque *περὶ τῶν  
 πρακτικῶν* regulas legesque secum invicem contulerit; in  
 pluribus etiam, opinor, quam Secta alia ulla; quum  
 nulla, credo, comperta sit, quæ pietatis ac virtutis  
 studium exercitiumque aut pluris faciat, aut altius  
 evehat, aut fortius spiret, aut acrius urgeat, aut peni-  
 tius inculcet, aut enixius provehat.

## EJUSDEM

*De consensu Stoicæ Philosophiæ cum Evangelio:*

Denique ut ad illud revertar, quod in pagina limi-  
 nari ex Hieronymo monueram, ad disciplinam nostram  
 quod horum utriusque (Epicteti et M. Antonini) scrip-  
 tis monitisque propius accedat, in exterorum priscorum,  
 quæ hodie extant, monumentis, nihil reperiri, fidenter  
 pronunciari posse existimem. Certe quæcunque Do-  
 minus ipse Christus in concionibus collationibusque suis  
 Historiæ Evangelicæ insertis intextisque, de mali cogi-  
 tatione etiam abstinenda, de affectibus vitiosis suppri-  
 mendis, de sermone otioso non insuper habendo, de  
 animo cumprimis excolendo, et ad imaginem divinam  
 effingendo, de beneficentia simplicissime exhibenda,  
 de injuriis æquanimitè ferendis, de admonitione et  
 increpatione cum moderatione cautioneque accurata  
 exercendis, de rebus quibusbilibet, adeoque viſa ipsa,  
 ubi res ratioque poscit, nihili habendis, de aliis denique

plerisque pietatis, caritatis, æquitatis, humanitatis officiis quam exquisitissime obeundis exequendisque, præcepta dedit; apud nostrum hunc (Antoninum) eadem, perinde ac si illa lectitasset ipse, in dissertationum commentationumque harum congerie inspersa passim, nec sine vehementia et vivacitate insigni, quæ in præcordia ipsa penitus penetret, atque in animo infixos altius relinquat aculeos, inculcata subinde, Lector quivis sedulus adverte, ingenuus agnoscat.

## EJUSDEM SUMMA STOICÆ PHILOSOPHIÆ.

### *De Deo, et erga Deum affectu.*

*Numen isti cæleste rerum humanarum curam gerere; nec universi tantummodo, sed hominum etiam singulorum; et rerum quoque singularum; rebus humanis præsto esse, generique humano, non ad bona vere sic dicta duntaxat, sed et ad vitæ hujus commoda et adminicula suppetias ferre. Deum itaque ante omnia colendum, ad omnia invocandum, per omnia cogitandum, in omnibus agnoscendum, et comprobandum, de omnibus laudandum, et celebrandum; huic uni in omni negotio simpliciter obsequendum, ab ipso, quicquid obvenit, animo prompto ac lubenti excipiendum atque amplexandum; nihil melius, nihil convenientius, nihil conducibilius, nihil opportunius aut tempestivius, quam id quicquid existat; quod ipse voluerit, existimandum; quocunque ducere visum fuerit, citra tergiversationem aut murmurationem, sponte sequendum, locum stationemque, quemcunque is assignaverit,*

*strenue tuendum, enixe tenendum, etiamsi mortem nullius oppetere oporteret.*

Hæc de Numine Stoici, et erga Numen affectu: de *Homine* quid, et officiis adversus congenerem sibi præstandis?

### *De adfectu et officiis erga hominem.*

*Hunc et corditus diligere et curare et sustinere, injuriæque omni (ut quæ impietatis etiam notum inurat) abstinere, et beneficentia prosequi, nec sibi soli genitum censere se, aut vivere, sed in commune bonum ac beneficium cunctis, pro facultate viribusque, semet exhibere; re ipsa, rei que bene gestæ conscientia, (nec hac etiam ipsa quadantenus reputata) citra testem, aut mercedis spem, commodiæ proprii intuitum, contentum agere, a beneficio uno præstito ad aliud transire, nec unquam benefaciendo defatisci; sed vitæ telam, tanquam vivendi fructus hic sit, benefactis sibi invicem continenter annexis ita totam pertexere, ut nusquam interveniat hiatus ullus vel minimus; beneficii loco, quod benefecêrit habentem; sibique profuisse existimantem, si alii cuiquam usui esse potuerit; nec extra se proinde quicquam vel laudis humanæ vel lucci, aut aucupantem aut expectantem. Adhæc nihil mentis cultu antiquius, nihil honesti studio potius aut pretiosius habere; ab eo denique, quod officii sui esse nôrit, nulla vel vitæ, nedum alius rei cujuscumque, cupidine abducendum, nulla mortis, cruciatusve ullius, nedum damni aut detrimenti, formidine abigendum, se permittere.*

# JACOBI BRUCKERI

*Instit. Hist. Phil. Per. II. Sect. VII.*

## DE SECTA STOICA.

### *Florens fortuna Stoicorum.*

§. I. PERDURAVIT, et lætissima incrementa cepit fortuna sectæ Stoicæ, sub imperatoribus Romanis, quam haud paucos procerum et jureconsultorum Romanorum recepisse, in antecedentibus diximus. Nam et imperatorum Stoicis plurimum faventium, maxime Augusti, Athenodorum magni facientis, Neronis Senecæ cura educati, M. Aurelii Antonini habitu Stoico philosophantis auctoritas eam egregie promovit: et jurisperiti ob legum jurisque rationes Stoicas ei constanter adhæserunt. Maxime vero magnifica Stoicorum verba hanc philosophiam valde commendarunt, eo quod plerique speciosis sententiis decepti ad vanitatem et arrogantiam\* Stoici systematis non attenderent. Factum id vero imprimis est, ubi Christianorum libri et apologiæ in aula imperatorum, maxime Neronis et Antonini, innotuissent. Cum enim dogmatum ad mores facientium sanctitas in illis pulchre splenderet, Stoici, et imprimis Seneca atque Antoninus, maximæ auctoritatis viri, haud pauca Christianorum præcepta imitati sunt, ita tamen, ut mutato sensu salva maneret Stoici

\* Hoc hominibus philosophia sua indignis potius objurgandum esse, quam ipsi philosophiæ; et Ethnicis Evangelio carentibus potius condonandum, quam Ethnicæ sapientiæ vitio vertendum, docent, quæ superius dicta sunt a Gatakero, et infra a doctissimis Cudworthio et Cartera.

systematis integritas.\* Ita vero non sancta tantum et præclara præcipere philosophia Stoica inter gentiles visa est, sed inter Christianos quoque; sic ut opus esse viris illis sanctis qui ecclesiæ præfuerunt, visum sit, Stoicæ sectæ invidiam, qua Christianos premebant, in apricum proferre. Plurimum autem gloriæ et auctoritatis Stoicæ sectæ accessit a magnis illis viris atque mulieribus, qui animo excelso, Stoicisque principiis innutrito, pro virtute, et libertate fortiter obierunt, quales fuerunt Cæcina Pætus, Thræseæ et Helvidii uxores, Arria utraque et Fannia. Ita factum, ut per orbem Romanum Stoica secta plurimum invalesceret, aliis sectarum successionibus deficientibus.\*\* Ideo Stoici quoque publico stipendio, velut utiles reipublicæ, docere ab Antonino Pio jussi sunt, et hoc pacto tum Athenis, tum Alexandriæ, et Romæ quoque doctrina Stoica personuit.\*\*\* Quæ, dici satis non potest, quam vehementer acuerit Stoicorum fortuna reliquarum sectarum invidiam, quæ subtiles Stoicorum argutias mire conciderunt, id quod magnis animis a Scepticis potissimum factum est. Cui cum medicinam afferre studeret syncretismus inter Stoicam, Platoniam et Peripateticam sectam initus, remedium morbo ipso deterius, Stoicam tandem sectam ita depressit, ut surgente philosophia eclectica, vix unus et alter inveniat Stoi-  
cus. Omnis itaque ejus sectæ fortuna duo-

\* Vid. Tempe Helvet. T. III. p. 260 seq.

\*\* JUVENAL. Sat. XV. v. 108. seq.

\*\*\* LUCIAN. in Eunuch. T. IV. p. 160. CAPITOL. in Anton. Pius c. 11.

bus post Christum natum seculis concluditur, quibus magnos ea viros habuit paucis jam enarrandos.

### *Athenodorus.*

§. II. Plurimum promovit res Stóicorum, imperante Augusto, Athenodorus Tarsensis, ei enim princeps philosophis addictissimus ob æquitatem, qua mitiora semper imperatori consilia suggerebat, impense favebat, adeo ut et Tarsum ob ejus intercessionem vectigalibus\* levaret, et Claudium in contubernium ei traderet. Neque tamen vel hunc Claudium, vel Tiberium et Caligulam Stoicis fuisse vel philosophiam promovisse legimus: aliter sub initiis imperii Neronis, Seneca et Burrho summam rerum administrantibus, evenit. Eo tempore Cornutus Afer magna Stoicæ doctrinæ, et humanitatis quoque disciplinarum glória floruit. Quam philosophiam Romæ professus, magna felicitate juventuti ad sapientiæ studium prævit, cujus exemplum sunt Lucanus atque Persius, qui præceptorem quoque magnis laudibus extollit, quod in contubernium receptum ad virtutem Stoicam effinxisset. Specimen doctrinæ ejus hodie extat, libellus de natura Deorum. Oris libertate cum Neronem insignem eruditionem affectantem offendisset, in exilium ejectus est\*\*.

\* Vid. ZOSIMUS l. I. c. 6. LUCIAN, in Macrob. T. II. p. m. 829.

\*\* SÜETON. vit. Persii. SUIDAS in Cornutus, T. II. p. 350. PERSIUS sat. V. Opusc. mythol. p. 139. sqq. DIO. l. LXII. p. 715.

*Musonius.*

§. III. Stoicam tunc quoque philosophiam ad rempublicam attulit Caius Musonius Rufus, cum Musonio Cynico non confundendus. Equestri ordine natus publicis munitionibus præfectus est, bonarum vero artium studiis, et imprimis philosophiæ Stoicæ vehementer se dedit, aliosque ad Stoicæ virtutis constantiam adduxit; magno enim animo Stoica præcepta Romæ inter juvenes, cives, militesque disseminavit. Quod cum apud Neronem quoque facere tentasset, prope occisus, et ad Gyaras in exilium abire jussus est. Ravocatus a Vespasiano pristinam virtutem excoluit, tanta cum gratia, ut philosophis urbe et Italia ejectis ille solus manserit.\* Præclaræ ei sententiæ tribuuntur, quibus vita, non ore, philosophandum et ad actionem referenda esse omnia, exemplo suo præcepta confirmans, censuit.\*\*

*Chæremon.*

§. IV. Eadem tulerunt tempora Chæremonem, Ægyptium, domestica quidem eruditione clarum, sed Stoica quoque philosophia Alexandriæ egregie imbutum. Fuit is ex præceptoribus Neronis, cum prius bibliothecæ Alexandrinæ præfectus fuisset, annis vero gravis mature obiit.†

\* Vid. TACITUS Ann. l. XIV. c. 60. Hist. l. III. c. 81. l. VI. c. 10. SUIDAS in Muson. T. II. p. 579.

\*\* STOBÆUS Sent. CXVII. p. 368. seq.

† Vid. EUSEB. præp. l. XI. c. 57. l. V. c. 10. SUIDAS in Alex. Ageus T. I. p. 105, et in Dionys. Alex. T. I. p. 598.



*Seneca.*

§. V. Nemo tamen tanto fulgore inter hujus ætatis Stoicos splenduit, quam Lucius Annæus Seneca, cujus historia hoc loco enarrari tota non potest. In Hispania illustribus parentibus ortus, licet tenerrimo corpusculo, adolescens tamen in pulcherrimarum scientiarum studiis, maxime eloquentia, educatus est. Cum autem magno animi impetu ad philosophiam ferretur, Eotionem Pythagoreum severissimæ disciplinæ virum præceptorem nactus, per omnium sectarum libros diligenter volutatus est, illisque non ut transfuga, sed ut explorator accessit, haud pauca quoque, quæ præclare dici intellexerat, in horrea sua digessit, sectæ tamen studio Stoicis adhæsit, ob virtutis constantiam ipsi commendatissimis, eorumque systema physiologicum et morale, adjectis ex aliorum penu, quæ placuerant, secutus est: ex quo de philosophia Senecæ judicandum est. Ita eruditione clarissimus ad honores rei publicæ promotus, Messalinæ invidia autem, cum Julia adulterii accusatus in insulam Corsicam relegatus est, in qua Stoica tranquillitate se vixisse jactavit; indignis tamen philosopho modis libertatem flagitavit, quam Agrippinæ tandem precibus obtinuit, quæ ob claritatem studiorum eum Domitio Neroni, filio suo, præceptorem delegerat, favente et plaudente populo. Principi regendo cum Burrho præfectus ingenium anceps, animumque lubricum magna prudentia rexit, adeo, ut quamdiu is operi manum adjecisset, Nero a recto tramite non deflecteret. Ita summis rerum gubernaculis admoto, nec honores defuere, nec opes,

quas maximas, et privato homine superiores corraserat, id quod obtrectandi occasionem suppeditavit ejus adversariis, ipsumque Neronis animum adeo ab eo alienavit, ut fraudibus a callido principe circumventus, mori ab eo juberetur, quod incisis quoque venis magno Stoicæ constantiæ animo demonstrato factum est. Vir vere magnus, quanquam supra hominis naturam esse virtutem Stoicam, ipse suo exemplo docuit. Vixit in insigni rerum omnium abundantia tenuiter et temperanter, sine unguentis et vino, et balneis, simplici haud raro et agresti victu contentus,† cultor hortorum sua manu; ingenio autem ornatus elegantissimo, et artibus liberalibus præclarissime comto, lectione immensa, doctrina excellentissima, facundia singulari et acuta, licet dulcibus quoque dicendi vitiis infecta, quæ et olim et recentiori ætate dicendi rationem ejus valde fecit jucundam juvenibus. Ast corrumpere tamen tum eloquentiam imaginationis lascivientis luxuria, et castigata dicendi ratione deficiens atque enervis, tum philosophiam, systematis Stoici vitia, tum vitam aulicæ mores et contaminati temporis circumstantiæ.

### *Dio Prusænsis.*

§. VI. Vixit quoque Neronis ætate inter celeberrimos Stoicos Dio Prusænsis, ab eloquentia Chrysostomus appellatus; inter oratores enim præclarissimum

\* Vid. IUSTI LIPSII et ANDR. SCHOTTI vita Senecæ, TACITUS ann. l. XV. 45, 56, 62, seqq. tum ipsa scripta SENECÆ.

† Epp. 108.

nomen nactus, et sophistæ munere sub Nerone et Vespasiano functus est, philosophis et sophistis ipsis reprehendendo gravis. Quod cum haud levem ei invdiam creasset, in Ægyptum abiit, abjectaque professione sophistica, ad dicendi genus civile et philosophicum conversus, Stoicæ philosophiæ adhæsit, ejusque præcepta ad formandos mores ita adhibuit, ut dulcissimam eloquentiam Stoicis sententiis ornaret, factus ob eam rem charus philosophis severiorem disciplinam urgentibus. Ipse, ut vita doctrinam exprimeret, Cynicam severitatem imitatus, vitia acerrime insectatus est, nec Domitiano quidem pepercit; non sine vitæ tamen periculo: quod vero fuga declinavit, Romani imperii fines excedendo et ad Getas confugiendo, ubi vitam exilio dignam agere coactus est. Tum ad Romanum exercitum conversus, Domitiano interfecto milites compescuit. Revocatus a Nerva Cocceio, tanta gratia floruit, ut Cocceianus ideo diceretur. Fuit animo magno, judicio firmo, eloquentia viva et dulci, oratione plena imaginibus, et sententiis optimis referta, cujus hodie præclara extant specimina.\*

### *Euphrates.*

§. VII. Amicitiam cum Dione coluit Euphrates Alexandrinus, Apollonio Tyaneo primo carissimus, at magna postea æmulatione infensus. Ab eo Vespasiano traditum, cum Apollonii auctoritatem ferre non posset,

\* Vid. PHILOSTR. de vit. Sophist. l. I. c. 7. p. 487. SYNES. opp. p. 35. PHOT. Cod. CCIX. p. 272. SUIDAS in Dio T. I. p. 607. ipsæque DIONIS orationes hodie superstites.

calumniis eum deprimere voluisse Philostratus ait, at fide exigua. Aliorum enim, ex veteribus, testimonio philosophorum suæ ætatis clarissimus atque optimus habebatur, laudavitque impense ejus eruditionem, acumen, eloquentiam, et virtutis vitæque sanctitatem atque comitatem, qui in ejus disciplina fuit Plinius junior. Severissimam autem philosophiæ rationem a se ipso incepisse, testis Epictetus est. Veniam voluntariæ mortis senecta attritus ab Hadriano petiit, et cicuta sumta Stoice obiit.\*

### *Epictetus.*

§. VIII. Insigni porro celebritate nominis porticum ornavit Epictetus, Phryx, adeo nativitate et conditione pauper, ut in servilem conditionem dejiceretur, animi vero divitiis abundantissimus; claudus, vel domini sui sævitia, vel corporis morbo. Manumissus ab hero propter philosophiam, non habuit Romæ, qui pauperius viveret. Ingenium nactus acre et imprimis in judicandis hominum moribus acutissimum, præceptore Rufo, cujus in corripiendo libertas et felicitas celebrata erat, grave illud dicendi genus assecutus est, quod auditores, quocunque vellet, permoveret, et quamvis nihil arti daret, sed admirabili simplicitate et naturali gravitate cuncta exponeret, altissime tamen penetraret in animos. Addidit exhortationibus vim et

\* Vid. PHILOSTR. vit. Apollon. l. V. c. 28, 33. l. VI. c. 7. l. VIII. c. 3. ep. Apoll. l. II. III. V. VI. VII. p. 385. EUSEB. adu. Hierocl. c. 33. p. 456. PLIN. l. I. ep. 10. ARRIAN. dila. Epict. l. VI. c. 8. p. m. 427. sqq.

auctoritatem-vitæ integritas tanta, quanta ab homine naturæ viribus tantum instructo postulari potest; animus rectus, magnus, nobilis, vanitatis humanæ contemptor, et infracto adversus omnia pectore munitus, qui eum quoque Cynismo faventem reddidit. A Domitiano cum aliis philosophis Roma ejectus Nicopolin, non velut in exilium, sed velut in patriam secessit, et juvenes senesque ad felicitatem ex mentis emendatione capiendam dissertationibus Stoicis maxima vi et efficaciacia hortatus est. Utrum Romam reversus sit, incertum est; certum autem, apud Hadrianum gratia valuisse: cujus tamen cum Epicteto altercatio, suppositum monumentum est. Vixisse quoque ad Antoninorum ætatem, falsum. Habuit discipulos plurimos, et inter hos Junium Rusticum, Favorinum et Arrianum, qui ejus dissertationes in literas retulit, et doctrinæ Epictetæ enchiridion confecit, nobile Stoicæ ethicæ compendium; cujus summa hæc statui potest: sustine et abstine.\*

### *Sextus.*

§ IX. Post hunc Sextus Chæronensis memorandus est inter Stoicos; cujus in hac philosophia præstantia ex discipulo purpurato, M. Aurelio Antonino potest colligi. Quem et reeto judicio et egregia voluntate Aurelium philosophari docuisse, ipse imperator luculentus testis est, qui tanti eum fecit, ut jam Cæsar designatus philosophiæ causa ad ædes ejus accederet, et

\* Vid. ARRIAN in præf. SPARTIAN. in Hadr. c. 16. GELLIUS I. XVII. c. 19. I. XV. c. 11. I. I. c. 2.

imperium nactus Sextum frequentaret, eumque jus dicens, secum haberet. Leguntur hodie dissertationes ejus Antiscepticæ, quibus a Sexto Empirico distinguitur.\*

### *M. Aurelius Antoninus.*

§. X. Summum tandem honoris fastigium consecuta est philosophia Stoica, cum se illi Marcus Aurelius Antoninus imperator tradidisset. De cujus vita et rebus gestis in imperatorum Romanorum historia tradendum est; paucos enim virtute, prudentia, doctrina, pacisque et belli artibus æquales habuit. Patre matre erepto, ab avo Vero puer adhuc ab optimis, qui undique conducebantur, præceptoribus ita educatus est, ut virilem virtutem adolescens adhuc referret. Nam præter scientias encyclicas, et imprimis Romanam eloquentiam, a Corneliô Frontone, maximo oratore, traditam, ad philosophiam traductus, Stoicæ potissimum sectæ se dedit, cum hanc reipublicæ, præ reliquis inservire melius, crederet. Puer itaque adhuc pro stratis grabatulum ac pellem expetiit, ceteraque institutionis Græcanicæ adminicula; ætate paulo provecior Sextum Chæroneum, Junium Rusticum, Claudium Maximum, Cinnam Catulum Stoicæ disciplinæ magistros habuit, quorum characteres ipse nobis depictos reliquit. Stoicæ quoque philosophiæ præcepta ad jurisprudentiam transferre eum docuit Lucius Volusianus Mœcianus Jureconsultus. Aliarum tamen sectarum

\* Vid. ANTONIN. de se ipso l. I. §. 9. PHILOSTR. vit. Sophist. l. II. c. l. §. 9. p. 557. SUIDAS in Sextus T. III. p. 297.

explorare sententiam, earumque audire philosophos, maxime Peripateticos et Platonicos non neglexit, et exercitationes corporis ad firmitatem addidit. Ita instructus, cum duodecimum ætatis annum attigisset, Stoici philosophi habitum sumpsit, et pallium induens humi cubuit, ad id omnes animi vires referens, ut virtutis actionem vita exprimeret, animumque philosophiæ præceptis emendaret. His vero naturæ et disciplinæ muneribus cum effulgeret, Hadriano fuit commendatissimus, qui adolescentem adhuc ad honores evexit: et Antoninum Pium ea lege adoptavit, ut is M. Aurelium sibi successorem deligeret: qua via Aurelius tandem ad imperii fastigium pervenit, licet adoptionem istam ob philosophiæ amorem tristis exciperet. Mores autem honoribus istis mutari passus haud est, sed regiminis curis admotus ab Antonino Pio, literarum et philosophiæ studia cupidissime frequentavit, Antonino calcar voce et exemplo addente. Quo defuncto, cum solus regnare posset, philosophiæ munitus præsidio Lucium Verum in societatem imperii adscivit; et lubricos ejus atque incertos mores magna patientia pertulit, ita autem reipublicæ adfuit, ut philosophiæ in imperio exercendæ eum se tradidisse, ex æquitate et lenitate cives intelligerent, Christianis ejusdem specimina expertis. Et hujus quidem philosophiæ usus in imperio ejus demonstrati exempla plurima extant, hoc loco non enarranda, quamvis fatali contra Christianos decreto memoriam suam contaminaverit, eo quod pertinaci superstitione eos teneri crederet. Maxime vero laudandum, quod ad populi mores emendandos, vitæque exemplo excitandos animum ad-

jecerit, philosophos veros amaverit, et promoverit, fucos et pallium atque barbam ostentantes ejecerit, otium ad meditationes philosophicas et sui emendationem adhibuerit, sive domi sive militiæ versaretur, quales observationes sibi enatas, cum in literas retulisset, egregius inde ejus commentarius, de se ipso, enatus est, nobile philosophiæ Stoicæ monumentum, hodie superstes. Adeo vero Stoicum robur et constantiam expressit, ut vultum nunquam mutaret mœrore vel gaudio, nec hostium victoria efferretur, in itineribus autem ubique ad emendationem morum, eruditionis incrementa, doctorumque præmia respiceret; academiis publicos doctores præficeret, et salaria constitueret. Animam tandem, ad Stoicam virtutem compositus efflavit Viennæ Austriæ, Commodi filii insidiis, uti versimile, enecatus.\* In quo viro naturalis animi severitas, insita tamen benevolentia quadam temperata, ita a Stoica disciplina formata est, juvantibus eam et præceptoribus optimis et exemplis efficacissimis, ut hanc potissimum laudem referret, fecisse ex civibus malis bonos, ex bonis optimos. Id quod tamen de virtute Stoica, non Christiana intelligendum est, quamvis nec illa obtrectatoribus caruerit. Philosophi vero et vultum et habitum ita effinxit, ut philosophi appellatio in convitium illi tribueretur; objicerentque adversarii, quod populum ad philosophiam cogere voluerit. Quæ qualis ei fuerit, ex commentariis de se ipso discendum.

\* Scriptores historiæ Romanæ Xiphilinus, Herodianus, Victor uterque, Eutropius, Zonaras, et imprimis CAPITOLINUS in Ant. ANTONINUS de se ipso l. I. DACIERII vita A. Antonini.



est.† Et in hoc quidem maximo viro Stoicæ sectæ  
vigor emarcuit.

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## CUDWORTH'S INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM,

B. I. ch. 4, p. 430. Second Edition.

THE Philosophy of the later Stoics, in order to “regulate the passions and affections of man,” recommends, as we have seen, the most effectual means of “purifying the human heart,” by submission to God’s Providence, and looking up to him, and *his only*, for assistance in the trials and temptations of life, in the spirit, and almost in the language of St. Peter, “casting all your care upon him, for he careth for you.”

To shew the great utility of their writings from their tendency to promote a habit of piety, and devout submission to Providence, and thankfulness to God for all things, I will close this defence of the later Stoics, with the testimony of Cudworth and Mrs. Carter.

“That the Stoics” (says Cudworth) “did religiously worship and honour the supreme God above

† Vid **BUDDÆI** introd. ad philos. Stoicam ex mente M. A. Antonini.

## lxix

all their other gods, may appear,—from their acknowledging God to be the supreme Governor of the whole world, and the Orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their professing to submit their wills to his will in every thing. Epictetus somewhere (B. III. ch. 5.) thus bespeaks God:—(See before p. xxxii.) He likewise exhorts others after this manner: “Dare to lift up thine eyes to God, and say, “Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest. I “agree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things. I refuse nothing, that shall “seem good to thee. Lead me, whither thou pleasest. “Let me act what part thou wilt, either of a public “or private person, of a rich man or a beggar. I “will apologize for thee as to all things before men.” [*And justify the ways of God to man*, says Milton, perhaps from this passage.]

“The same is likewise manifest from their pretensions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and assistance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus also Epictetus: “My design is “this, to render you free and undisturbed, always “looking at God, [*εις τον θεον αφορωντας*] as well in every “small, as greater matter.” Again the same Stoic concludes, “A man will never be able otherwise to “expel grief, fear, desire, envy, &c. than by looking “to God alone, [*προς μονον τον θεον αποβλεποντα*] and “being devoted to him, and the observance of his “commandments.”

“This may be concluded also from their thanking the one supreme God for all, as the Author of all

good, and delightfully celebrating his praises. Epic-  
tetus declares it to be the duty of a good man, *χαρῶν  
εἶναι ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶ θεῷ*, "to thank God for all things."

"Lastly the same is evident from their invoking the  
supreme God, as such, addressing their devotions to  
him alone, without the conjunction of any other gods;  
and particularly imploring his assistance against the  
assaults and temptations, called by them phansies,  
[φαντασίας.] To this purpose is that of Epictetus:  
"This is a great conflict or contention; a divine en-  
terprize; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now  
"remember the supreme God; [τοῦ θεοῦ μνησθε] · call  
"upon him, as thy Helper and Assistant."

"But because many are so extremely unwilling to  
believe, that the Pagans ever made any devotional ad-  
dress to the supreme God, as such, we shall here set  
down an excellent and devout hymn of Cleanthes to  
Him; the rather, because it hath been but little taken  
notice of.

*Κυδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυνυμμε, παγκρατεῖς αἰεὶ, &c."*

Cudworth has given, with the Greek text, Duport's  
Latin translation of it. Instead of the Latin, I sub-  
join Mr. Sumner's English translation from his very  
valuable *Treatise on the Records of Creation*, Vol. I.  
p. 174, Second Ed.

"Nothing," says Mr. Sumner, "among the hea-  
then devotional pieces, is equal in consistent grandeur  
of ideas to the hymn ascribed to Cleanthes the Stoic,  
which candour requires me to cite at large.

"Hail, O Jupiter, most glorious of the immortals,

“invoked under many names, always most powerful,  
 “the first Ruler of nature, whose law governs all  
 “things; hail, for to address thee is permitted to  
 “all mortals. For our race we have from thee; we  
 “mortals, who creep upon the ground, receiving only  
 “the echo of thy voice. Wherefore I will celebrate  
 “thee, and will always sing thy power. All this  
 “universe rolling round the earth, obeys thee wher-  
 “ever thou guidest, and willingly is governed by  
 “thee. So vehement, so fiery, so immortal is the  
 “thunder, which thou holdest subservient in thy un-  
 “shaken hands: for, by the stroke of this, all nature  
 “was rooted, by this thou directest the common rea-  
 “son, which pervades all things, mixed with the great-  
 “er and lesser luminaries; so great a king art thou,  
 “supreme through all, nor does any work take place  
 “without thee on the earth, nor in the ethereal sky, nor  
 “in the sea, except what the bad perform in their own  
 “folly.—But do thou, O Júpiter, giver of all bles-  
 “sings, dwelling in the clouds, Ruler of the thunder,  
 “defend mortals from dismal misfortune; which dis-  
 “pel, O Father, from the soul, and grant it to attain  
 “that judgment, trusting to which thou governest all  
 “things with justice; that, being honoured, we may  
 “repay thee with honour, singing continually thy  
 “works, as becomes a mortal, since there is no great-  
 “er need to men or gods, than always to celebrate  
 “justly the universal law.”\*

\* Cleanthes was the successor of Zeno, and the master of Chrysippus.

## CLEANTHIS HYMNUS.

Κυδὶς' ἀθανάτων, πολυνυνμε, παγκράτες αἰεὶ,  
Ζεῦ, Φυσεὺς ἀρχηγέ, νόμος μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν,  
Χαίρε. Σε γὰρ πάντεσσι θεμὶς θνητοῖσι προσαυδαν'  
Ἐκ σου γὰρ γένος ἐσμεν, ἱὲς μιμημα λαχόντες  
Μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζῶει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνητ' ἐπὶ γαίαν.  
Τῷ σε καθυμνήσω, καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν αἰσῶ.  
Σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὁδε κόσμος ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαίαν  
Πεῖθεται, ἥ κεν ἀγῆς, καὶ ἔκων ὑπὸ σείῳ κρατεῖται.  
Τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνίκητοισι ἐνὶ χερσίν  
Ἀμφίηκῃ, πυροεντὰ, αἰῶζοντα κεραυνόν·  
Τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῆς Φυσεὺς πάντ' ἐρριγασίν,  
Ὡς συ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων  
Φοῖτα, μίγνυμενος μεγαλοῖς μικροῖς τε Φαεσσίν.  
Ὡς τοσσὸς γεγάως ὑπάτος βασιλεὺς διὰ πάντος·  
Οὐδὲ τι γίγνεται ἐργὸν ἐπὶ χθονὶ σὲ δίχα, δαίμον,  
Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ' ἐπὶ ποντῷ,  
Πλήν ὅποσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετερησὶν ἀνοίαις.

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Ἀλλὰ, Ζεῦ πανδῶρε, κελαινεφές, ἀρχικεραυνέ,  
Ἀνθρώπους ῥυοῖο ἀπειροσύνης ἀπο λυγρῆς,  
Ἦν συ, πατέρ, σκεδασὸν ψυχῆς ἀπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι  
Γνώμης, ἥ πίσυνος συ δίκης μετὰ πάντα κυβερνάς·  
Οφρ' ἀν τιμῆθεντες ἀμειβόμεσθα σὲ τιμῇ,  
Ἵμνούντες τὰ σὰ ἐργὰ διηνεκές, ὥς ἐπεοικε  
Θνητὸν εἶν· ἔπει οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο-τι μείζον,  
Οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν αἰὲ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὕμνειν.

*Mrs. Carter's Introduction to her Translation  
of Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus, p. xxv.  
xxxiii. xli.*

“THE Stoics are frequently and justly charged with great arrogance in their discourses, and even in their addresses to God. They assert however the doctrine of Grace, and the duty of Praise and Thanksgiving for the divine assistance in moral improvements.”

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“Even now their compositions may be read with great advantage, as containing excellent rules of self-government and of social behaviour; of a noble reliance on the aid and protection of Heaven, and of a perfect resignation to the Divine will: points which are treated with great clearness, and with admirable spirit in the lessons of the Stoics; and though their directions are seldom practicable on their principles, in trying cases, may be rendered highly useful in subordination to Christian reflections.” (p. xxxiii.)

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“Under all these disadvantages, this immethodical collection [of the Discourses of Epictetus] is perhaps one of the most valuable remains of antiquity; and they who consult it with any degree of attention, can

scarcely fail of receiving improvement. Indeed it is hardly possible to be inattentive to so awakening a speaker, as Epictetus. There is such a warmth and spirit in his exhortations; and his good sense is enlivened by such a keenness of wit, and gaiety of humour, as render the study of him, a most delightful as well as profitable entertainment." (p. xli.)

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Hoc loco demum adjicere liceat verba viri σοφιστάτω doctissimique, JOHANNIS MAPLETOFT, S.T.P. quæ in vacua libelli sui aureoli,\* ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ, pagina exemplaris, quod penes me est, manu sua scripsit. " Utile est, ut qui Imperio, Natalibus, Honoribus, Titulisve, vel etiam opibus, supra communem sortem efferuntur, post Sacros codices, sapientiæ insuper Ethnicæ coryphæis operam dent. Mortui enim ea libere edocebunt, quæ tum ad falsas de rebus caducis opiniones (e quibus orinatur omnia vitæ mala) evellendas, tum ad animi et morum emendationem apte conducant; et quæ certe nemo hodie viventium, monitores ægre ferentibus, facile, vel æque fideliter, indicaverit."

\* Editi anno 1717, et dignissimi sane, qui iterum edatur. Titulus est, Κυριαί Δόξαι, καὶ Ὑποθηκαὶ βιωφελίσταται, &c. Sive Placita Principalia, et Consilia ad bene beateque vivendum utilissima. E Veterum Philosophorum, et Dramaticorum fere Poetarum scriptis. Delegit ediditque Johannes Mapletoft, S.T.P. in gratiam Juventutis Christianæ. Londini 1717.

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## SELECTIONS

FROM

*Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus.*

Sunt verba et voces, quibus hunc lenire dolorem  
Possis, et magnam morbi deponere partem.

HORAT.

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CICERO Parad. Proœm.

Cato autem perfectus (mea sententia) Stoicus—  
duntaxat de magnitudine animi, de continentia, de  
morte, de omni laude virtutis, de diis immortalibus,  
de caritate patriæ, Stoice solet dicere.

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# THE LIFE

OF

## EPICETUS.\*

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EPICETUS, an illustrious philosopher of the Stoics, flourished in the first century of the Christian æra. He was born at Hierapolis in Phrygia, and was sold as a slave to Epaphroditus, one of Nero's domestics. He was lame, which has been variously accounted for. Suidas says, that he lost one of his legs when he was young, in consequence of a defluxion; Amplicius asserts that he was born lame; Plinius relates, that when his master, in order to torture him, bended his leg, Epicetetus without discovering any signs of pain, said to him, "You will break it:" and when his tormentor had broken the leg, he only said, "Did I not tell you, you would break it?" Others ascribe his lameness to the heavy chains, with which his master loaded him. Having

\* From Chalmers's Biographical Dictionary.

at length, by some means obtained his freedom, he retired to a small hut within the city of Rome, where, with the bare necessities of life, he devoted himself to the study of philosophy, and passed his days entirely alone, till his humanity led him to take the charge of a child, whom a friend of his had through poverty exposed, and to provide it with a nurse. Having furnished himself, by diligent study, with the principles of the Stoic philosophy, and been instructed in rhetoric by Rufus, who was himself a bold and successful corrector of public manners, Epictetus, notwithstanding his poverty, became a popular moral preceptor, for which he was admirably qualified, being an acute and judicious observer of manners. His eloquence was simple, majestic, nervous, and penetrating; and while his doctrine inculcated the purest morals, his life was an admirable pattern of sobriety, magnanimity, and the most rigid virtue.

Neither his humble station, nor his

singular merit, could however screen Epictetus from the tyranny of the monster Domitian. With the rest of the philosophers he was banished, under a mock decree of the senate, from Italy, which he bore with a degree of firmness worthy of a philosopher, who called himself a citizen of the world, and could boast that, wherever he went, he carried his best treasures along with him. At Nicopolis, the place, which he chose for his residence, he prosecuted his design of correcting vice and folly by the precepts of philosophy. Wherever he could obtain an auditory, he discoursed concerning the true way of attaining contentment and happiness; and the wisdom and eloquence of his discourses were so highly admired, that it became a common practice among the most studious of his hearers to commit them to writing. It is probable from the respect which Adrian entertained for him that he returned to Rome after the death of Domitian; and the "Conference between Adrian and Epictetus," if

the work were authentic, would confirm this probability; but it is impossible to compare it with his genuine remains without pronouncing it spurious.

Epictetus flourished from the time of Nero to the latter end of the reign of Adrian, but not so far as the time of the Antonines: for Aulus Gellius, who wrote in their time, speaks of Epictetus as lately dead; and the emperor Marcus Aurelius mentions him only to lament his loss. The memory of Epictetus was so highly respected, that, according to Lucian, the earthen lamp by which he used to study, was sold for three thousand drachmas. Epictetus himself wrote nothing. His "Dissertations" collected by Arrian,\* were drawn up from notes, which his disciples took from his lips. Simplicius has left a

\* Arrian, a celebrated historian and philosopher, lived under the emperor Adrian, and the two Antonines, in the second century. He was born at Nicomedia in Bithynia, was styled the second Xenophon, and raised to the most considerable dignities of Rome. (Chalmers's *Life of Arrian*.)

commentary upon his doctrine, in the eclectic manner. There are also various fragments of the wisdom of Epictetus preserved by Antoninus, Gellius, Stobæus, and others. Although the doctrine of Epictetus is less extravagant than that of any other Stoic, his writings everywhere breathe the true spirit of Stoicism. The tenet of the immortality of the soul was adopted and maintained by him with a degree of consistency, suited to a more rational system than that of the Stoics, who inculcated a renovation of being in the circuit of events according to the inevitable order of fate; and his exhortations to contentment and submission to Providence are enforced on much sounder principles than those of the Stoics. He also strenuously opposed the opinion held by the Stoics in general concerning the lawfulness of suicide; and his whole system of practical virtues approaches nearer than that of any other instructor unenlightened by revelation, to the purity of Christian morality. If there were

Christians in Nero's household, which seems certain, it is not improbable he might have been taught some of their principles. There are various editions of the remains of this philosopher, published at Leyden in 1670, in 8vo. cum notis variorum; at Utrecht in 1711, 4to. at Oxford in 1740, in 8vo. by Joseph Simpson, together with the Table of Cebes, &c. at London in 1742, by J. Upton, in 2 vols. 4to. a very excellent edition. The Enchiridion was published by C. G. Heyne in 1776, in 8vo. and together with Cebes's Table, by Schweigheuser, in 1798, [6 vols.]\* 8vo, by far the best edition ever published. These [the Enchiridion and Discourses] have been translated into various languages; but the most esteemed version in our country is that by Mrs. Carter, published in 1758, with notes.

\* Schweigheuser's edition of the Enchiridion is in one volume 8vo. the whole works, including the Discourses and Enchiridion, in six. *Tribus voluminibus*, he says in the Preface to the Enchiridion; but they are commonly divided into four or six.

## SELECTIONS

### LOGICAL AND ETHICAL.

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#### I.\*

*What the Beginning of Philosophy is.*

**T**HE beginning of Philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper way, and by the door, is a consciousness of our own weakness and inability in necessary things. For we came into the world without any natural idea of a right angled triangle; of a *diesis* or a *hemitone* in music: but we learn each of these things by some instruction of art. Hence, they who do not understand them, do not form any conceit of understanding them. But who ever came into the world without an innate idea of good and evil, fair and base, becoming and unbecoming, happiness and misery, proper and

\* Mrs. Carter's *Epictetus*, Book II. ch. 11.



improper, what ought to be done and what not to be done? Hence we all make use of the names, and endeavour to apply our pre-conceptions to particular cases. "Such a one hath acted well; not well: right; not right: is unhappy; is happy: is just; is unjust." Who of us refrains from these names? Who defers the use of them till he had learnt it, as those do, who are ignorant of lines and sounds? The reason of this is, that we\* come instructed, in some degree by nature upon these subjects; and from this beginning we go on to add Self-conceit. "For why, say you, should not I know what fair and base is? have not I the idea of it?" You have. "Do not I apply this idea to particulars?" You do. "Do not I apply it right then?" Here lies the whole question, and here arises Self-conceit. For, beginning from these acknowledged points, men proceed to what is in dispute, by means of their unsuita-

\* For *τινα*; in the Greek, the sense seems to require *ἡμεις*.

ble application. For, if they possess a right method of application, what would restrain them from being perfect? Now since you think, that you make a suitable application of your pre-conceptions to particular cases, tell me, whence you derive this.

From its seeming so to me.

But doth it not seem so to another: and doth not he too form a conceit, that he makes a right application?

He doth.

Is it possible, then, that each of you should apply your pre-conceptions right, on the very subjects about which you have contradictory opinions?

It is not.

Have you any thing to show us, then, for this application, preferable to its *seeming* so to you? And doth a mad-man act any otherwise than seems to

him right? Is this then a sufficient criterion to him too?

It is not.

Come, therefore, to something preferable to what *seems*.

What is that?

§. 2. The beginning of philosophy is this: the being sensible of the disagreement of men with each other: an inquiry into the cause of this disagreement: and a disapprobation and distrust of what merely *seems*: a certain examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly: and an invention of some rule, like a balance for the determination of weights; like a square for strait and crooked.

Is this the beginning of philosophy, that all things which seem right to all persons, are so?

Why; is it possible, that contradictions can be right?

Well then, not all things; but all that seem so to *us*.

And why more to you, than to the Syrians or Egyptians? than to me or to any other man?

Not at all more.

§. 3. Therefore [merely] what seems to each man is not sufficient to determine the reality of a thing. For even in weights and measures we are not satisfied with the bare appearance, but for every thing we find some rule. And is there, in the present case, then, no rule preferable to what *seems*? Is it possible that what is of the greatest necessity in human life should be left incapable of determination and discovery?

There is, then, some rule.

And why do we not seek and discover it? and, when we have discovered, make use of it, without fail, ever after, so as not even to move a finger without it? For

this is what, when found, will cure those of their madness, who make use of no other measure, but their own perverted way of thinking, that afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate points, we may make use of preconceptions, properly applied to particulars. What is the subject that falls under our inquiry?

Pleasure.

Bring it to the rule. Throw it into the scale. Must good be something in which it is fit to confide? and to which we may trust?

Yes.

Is it fit to trust to any thing unsteady?

No.

Is pleasure then a steady thing?

No.

Take it then, and throw it out of the

scale, and drive it far distant from the place of good things. But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by good?

Yes.

Is it fit then, to be elated by a present pleasure?

See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a scale. Thus are things judged and weighed, when we have the rules ready. This is the part of philosophy, to examine and fix the rules: and to make use of them, when they are known, is the business of a wise and good man.

## II.\*

### *That the Art of Reasoning is necessary*

§. 1. SINCE it is Reason, which sets in order and finishes all other things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder. But by what shall it be set in order?

Evidently, either by itself, or by something else.

Well: either that too is Reason, or there is something else superior to reason (which is impossible): and, if it be reason, what again shall set it in order? For if Reason can set itself in order in one case, it can in another: and, if we will still require any thing further, it will be infinite, and without end. But, the most urgent necessity is to cure [our opinions passions], and the like.

Would you hear about these, therefore?

\* B. I. ch. 17.

Well: hear. But then, if you should say to me, "I cannot tell whether your arguments are true or false;" and if I should happen to express myself doubtfully, and you should say, "Distinguish [which you mean]," I will bear with you no longer; but will retort your own words upon you; *the more urgent necessity is, &c.* Therefore, I suppose, the **Art of Reasoning** is first settled: just as, before the measuring of corn, we settle the measure. For unless we first determine what a bushel, and what a balance is, how shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus in the present case: unless we have first learnt, and accurately examined, that which is the criterion of other things, and by which other things are learnt, how shall we be able accurately to learn any thing else? And how is it possible? Well: a bushel, however, is only wood, a thing of no value [in itself]: but it measures corn. And Logic [you say] is of no value in itself. That we will consider hereafter. Let us for



the present, then, make the concession. It is enough that it distinguishes and examines, and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other things.

### III.\*

#### *That Logic is necessary.*

WHEN one of the company said to him, "Convince me that Logic is necessary." Would you have me demonstrate it to you? says he.—"Yes."—Then I must use a demonstrative form of argument.—"Granted."—And how will you know then, whether I argue sophistically? On this, the man being silent; you see, says he, that, even by your own confession, Logic is necessary; since without its assistance, you cannot learn so much as whether it be necessary or not.

\* B. II. ch. 25.

#### IV.\*

#### *The Relation, which Logic has to the Duties of Life.*

It is a secret to the vulgar that the practice of convertible, and hypothetical, and interrogatory conclusions, and in general, of all other logical forms, hath any relation to the duties of life. For in every subject of action, the question is, how a wise and good man may find a way of extricating himself, and a method of behaviour conformable to his duty upon the occasion. Let them say, therefore, either that the man of virtue will not engage in questions and answers: or that, if he doth, he will not think it worth his care, whether he behaves rashly and at hazard in questioning and answering: or if they allow neither of these, it is necessary to confess that some examination ought to be made of those topics, in which the af-

fair of question and answer\* is principally concerned. For what is the profession of reasoning? to lay down true positions; to reject false ones; and to suspend the judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this? It is enough, say you.—Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any mistake in the use of money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good pieces, and to reject the bad?—This is not enough.—What must be added besides?—That faculty which tries and distinguishes what pieces are good, what bad.—Therefore, in reasoning too, what hath been already said is not enough: but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true, and the false, and the doubtful.—It is necessary.

## §. 2. And what further is professed in

\* The Logic of the Megaric Philosophers was called Dialectic, because it was carried on in question and answer, (Stanley.) Zeno of Elea is called the inventor of Dialectic.

**Reasoning?**—To admit the consequences of what you have properly granted. Well, and here, too, Is the mere knowing this enough?—It is not; we must learn *how* such a thing is the consequence of such another; and when one thing follows from one thing; and when from many things in common. Is it not, moreover, necessary, that he, who would behave skilfully in Reasoning, should both himself demonstrate what he delivers, and be able to comprehend the demonstrations of others; and not be deceived by such as sophisticate, as if they were demonstrating. Hence, then, the employment and exercise of concluding arguments and figures arises; and appears to be necessary.

§. 3. But it may possibly happen; that from the premises which we have properly granted, there arises some consequence, which, though false, is nevertheless a consequence. What then ought I to do? To admit a falsehood? And

how is that possible?—Well: or to say that my concessions were not properly made?—But neither is this allowed.—Or that the consequence doth not arise from the premises?—Nor is even this allowed.—What then is to be done in the case?—Is it not this?—As the having once borrowed money, is not enough to make a person a debtor, unless he still continues to owe money, and hath not paid it: so the having granted the premises is not enough to make it necessary to grant the inference, unless we continue our concessions. If the premises continue to the end, such as they were when the concessions were made, it is absolutely necessary to continue the concessions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the premises do not continue such as they were when the concession was made, it is absolutely necessary to depart from the concession, and admit [rather the contrary: I mean] what doth not follow from the argument itself. For this inference is no consequence of ours, nor be-

longs to us, when we have departed from the concession of the premises. We ought then to examine these kinds of premises, and their changes and conversions, on which any one, by laying hold, either in the Question itself, or in the Answer, or in the syllogistical conclusion, or in any other thing of that sort, giving an occasion to the unthinking of being disconcerted, not foreseeing the consequence.—Why so? That in this topic we may not behave contrary to our duty, nor with confusion.

§. 4. The same thing is to be observed in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments; for it is sometimes necessary to require some hypothesis to be granted, as a kind of step to the rest of the argument. Is every given hypothesis then to be granted, or not every one; and if not every one; which? And is he, who has granted an hypothesis, for ever to abide by it? or is he sometimes to depart from it, and admit only consequences, but not

to admit contradictions?---Aye, but a person may say, on your admitting the hypothesis of a possibility, I will drive you upon an impossibility. With such a one as this, shall the man of prudence not engage; but avoid all examination and conversation with him? And yet who, besides the man of prudence, is capable of treating an argument, or who besides is sagacious in Questions and Answers, and incapable of being deceived and imposed on by sophistry? Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves rashly and at hazard, in the argument? Yet how then can he be such a one as we are supposing him? But, without some such exercise and preparation, is it possible for him to preserve himself consistent? Let them shew this: and all these theorems will be superfluous and absurd, and unconnected with our idea of the virtuous man. Why then are we still indolent and slothful, and sluggish, seeking pretences of avoiding labour? Shall we not be watchful to

render reason itself accurate? But suppose after all I should make a mistake in these points? Have I killed a father? Wretch! Why, in this case, where had you a father to kill? What is it then that you have done? The only fault that you could commit in this instance, you have committed. This very thing I myself said to Rufus when he reproved me for not finding something that was omitted in some syllogism. Why, said I, have I burnt the capitol then? Wretch! answered he, was the thing here omitted the capitol? or are there no other faults but burning the capitol or killing a father? and is it no fault to treat the appearances presented to our minds rashly; and vainly, and at hazard; not to comprehend a reason, nor a demonstration, nor a sophism; nor, in short, to see what is for or against one's self in a question or answer? is nothing of all this any fault?



## V.\*

*With what laws in life the laws of Logic have an affinity.*

### *1. To foresee consequences & avoid contradictions.*

As one (of his scholars) was reading hypothetical syllogisms, "It is likewise a law in these, says Epictetus, to admit what follows from the hypothesis: but much more is it a law in life, to do what follows from nature. For, if we desire in every subject of action, and in every circumstance, to keep up to nature, we must, on every occasion evidently make it our aim, neither to let consequences escape our observation, nor to admit contradictions. Philosophers, therefore, first exercise us in theory, which is the more easy task, and then lead us to the more difficult. For in theory there is nothing to oppose our following what we are taught; but in life there are

many things to draw us aside. It is ridiculous then to say, we must begin from these; for it is not easy to begin from the more difficult.\*



*2. To examine what we know, and how we live.*

The first step, therefore, towards becoming a philosopher, is, being sensible in what state the ruling faculty of the mind is; for, when a person knows it to be in a weak state, he will not immediately employ it in great attempts. But for want of this, some who can scarce get down a morsel, buy, and set themselves to swallow, whole treatises; and so they throw them up again, or cannot digest them:

\* Theory and instruction should always precede practice. This is as true of Christianity as of philosophy. The mind must be well grounded in right principles in early youth, before the cares, and business, and pleasures of the world have given it a wrong direction. Hence the utility of catechisms of principles, and early conformities to established doctrines. (E.D.)

and then come cholics, fluxes, and fevers. Such persons ought to consider, what they can bear. Indeed it is easy to convince an ignorant person in theory; but in matters relative to life, no person offers himself to conviction; and we hate those who have convinced us. Socrates used to say, that we ought not to live a life unexamined.

## VI.\*

### *How to reason with ignorant and untaught persons.*

WHAT things are to be learned, in order to the right use of Reason; the philosophers of our sect have accurately taught: but we are altogether unpractised in the due application of them. Only give any of us, that you please, some illiterate person for an antagonist, and he will not find out how to treat him. But when he hath a little moved the man, if he happens to answer besides the purpose, he knows not how to deal with him any further; but either reviles or laughs at him, and says, "He is an illiterate fellow: there is no making any thing of him." Yet a guide, when he perceives his charge going out of the way, doth not revile and ridicule, and then leave him, but leads him into the right path. Do you also shew your antagonist

\* B. II. ch. 12.

the truth, and you will see, that he will follow. But till you do shew it, do not ridicule him: but rather be sensible of your own incapacity.

§. 2. How then did Socrates use to act? He obliged his antagonist himself to bear testimony to him; and wanted no other witness. “I give up all the rest, and am always satisfied with the testimony of my opponent: and I call in no one to vote, but my antagonist alone.” For he rendered the arguments drawn from natural notions so clear, that every one saw, and avoided the contradictions.—“Doth an envious man rejoice?” “By no means, he rather grieves.” (This he moved him to say, by proposing the contrary.)—“Well: and do you think envy to be a grief for misery?” And who ever envied misery? (Therefore he makes the other say, that envy is a grief for happiness.) “Doth any one envy those who are nothing to him?” “No surely.” Having thus drawn [from his opponent] a full and distinct idea, he

then left that point, and doth not say, "Define to me what envy is ;" and after he had defined it: "You have defined it wrong; for the definition doth not reciprocate to the thing defined."

Technical terms are therefore grievous, and scarcely to be made intelligible to the illiterate, which yet *we*, it seems, cannot part with. But we have no capacity at all to move them by such arguments, as might induce them in following the track of the appearances in their own minds, to allow, or disprove, any point. And from a consciousness of this incapacity, those among us, who have any modesty, give the matter entirely up; but the greater part, rashly entering upon these debates, mutually confound, and are confounded; and at last reviling, and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and most peculiar characteristic of Socrates, never to be provoked in a dispute; nor to throw out any reviling or injurious expressions: but to bear patiently with those who reviled him:

and to put an end to the controversy. If you would know how great abilities he had in this particular, read Xenophon's banquet, and you will see how many controversies he ended. Hence, even among the poets, that person is justly mentioned with the highest commendation,

Whose lenient art attentive crowds await,  
To still the furious clamours of debate.

## VII.\*

*Logic an instrument only, and not an end; and of no use in life, unless morally applied.*

WHEN he was asked, How it came to pass, that though the Art of Reasoning is more studied now, yet the improvements were greater formerly; in what instance, answered he, is it more studied *now*; and in what were the improvements *then*? For in what is studied at present, in that will be found likewise the improvement at present. The present study is the solution of syllogisms; and in this, improvements are made. But formerly the study was to preserve the governing faculty conformable to nature; and improvements were made in *that*. Therefore do not confound things; nor when you study one, expect improvement in another; but see, whether any of us, who applies himself to think and act conformably to nature, † ever fails of improvement. Depend upon it, you will not find one.

\* B. III. ch. 6. † And to the revealed will of God, (Ed.)



## VIII.\*

*How, from the doctrine, that God is the Father of mankind, we may proceed to its consequences.*

§. 1. If a person could be persuaded of this principle as he ought, that we are all originally descended from God, and that he is the Father of gods and men; I conceive he never would think meanly or degenerately concerning himself. Suppose Cæsar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty looks: and will you not be elated on knowing yourself to be the son of Jupiter? Yet, in fact, we are not elated. But having two things in our composition, intimately united to a body in common with the brutes, and reason and sentiment in common with the gods: many incline to this unhappy and mortal kindred, and only some few to the divine and happy one. And, as of necessity every one must treat

\* B. 1. ch. 3.

each particular thing, according to the notions he forms about it ; so those few, who suppose, that they are made for fidelity, decency, and a well-grounded use of the appearances of things, never think meanly or degenerately concerning themselves. But with the multitude the case is contrary : “ For what am I ? A poor contemptible man, with this miserable flesh of mine ! ” Miserable, indeed. But you have likewise something better than paltry flesh. Why then, overlooking *that*, do you pine away in attention to *this*.

§. 2. By means of this [animal] kindred, some of us deviating towards it, become like wolves, faithless, and insidious, and mischievous : others like lions, wild, and savage, and untamed : but most of us foxes and wretches even among brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured man, than a fox, or something yet more wretched and mean ? See then, and take heed, that you do not become such wretches.

## IX.\*

*How, from the doctrine of our kindred to God, we are to proceed to its consequences.*

§. 1. IF what philosophers say of the kindred between God and man be true; what has any one to do, but, like Socrates, when he is asked what countryman he is, never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth, but of the world. For, why do you say that you are of Athens: and not of that corner only, where that paltry body of yours was laid at its birth? Is it not, evidently, from what is principal, and comprehends not only that corner, and your whole house; but the general extent of the country, from which your pedigree is derived down to you, that you call yourself an Athenian or a Corinthian? Why may not he then, who understands the administration of the world, and has

\* B. I. ch. 9.

arned that the greatest, and most principal, and comprehensive, of all things, is this system, composed of men and God : and that from him the seeds of being are descended, not only to my father or grandfather, but to all things that are produced and born on earth; and especially to rational natures, as they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the Deity being connected with him by reason: why may [not such a one] call himself a citizen of the world? Why not a son of God? And, why shall we fear any thing that happens among men? Shall kindred to Cæsar, or any other of the great men at Rome enable a man to live secure, above contempt, and void of all fears whatsoever: and shall not the having God for our Maker, and Father, and Guardian, free us from griefs and terrors?

§. 2. “ But how shall I subsist? for I have nothing.”

Why, how do slaves, how do fugitives?

To what do they trust, when they run away from their masters? Is it to their estates? their servants? their plate? To nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to get necessities. And must a philosopher, think you, when he leaves his own abode, rest and rely upon others, and not take care of himself? Must he be more helpless and anxious than the brute beasts; each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper food nor any suitable and natural provision? One would think there should be no need for an old fellow to sit here contriving, that you may not think meanly, nor entertain low and abject notions of yourselves; but that his business would be, to take care, that there may not happen to be [among you] young men of such a spirit,\* that,

\* It is in this spirit, that the younger Scipio Africanus addresses his father, Paulus Æmilius, in the *Somnium Scipionis*. The elder Scipio had said, "*Imo vero ii vivunt, qui ex corporum vinculis, tanquam e carcere evolaverunt: vestra vero quæ dicitur vita, mors est.*" On which, the younger observes to his

knowing their affinity to the gods; and that we are as it were fettered by the body and its possessions, and by so many other things as are necessary, upon these accounts, for the œconomy and commerce of life; they should resolve to throw them off, as both troublesome and useless, and depart to their kindred.

§. 3. This is the work, if any, that

father : “ Quæso, pater sanctissime, atque optime, quoniam hæc est vita (ut Africanum audio dicere) quid noror in terris, quin huc ad vos venire propero ?” His father, correcting his impatience, says in terms similar to the admonition of Epictetus : “ Non est ita, inquit ille : nisi enim Deus is, cujus hoc templum est omne, quod conspicis, istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit, huc tibi aditus patere non potest.—Quare et tibi, Publi, et piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis ; nec injussu ejus, a quo ille est vobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum est, ne munus humanum assignatum a Deo, defugisse videamini.” Epictetus’s submission to the will of Providence is a powerful principle of restraint; and worthy of his enlightened philosophy. But the penalty, *huc tibi aditus patere non potest*, is a great improvement on the precept, and enforces the principle by a sanction not to be disputed. Nothing was wanting to give it weight, but that

ought to employ your master and preceptor, if you had one, that you should come to him, and say,

“ Epictetus, we can no longer bear being tied down to this paltry body: feeding and resting, and cleaning it, and hurried about with so many low cares on its account. Are not these things indifferent, and nothing to us: and death no

which Cicero would have rejoiced to have known, the authority of Revelation. The whole spirit of the Gospel is a prohibition against suicide. Every precept of *humility, patience, and submission to the will of God*, condemns it. I will select a few passages, out of many, from the Scriptures. Take, for instance, those most consolatory and tranquillizing passages of David and Isaiah. “Tarry thou the Lord’s leisure; be strong, and he shall comfort thine heart; and put thou thy trust in the Lord.” (Ps. xxvii. 14.) “Who is he among you, that feareth the Lord, that obeyeth the voice of his servant, that walketh in darkness, and hath no light; let him trust in the name of the Lord, and stay upon his God.” (Is. l. 10.) St. James says, “Let patience have her *perfect* work.” (i. 4.) When our Saviour forewarned his disciples of the hatred, treachery, and cruelties, which they were to suffer for his name’s sake, he bids them “In your patience pos-

evil? Are not we relations of God, and did we not come from him? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came; suffer us at length to be delivered from these fetters; that chain and weigh us down here. Thieves and robbers, courts of judicature, and those who are called tyrants, seem to have some power over us, on account of the body and its possessions. Suffer us to shew them, that they have no power."

sess ye your souls." If we "look unto Jesus, the Author and Finisher of our faith,—who endured the cross, *despising the shame*," who under a weight of unutterable agony, could say, "Not my will, but thine be done," his example is the strongest of all prohibitions. But if we seek from Scripture a prohibition in direct terms, the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill, —Thou shalt do *no* murder," could not mean to except that life, which God committed to our own individual care, with the unwritten law upon our hearts, which Shakospeare has so well expressed :

Against self slaughter

There is a prohibition so divine,  
That cravens ~~my~~ weak hands.

If the instinctive law of self-preservation be thought to add nothing to the prohibition in the commandment.



§. 4. And in this case it would be my part to answer : “ My friends, wait for God, till he shall give the signal and dismiss you from this service; then return to him. For the present, be content to remain in this post where he has placed you. The time of your abode here is short and easy to such as are disposed like you. For what tyrant, what robber, what thief, or what court of judicature are formidable to those, who thus account the body,

God’s express reason for the punishment of murder will. “ Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed, *for in the image of God made he man.*” As all men are made in the image of God, to deface that image is impious. We have therefore no more right over our own life, than over a fellow-creature’s.

But Stoicism though defective for want of a revealed sanction, possesses in its own principles a powerful antidote to the abuse of them. If *the contempt of externals* has any tendency to promote a *contempt of life*, their other great principle, *submission to the will of Providence*, ought to have a contrary tendency, and to create a value and respect for life, as a post assigned to us by Providence, *munus a Deo assignatum*. If a brave soldier would rather die a thousand

and its possessions as nothing. Stay, depart not inconsiderately."

§. 5. Thus ought the case to stand between a preceptor and ingenuous young men. But how stands it now? The preceptor has no life in him; you have none neither. When you have had enough to-day, you sit weeping about to-morrow; how you shall get food. Why, if you have it, wretch, you will have it;

times than desert his post, though appointed by a fellow-mortal, a rational being should be content to suffer any difficulties and privations rather than throw away a life entrusted to him by his Maker. Why, then, did the abuse of one principle prevail over the just influence of the other? Perhaps from the neglect of that principle, or from want of belief in it, or from the want of the sanction, which Revelation alone could give it.

But may it not also be asked, Why does Suicide ever prevail in Christian countries, where the Gospel cannot, even by abuse, be brought to countenance it? Probably, from the neglect or ignorance of Christian principles, from neglect of prayer, and the absence of all devotional feeling, from want of faith, and of a true Christian education, or from insanity. (EDITOR.)

if not, you will go out of life. The door is open,\* why do you lament; what room doth there remain for tears? What occasion for flattery? Why should any one person envy another? Why should he be struck with awful admiration of those who have great possessions, or are placed in high rank [as is common]? especially if they are powerful and passionate. For what will they do to us? The things which they can do, we do not regard: the things which we are concerned about, they cannot do. Who, then, after all, shall command a person thus disposed? How was Socrates affected by these things? As it became one persuaded of his being a relation of the gods. "If you should tell me (says he to his judges) we will acquit you, upon condition that you shall no longer discourse in the manner you have hitherto done, nor make any disturbance either among

\* Is opened for you by Providence; and death will release you from all your distresses. (Ed.)

our young or our old people." I would answer, " You are ridiculous in thinking that, if your general had placed me in any post, I ought to maintain and defend it, and chuse to die a thousand times, rather than desert it: but that if God hath assigned me any station or method of life, I ought to desert that for you."

§. 6. This it is, for a man to be truly a relation of God. But we consider ourselves as a mere assemblage of stomach and entrails, and bodily parts. Because we fear, because we desire; we flatter those who can help us in these matters; we dread the very same persons.

## X.\*

### *Of Improvement.*

§. 1. HE who is entering on a state of improvement, having learnt from the philosophers, that the object of desire is good, of aversion evil ; and having learnt too, that prosperity and ease are no otherwise attainable by man, than in not being disappointed of his desire, nor incurring his aversion : such an one removes totally from himself, and postpones desire, and applies aversion, only to things dependent on choice. For if he should be averse to things independent on choice ; he knows, that he must sometimes incur his aversion, and be unhappy. Now, if virtue promises happiness, prosperity, and ease, then an improvement in virtue is certainly an improvement in each of these. For to whatever point the perfection of any thing absolutely brings us, improvement is always an approach towards it.

\* E. I. ch. 4.

§. 2. How happens it then, that when we confess virtue to be such, yet we seek and make an ostentatious show of improvement in other things? What is the business of virtue?

**A prosperous life.**

**Who is in a state of improvement then?**

**He who hath read the many treatises of Chrysippus. Why, doth virtue consist in having read Chrysippus through? If it doth, improvement is confessedly nothing else than understanding a great deal of Chrysippus: otherwise we confess virtue to produce one thing, and declare improvement, which is an approach to it, to be quite another thing.**

§. 3. This person says one [of you] is already able to read Chrysippus by himself.—“Certainly, sir, you have made a vast improvement!” What improvement? Why do you ridicule him? Why do you withdraw him from a sense of his misfortunes? Why do not you shew him

the business of virtue, that he may know where to seek improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your business lies. And where doth your business lie? In desire and aversion; that you may neither be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other; in exerting the powers of pursuit and avoidance, that you may not be liable to fail; in assent and suspense, that you may not be liable to be deceived. The first and most necessary is the first topic. But if you seek to avoid incurring your aversion, trembling and lamenting all the while, at this rate how do you improve?

§. 4. Shew me then your improvement in this point. As if I should say to a wrestler, Shew me your shoulders: and he should answer me, "See my poisers." Do you and your poisers look to that: I desire to see the effect of them.

"Take the treatise on the subject of the active powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it."

I do not enquire into this, wretch: but how you exert the powers; how you manage your desires and aversions; how your intentions and purposes; how you are prepared for events; whether conformably or contrary to nature. If conformably, give me evidence of that, and I will say you improve: if contrary, go your way, and not only comment on these treatises, but write such yourself; and what service will it do you? Do you not know that the whole volume is sold for half a crown? Doth he who comments upon it, then, value himself at more than half a crown? Never look for your business in one thing, and for improvement in another.

Where is improvement then?

If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own faculty of choice, to exercise, and finish, and render it conformable to nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, decent; if he hath learnt, too, that



whoever desires, or is averse to, things out of his own power, can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily be tossed up and down with them ; must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or is averse to ; if, rising in the morning, he observes and keeps to these rules ; bathes and eats as a man of fidelity and honour ; and thus, on every subject of action, exercises himself in his principal duty ; as a racer in the business of racing ; as a public speaker in the business of exercising his voice : this is he who truly improves ; this is he, who hath not travelled in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading books, and hath laboured that point only, and travelled for that, I bid him go home immediately, and not neglect his domestic affairs ; for what he travelled for is nothing. The only real thing is studying how to rid his life of lamentation, and complaint, and *alas!* and *I am undone*, and misfortune and disappointment ; and to learn what death, what ex-

le, what a prison, what poison is : that he may be able to say in a prison, like Socrates, "My dear Crito ; if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be ;" and not—  
 ' Wretched old man, have I kept my grey hairs for this !" Who speaks thus ? Do you suppose I will name some mean and despicable person ? Is it not Priam who says it ? Is it not Œdippus ? Nay, how many kings say it ? For what else is tragedy, but the sufferings of men, struck by an admiration of externals, represented in that kind of poetry ? If one was to be taught by fictions, that externals independent upon choice are nothing to us, I, for my part, should wish for such a fiction as that, by which I might live prosperously and undisturbed. What you wish for, it is your business to consider.

§. 5. "Of what service, then, is Chrysippus to us ?" To teach you that those things are not false, on which prosperity and ease depend. Take my books, and

you will see how true and conformable to nature those things are, which render me easy. How great a happiness ! and how great the benefactor, who shews the way ! To Triptolemus all men have raised temples and altars, because he gave us a milder kind of food : but to him who hath discovered, and brought to light, and communicated the truth to all ; the means not of living, but of living well ; who among you ever raised an altar, or a temple, or dedicated a statue ? or who worships God on that account ? We offer sacrifices on account of those [benefactors,] who have given us corn and the vine ; and shall we not give thanks to God for those, who have produced that fruit in the human understanding, by which they proceed to discover to us the true doctrine of happiness ?

## XI.\*

*Self-conceit, the greatest obstacle to improvement; and knowledge useless, which is not grounded on principles, and method; and which does not improve our moral habits.*

§. 1: WHAT is the first business of one, who studies philosophy? To part with self-conceit. For it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he hath a conceit that he already knows. We all go to the philosophers, talking at all adventures upon negative and positive duties; good and evil; fair and base. We praise, censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and base enterprizes. And for what do we go to the philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves not to know. And what is this? Theorems. We are desirous to hear what the philosophers say for its elegance and acuteness: and some with a view only to gain.

\* B. II. ch. 17.

Now it is ridiculous to suppose, that a person will learn any thing, but what he desires to learn; or make an improvement in what he doth not learn.

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§. 2.---Have no will but the will of God; and who shall restrain you; who shall compel you, any more than Jupiter? When you have such a guide, and conform your will and inclinations to his, what need you fear being disappointed? Yield up your desire and aversion [as slaves] to riches or poverty; the one will be disappointed, the other incurred. Yield them up to health, power, honour, your country, friends, children, in short, to any thing independent on choice, you will be unfortunate. But yield them up to Jupiter, and the other gods. Give yourself up to these: let these govern: let both be ranged on the same side with these; and how can you be any longer unprosperous? But, if, poor wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble,

and never cease a single day from complaining of yourself, and the gods, why do you boast of your education? What education, man? That you have learned convertible syllogisms? Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and begin again; convinced, that hitherto, you have not even touched upon the point? And, for the future, beginning from this foundation, proceed, in order,\* to the superstructure; that nothing may happen which you do not wish, and that every thing may happen which you do. Give me but one young man, who brings this intention with him to the school; who is a champion for this point, and says, "I yield up all the rest: it suffices me, if once I become able to pass my life, free from hinderance and grief: to stretch out my neck to all events, as free; and

\* The order of instruction marked out in the following passage is the method of the *Euchiridion*; which order may also be collected from what Epictetus says in the 51st Section of Mrs. Carter's Translation, and in the *Discourses*, B. III. ch. 2. (Ed.)

to look up to heaven, as the friend of God ; fearing nothing that can happen." Let any one of you shew himself of such a disposition, that I may say, "Come into the place, young man, that is of right your own ; for you are destined to be an ornament to philosophy. Yours are these possessions ; yours these books ; yours these discourses." Then when he hath mastered, and got the better of this first class, let him come to me again, and say, "I desire indeed to be free from passion, and perturbation ; but I desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, and a carefully attentive man, to know, what is my duty to God, to my parents, to my relations, to my country, and to strangers." Come into the second class too ; for this likewise is yours. "But I have now sufficiently studied the second too ; and I would willingly be secure, and unshaken by error and delusion, not only awake, but even when asleep ; when warmed with wine ; when diseased with the spleen." "You are a god, man : your intentions are great."

§. 3. \* “No. But, I, for my part, desire to understand what Chrysippus says in his logical Treatise of the *Pseudonemos*.”

—Go hang yourself, pitiful wretch, with such an intention as this. What good will it do you? You will read the whole, lamenting all the while, and say to others, trembling, “Do as I do.” “Shall I read to you, my friend, and you to me? You write surprisingly, sir; and very finely imitate the style of Plato; and Xenophon; and you of Antisthenes.” And thus, having related your dreams to each other, you return again to the same state. Your desires and aversions, your pursuits, your intentions, your resolutions, your wishes, and endeavours, are just what they were—you do not so much as seek for one to advise; but are offended

\* This is another Scholar, that speaks here, and is an example to Epictetus’s observation in the *Enchiridion*, §. 51. of Upton and Mrs. Carter; and §. 76. of Wolfius and Simpson. (Ed.)



when you hear such things as these, and cry, "An ill-natured old fellow! He never wept over me when I was setting out, nor said, To what a danger are you going to be exposed? If you come off safe, child, I will illuminate my house."

"This would have been the part of a good-natured man." Truly. It will be a mighty happiness if you do come off safe: it will be worth while to make an illumination. For you ought to be immortal, and exempt from sickness, to be sure.

§. 4. Throwing away then, I say, this self-conceit, by which we fancy we have gained some knowledge of what is useful, we should come to philosophic reasoning, as we do to mathematics and music: otherwise we shall be far from making any improvement, even if we have read over all the collection and compositions, not only of Chrysippus, but of Antipater and Archedemus too.

## XII.\*

### *Of Preconceptions.*

§. 2. THE Preconceptions † are common to all men : and one preconception doth not contradict another. For who of us doth not lay it down as a maxim, That *good* is advantageous and eligible, and, at all events, to be pursued and followed : that *justice* is fair and becoming? Whence, then, arises the dispute? In adapting these Preconceptions to particular cases. As when one cries, “Such a person hath acted well: he is a gallant man:” and another: “No: he hath acted like a fool.” Hence arises the dispute among men. This is the dispute

\* B. I. ch. 22.

† The Preconceptions are general notions, such as the Stoics supposed to take original possession of the mind, before it forms any of its own. To adapt these *Preconceptions* to particular cases, is the office of Reason; and is often inserted on by Epictetus, as a point of the highest importance. (Mrs. CARTER's Introduction, §. 10.)

between Jews and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans; not, whether sanctity be preferable to all things, and in every instance to be pursued; but, whether the eating of swine's flesh \* be consistent with sanctity or not. This, too, you will find to have been the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon. For call them forth. What say you Agamemnon? Ought not that to be done, which is fit and right? Yes, surely. Achilles, what say you? Is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done? Yes: beyond every other thing. Adapt your Preconceptions, then. Here begins the dispute. One says, "It is not fit, that I should restore Chryseis to her father." The other says, "Yes, but it is." One or other of them, certainly makes a wrong adaptation of the Precon-

\* A Jew, who abstains rigidly from swine's flesh, and yet lives a selfish, avaricious, worldly, dishonest, or otherwise immoral life, prefers external observances to sanctity. And this may be said of all professions of religion. (EDITOR.)

ception of *fitness*. Again, one says, "If it be fit, that I should give up Chryseis, it is fit, too, that I should take some one of your prizes." The other; "What, that you should take my mistress?" "Aye, yours." "What *mine* only? Must I only, then, lose my prize."

§. 2. What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to adapt natural Preconceptions to particular cases, conformably to nature.\*

\* And to the Gospel. (ED.)

### XIII.\*

*That we do not study to make use of the Principles concerning good and evil.*

WHERE lies good? In choice. Where evil? In choice. Where neither good nor evil? In things independent on choice. What then, doth any of us remember these lessons out of the schools? Doth any of us study how to answer for himself in things as in questions? "Is it day?" "Yes." "Is it night, then?" "No." "Is the number of stars even?" "I cannot tell." When money is offered you, have you studied to make the proper answer, That it is not a good?† Have you exercised yourself in such answers as these, or only in sophistries? Why do you wonder then, that you improve in points which you have studied; and in those which you have not studied, there

\* B. II. ch. 16.

† The Stoics called nothing *good*, which is external, and accidental, and not in our own power. (ED.)

you remain the same? When an orator knows, that he hath written well; that he hath committed to memory what he hath written; and that he brings an agreeable voice with him; why is he still solicitous? Because he is not contented with what he hath studied. What doth he want, then? To be applauded by the audience. He hath studied the power of speaking, then; but he hath not studied censure and applause. For when did he hear from any one, what applause, what censure is? What is the nature of each? What kind of applause is to be sought, and what kind of censure to be shunned? And when did he ever apply himself to study what follows from these lessons? Why do you wonder, then, if, in what he hath learned, he excels others; but, where he hath not studied, he is the same with the rest of the world? Just as a musician knows how to play, sings well, and hath the proper dress of his profession: yet trembles when he comes upon the stage. For the

first he understands: but what the multitude is, or what the clamour and laughter of the multitude is, he doth not understand. Nor doth he even know, what solicitude itself is: whether it be our own affair, or that of others; or whether it be possible to suppress it, or not. Hence, if he is applauded, he is puffed up, when he makes his exit: but, if he is laughed at, the tumour is pricked, and subsides.

§. 2. Thus we too are affected. What do we admire? Externals. For what do we strive? Externals. And are we then in any doubt, how we come to fear, and be solicitous? What is the consequence, then, when we esteem the things that are brought upon us, to be evils? We cannot but fear; we cannot but be solicitous. And then we say, "O Lord God, how shall I avoid solicitude!" Have you not hands, fool? Hath not God made them for you? Sit down now, and pray, that your nose may not run.

Wipe it rather ; and do not murmur. Well: and hath he given you nothing in the present case? Hath not he given you patience? Hath not he given you magnanimity? Hath not he given you fortitude? \* When you have such hands as these, do you still seek for somebody to wipe your nose? But we neither study nor regard these things. For give me but one, who cares how he doth any thing, who doth not regard the success of any thing, but his own manner of acting. Who, when he is walking, regards his own actions? Who, when he is deliberating, the deliberation itself, and not the success that is to follow it? If it happens to succeed, he is elated, and cries, "How prudently have we deliberated! Did not I tell you, my dear friend, that it was impossible, when we considered about any thing, that it should not happen

\* "It is God, which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Phil. ii. 13. "If God peradventure will give them repentance." 2 Tim. ii. 25. Compare this passage with the prayer in Sect. 4.



right?" But, if it miscarries, the poor wretch is dejected; and knows not what to say about the matter. Who among us ever, upon this account, consulted a diviner? Who of us ever slept in a temple, to be informed concerning his manner of acting? I say, who? Shew me one (that I may see what I have long sought) who is truly noble and ingenuous. Shew me either a young or an old man.

§. 3. Why then are we still surprised if, when we waste all our attention on the materials of action, we are, in the manner of action itself, low, sordid, wretched, and a mere heap of disappointment and misery? For we do not care for these things, nor make them our study. If we had feared, not death or exile but fear itself, we should have studied not to fall into what appears to us to be evil. But, as the case now stands, we are eager and loquacious in the schools; and when any little question arises about any of these things, we ask

prepared to trace its consequences : but drag us into practice, and you will find us miserably shipwrecked. Let some alarming appearance attack us ; and you will perceive what we have been studying, and in what we are exercised. Besides this negligence, we always accumulate somewhat else, and represent things greater than reality. In a voyage, for instance, casting my eyes down upon the ocean below, and looking round me, and seeing no land, I am out of my wits ; and imagine that, if I should be shipwrecked, I must swallow all that ocean : nor doth it once enter my head, that three pints are enough to do my business. What is it then, that alarms me ? The ocean ? No : but my own principle. Again : in an earthquake, I imagine the city is going to fall upon me ; but is not one little stone enough to knock my brains out ? What is it then, that oppresses, and puts us out of our wits ? Why, what else, but our principles ? For what is it, but mere principle, that oppresses him, who

leaves his country, and is separated from his acquaintance, and friends, and place, and usual manner of life? When children cry, if their nurse happens to be absent for a little while, give them a cake, and they forget their grief. Shall we compare you to these children then?

No, indeed. For I do not desire to be pacified by a cake; but by right principles. And what are they?

Such as a man ought to study all day long, so as not to be attached to what doth not belong to him, neither to a friend, to a place, an academy; nor even to his own body: but to remember the law, and to have that constantly before his eyes. And what is the divine law? To preserve inviolate what is properly our own: not to claim what belongs to others: to use what is given us, and not desire what is not given us: and when any thing is taken away, to restore it readily; and to be thankful for the

time you have been permitted the use of it; and not cry after it, like a child for its nurse and its mamma. For what doth it signify, what gets the better of you or on what you depend? And in what are you superior to him, who cries for a puppet, if you lament for a paltry academy, and a portico, and an assembly of young people, and such like amusements? Another comes, lamenting that he must no longer drink the waters of Dirce. Why, is not the Marcian water as good? "But I was used to that." And in time you will be used to the other. And, when you are attached to this too, you may cry again, and set yourself in imitation of Euripides, to celebrate in verse,

*The baths of Nero, and the Marcian waters.*

Hence, see the origin of tragedy, when trifling accidents befall foolish men. "Ah, when shall I see Athens, and the citadel again?" Wretch, are not you contented with what you see every day? Can you see any thing better than the

sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea? But if, besides, you comprehend him who administers the whole, and carry him about in yourself, do you still long after pebbles, and a fine rock? What will you do then, when you are to leave even the sun and moon? Will you sit, crying like an infant? What then have you been doing in the school? What did you hear? What did you learn? Why have you written yourself a philosopher, instead of writing the real fact? I have made some introductions [you may say]; and read over Chrysippus; but I have not so much as gone near the door of a philosopher. For what pretensions have I to any thing of the same kind with Socrates? Who died, and lived in such a manner? Or with Diogenes? Do you observe either of these crying, or out of humour, that he is not to see such a man, or such a woman; nor to live any longer at Athens, or at Corinth; but at Susa, for instance, or Ecbatana? For doth he stay, and re-

pine, who is at his liberty, whenever he pleases, to quit the entertainments, and play no longer? Why doth he not stay, as children do, as long as he is amused? Such a one, no doubt, will bear perpetual banishment, and a sentence of death wonderfully well? Why will not you be weaned as children are; and take more solid food? Will you never cease to cry after your mammas and nurses, whom the old women about you have taught you to bewail? "But if I go away, I shall trouble them."—You trouble them! No; it will not be you: but that which troubles you too, principle. What have you to do then? Pluck out your (false) principle, and, if they are wise, they will pluck out theirs too; or, if not, they will lament for themselves.

§. 4. Boldly make a desperate push, man, as the saying is, for prosperity, for freedom, for magnanimity. Lift up your head, at last, as free from slavery. Dare to look up to God, and say, "Make use

of me for the future as thou wilt. I am of the same mind : I am equal with thee.\* I refuse nothing which seems good to thee. Lead me whither thou wilt. Clothe me in whatever dress thou wilt. Is it thy will, that I should be in a public or a private condition ; dwell here, or be banished ; be poor, or rich ? Under all these circumstances I will make thy defence to men. I will shew what the nature of every thing is."---No. Rather sit alone in a warm place: and wait till your mamma comes to feed you. If Hercules had sat loitering at home, what would he have been ? Eurystheus, and not Hercules. Besides, by travelling through the world, how many acquaintance ; and how many friends had he ? But none more his friends than God : for which reason he was believed to be the son of God : and was so. In obedience

\* Instead of ὁμογενημοῦ σοι, ἴσος ἐγώ, it should be read, as it is edited by Schweigheuser, ἑμογενημοῦ σοι, σοι ἐγώ *I am of the same mind with thee ; I am thine.* (EDITOR.)

to him, he went about extirpating injustice, and lawless force. But you are not Hercules, able to extirpate the evils of others: nor even Theseus, to extirpate the evils of Attica. Extirpate your own then. Expel, instead of Procrustes and Seiron, grief, fear, desire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance, [from your mind.] But these can be no otherwise expelled, than by looking up to God alone as your pattern; by attaching yourself to him alone, and being consecrated to his commands.\* If you wish for any thing else, you will, with sighs and groans, follow what is stronger than you :

\* In this most Christian-like passage the words *ὑποτασσάμενοι*, *devoted to God*, and *καθωσκημένον*, *consecrated to his commands*, express the language of our Liturgy in the general Thanksgiving: " And we beseech thee, give us that due sense of all thy mercies, that our hearts may be unfeignedly thankful; and that we may shew forth thy praise, not only with our lips but in our lives, by *giving up ourselves to thy service*, and by walking before thee *in holiness and righteousness* all our days." The language of Epictetus in this passage is very different from the intellec-



always seeking prosperity without, and never able to find it. For you seek it where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is.

tual pride commonly imputed to the Stoics, (and to the more ancient Stoics, perhaps, justly) and expressed by Horace in his

————— Qui donat et aufert,  
Det vitam, det opes : æquum mi animum ipse parabo.  
(EDITOR.)

#### XIV.\*

##### *How to struggle with Difficulties.*

**DIFFICULTIES** are things, that shew what men are. For the future, on any difficulty, remember, that God, like a master exercise, has engaged you with a tough antagonist.

**For what end?**

That you may be a conqueror, like a champion in the Olympic games; and it cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion, has a more advantageous difficulty on his hands than you have, provided you will but use it, as an athletic champion doth his antagonist.

\* B. I. ch. 24.

## XV.\*

### *Of Contentment.*

§. 1. CONCERNING the gods, some affirm there is no Deity; others that he indeed exists, but slothful, negligent, and without a Providence: a third sort admit both his Being and Providence, but only in great and heavenly objects, and in nothing upon earth: a fourth, both in heaven and earth: but only in general, not in individuals: a fifth like Ulysses and Socrates, who said,

O thou, who ever present in my way,  
Dost all my motions, all my toils survey.

It is, before all things, necessary to examine each of these, which is, and which is not, rightly said. Now, if there are no gods, how is it our end to follow them? If there are, but they take no care of any thing, how will it be right, in this case, to follow them? Or, if they both

\* B. I. ch. 12.

re, and take care; yet, if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor indeed to myself in particular, how can it be right even in this case? A wise and good man, after examining these things, submits his mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the laws of the commonwealth.

§. 2. He then, who comes to be instructed, ought to come with this intention:

“How may I in every thing follow the gods? How may I acquiesce in the divine administration? And how may I be free?” For he is free, to whom all happens agreeably to his choice, and whom no one can restrain.

What, then, is freedom distraction?

By no means: for madness and freedom are incompatible.

But I would have whatever appears to

me to be right, happen ; however it comes to appear so.

You are mad ; you have lost your senses. Do not you know that freedom is a very beautiful and valuable thing ? But for me to chuse at random, and for things to happen agreeably to such a choice, may be so far from a beautiful thing, as to be, of all others, the most shocking. For how do we proceed in writing ? Do I chuse to write the name of Dion (for instance) as I will ? No : but I am taught to be willing to write it, as it ought to be writ. And what is the case in music ? The same. And what in every other art or science ? Otherwise, it would be to no purpose to learn any thing, if it was to be adapted to each one's particular humour. Is it then only in the greatest and principal point, that of freedom, permitted me to will at random ? By no means : but true instruction is this : learning to will, that things should happen as they do. And

how do they happen? As the appointer of them hath appointed. He hath appointed, that there should be summer and winter; plenty and dearth; virtue and vice; and all such contrarieties, for the harmony of the whole. To each of us he hath given a body, and its parts, and our several properties, and companions.\* Mindful of this appointment, we should enter upon a course of education and instruction, not to change the constitutions of things, which is neither put within our reach, nor for our good; but that, being as they are, and as their nature is with regard to us, we may have our mind accommodated to what exists. Can we, for instance, fly mankind? And how is that possible? Can we, by conversing with them, change them? Who hath given us such a power? What, then, remains, or what method is there to be found for such a commerce with

\* *Koinonous*, all with whom we are engaged in society,  
as Mrs. Carter has translated the term in B. I. c. 22.  
§. 2. (EDITOR.)

them, that while they act agreeably to the appearances in their own minds, we may nevertheless be affected conformably to nature? But you are wretched and discontented. If you are alone, you term it a desert; and if with men, you call them cheats and robbers. You find fault too with your parents, and children, and brothers, and neighbours, whereas you ought, when you live alone, to call that a repose and freedom; and to esteem yourself as resembling the gods: and when you are in company, not to call it a crowd and tumult, and a trouble; but an assembly, and a festival; and thus to take all things contentedly. What then is the punishment of those who do not? To be just as they are. Is any one discontented by being alone? Let him be in a desert. Discontented with his parents? Let him be a bad son; and let him mourn. Discontented with his children? Let him be a bad father. Throw him into a prison. What prison? Where he already is: for he is in a situ-

ation against his will: and wherever any one is against his will, that is to him a prison: just as Socrates was not in prison; for he was willingly there. "What then must my leg be lame?" And is it for one paltry leg, wretch, that you accuse the world? Why will you not give it up to the whole? Why will you not withdraw yourself from it? Why will you not gladly yield it to him who gave it? And will you be angry and discontented with the decrees of Jupiter; which he, with the fates, who spun in his presence the thread of your birth, ordained and appointed? Do not you know how very small a part you are of the whole?—"How wretched am I in such a father and mother!" What, then, was it granted you to come before-hand, and make your own terms, and say, "Let such and such persons, at this hour, be the authors of my birth?" It was not granted: for it was necessary that your parents should exist before you, and so you be born afterwards.--Of whom?---



Of such as they were. What, then, since they are such, is there no remedy afforded you? Now, surely, you would be wretched and miserable, if you were ignorant to what purpose you possess the faculty of sight, and shut your eyes at the approach of colours: and are not you more wretched and miserable, in being ignorant, that you have a greatness of soul, and a manly spirit answerable to each of the above-mentioned accidents. Occurrences proportioned to your faculty (of discernment) are brought before you: but you turn it away at the very time when you ought to have it the most open and quick-sighted. Why do not you rather thank the gods, that they have made you superior to whatever they have not placed in your own power; and have rendered you accountable for that only, which is in your own power? Of your parents they acquit you, as not accountable: of your brothers they acquit you; of body, possessions, death, life, they acquit you. For what, then, have they

made you accountable? For that which is alone in your own power; a right use of the appearances of objects.\* Why, then, should you draw those things upon yourself, for which you are not accountable? This is giving one's self trouble without need.

\* *Χρησις οἷα δι φαντασιων*, a right use of your ideas, notions, imaginations. *Φαντασια* (from whence our *fancy*) is the impression made upon the mind by external objects, and occurrences. (EDITOR.)

## XVI.\*

*How every thing may be performed acceptably to the gods.*

§. 1. WHEN a person inquired, How any one might eat† acceptably to the gods: if he eats with justice, says Epictetus, and gratitude; and fairly, and temperately, and decently; must he not also eat acceptably to the gods? And when you call for hot water, and your servant doth not hear you; or if he doth, brings it only warm; or perhaps is not to be found at home; then not to be angry, or burst with passion: is not this acceptable to the gods?

But how, then, can one bear such things? Wretch,‡ will you not bear with

\* B. I. ch. 13.

† “Whether, therefore, ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.” 1 Cor. x 31. (ED.)

‡ *Ανταποδορ, slave.* In these oburgatory passages Epictetus sometimes uses the word *ταλας, wretch*, sometimes *ανταποδορ, slave*. The latter is here used, as a term of severe reproach to a tyrannical temper. Senec.

your own brother, who hath God for his father, as being a son from the same stock, and of the same high descent (with yourself)?\* But if you chance to be placed in some superior station, will you presently set yourself up for a tyrant? Will you not remember what you are, and over whom you bear rule? That they are by nature your relations, your brothers, that they are offspring of God?

But I have them by right of purchase, and not they me.

Do you see what it is you regard? That it is earth and mire, and these wretched laws of dead men; and that you do not regard those of the gods.

*Says, Servi sunt? imo homines. Servi sunt? imo fratres. Servi sunt? imo cōservi. (Ed.)*

\* The principles of humanity so long inculcated by Mr. Gr. Sharp, Mr. Wilberforce, and others, for the amelioration of slavery in the West Indies, and for the abolition of the Slave Trade, and which finally triumphed over inveterate custom by an act of the Legislature in the year 1807, were first reduced to legal evidence by Mr. Gr. Sharp in his defence of Somerset, the Negro. (Ed.)

## XVII.\*

*That all things are under the Divine inspection.*

§. 1. WHEN a person asked him, how any one might be convinced, that each of his actions are under the inspection of God? Do not you think, says Epictetus, that all things are mutually connected and united?

I do.

Well: and do not you think, that things on earth feel the influence of the heavenly bodies.

Yes.

Else how could the trees so regularly, as if by God's express command, bud, blossom, bring forth fruit, and ripen it, then let it drop, and shed their leaves, and lie contracted within themselves in quietude and repose; all when he speaks the

\* B. I. ch. 14.

word? Whence, again, are there seen on the increase and decrease of the moon, and the approach and departure of the sun, so great vicissitudes and changes, to the direct contrary, in earthly things? Have then the very leaves, and our own bodies, his connection and sympathy with the whole; and have not our souls much more? But our souls are thus connected and intimately joined to God, as being indeed members and distinct portions of his essence: and must not he be sensible of every movement of them, as belonging and connatural to himself? Can even *you* think of the divine administration, and every other divine subject, and together with these of human affairs also? Can you at once receive impressions on your senses and your understanding, from a thousand objects? At once assent to some things, deny or suspend your judgment concerning others, and preserve in your mind impressions from so many and various objects, and whenever you are moved by the traces of) them, hit on ideas similar

to those which first impressed you? Can you retain a variety of arts, and the memorials of ten thousand things? And is not God capable of surveying all things, and being present with all, and receiving a certain communication from all? Is the sun capable of illuminating so great a portion of the universe, and of leaving only that small part of it unilluminated, which is covered by the shadow of the earth; and cannot HE, who made and revolves the sun a small part of himself, if compared with the whole, cannot HE perceive all things?

§. 2. "But I cannot (say you) attend to all things at once." Why, doth any one tell you that you have equal power with Jupiter? No: but nevertheless he has assigned to each man a director, his own good Genius, and committed him to his guardianship; a director, whose vigilance no slumbers interrupt, and whom no false reasonings can deceive. For to what better and more careful guardian

could he have committed us? So that when you have shut your doors, and darkened your rooms, remember, never to say that you are alone; for you are not: but God is within, and your Genius is within: and what need have they of light, to see what you are doing? To this God you likewise ought to swear such an oath as the soldiers do to Cæsar. For do they, in order to receive their pay, swear to prefer before all things the safety of Cæsar: and will not *you* swear, who have received so many and so great favors: or, if you have sworn, will you not stand to it? And what must you swear? Never to disobey, nor accuse, nor murmur at any of the things appointed by him: nor unwillingly to do or suffer any thing necessary. Is this oath like the former? In the first, persons swear not to honour any other beyond Cæsar; in the last, beyond all, to honour themselves.



## XVIII.\*

*How we may investigate the duties of life  
from the names which we bear.*

§. 1. EXAMINE who you are. In the first place, a man: that is, one who hath nothing superior to the faculty of choice; but all things are subject to this; and this itself unenslaved, and unenslaved to any thing. Consider, then, from what you are distinguished by reason. You are distinguished from wild beasts: you are distinguished from cattle. Besides, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it: not a subservient, but a principal part. You are capable of comprehending the divine œconomy; and of considering the connexions of things. What, then, doth the character of a citizen promise? To hold no private interest: to deliberate of nothing as a separate individual, but like the hand or the foot; which, if they had reason, and compre-

\* B. II. ch. 10.

hended the constitution of nature, would never pursue or desire, but with a reference to the whole. Hence the philosophers rightly say, that, if a wise and good man could foresee what was to happen, he would help forward sickness, death, and mutilation, to himself; being sensible, that these things are appointed from the order of the universe; and that the whole is superior to a part, and the city to the citizen. But since we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our duty to adhere to what is more naturally adapted to our option: for, amongst other things, we were born for this.

§. 2. Remember next, that perhaps you are a son: and what doth this character promise? To esteem every thing that is his, as belonging to his father: in every instance to obey him; not to revile him to another; not to say or do any thing injurious to him; to give way and yield in every thing; co-operating with him to the utmost of his power.

§. 3. After this, know likewise, that you are a brother too; and that to this character it belongs to make concessions; to be easily persuaded; to use gentle language; never to claim for yourself any of the things independent on choice; but cheerfully to give these, that you may have the larger share of what is dependent on that. For consider what it is, instead of a lettuce, for instance, or a chair, to procure for yourself a good temper? How great an advantage gained!

§. 4. If, besides this, you are a senator of any city, consider yourself as a senator: if a youth, as a youth; if an old man, as an old man. For each of these names, if it comes to be considered, always points out the proper duties. But, if you go and revile your brother, I tell you, you have forgot who you are, and what is your name. For, even if you were a smith, and made an ill use of the hammer, you would have forgot the smith; and if you have forgot the brother, and are become, instead of a brother, an ene-

my, do you imagine you have made no change of one thing for another, in that case? If, instead of a man, a gentle, social creature, you are become a wild beast, mischievous, insidious, biting: have you lost nothing? But must you lose money, in order to suffer damage; and is there no other thing, the loss of which endamages a man? If you were to part with your skill in grammar, or in music, would you think the loss of these a damage? And if you part with honour, decency, and gentleness, do you think that no matter? Yet the first are lost by some cause, external, and independent on choice; but the last by our own fault. There is no shame either in not having, or in losing the one; but either not to have or lose the other, is equally shameful, and reproachful, and unhappy.-----\* What doth an adulterer lose? The modest, the chaste character,

\* The original passage having, probably, a corrupt reading, and being otherwise unfit for construction, the translation of it is omitted. (EDITOR.)

the neighbour. What doth an angry person lose? Something else? A coward? Something else. No one is wicked without some loss or damage. Now, if, after all, you have made the loss of money the *only* damage, all these [wretches] are unhurt and undamaged. Nay, it may be, even gainers; as by such practices, their money might possibly be increased. But consider; if you refer every thing to money, the man who loses his nose is not hurt. Yes, say you, he is maimed in his body. Well: but doth he who loses his smell itself, lose nothing? Is there, then, no faculty of the soul, which he, who possesses it, is the better for; and he who parts with it the worse?

What sort do you mean?

Have we not a natural sense of honour?

We have.

Doth he, who loses this, suffer no da-

mage? Is he deprived of nothing? Doth he part with nothing that belongs to him? Have we no fidelity? No natural affection? No natural disposition to mutual usefulness, to mutual forbearance? Is he, then, who carelessly suffers himself to be damaged in these respects, unhurt, undamaged?

§. 5. What, then, shall not I hurt him who hath hurt me?

Consider first what *hurt* is;\* and re-

\* The Stoics considered the injurious person, in a moral sense, to be the real sufferer; that the moral injury, which he sustained was greater than the bodily injury, which he committed; and that the bodily injury was nothing to *him*, whose mind was rightly principled and regulated. In such a state of self-government, Epictetus says (Enchirid. §. 1.) "You will find fault with no one; you will accuse no one; no one will *hurt* you; you will not have an enemy: for you will suffer no *harm*:" that is, you will not think yourself hurt, you will count no one your enemy; for what the world calls *hurt* and *harm*, will not be so to you. Jerome says, *Stoici nostro dogmati in plerisque concordant.* (In Isaiam c. xi.) Their doctrine

member what you have heard from the philosophers. For if both good and evil consists in choice, see whether what you say, doth not amount to this: "Since he hath hurt himself by injuring me, shall not I hurt myself by injuring him?" Why do we not make some such representation to ourselves as this? Are we hurt when any detriment happens to our bodily possessions, and are we not at all hurt when any thing happens to our faculty of choice? He, who is deceived or hath done an injury, hath no pain in the head, nor loses an eye, a leg, or a

of *forbearance* approached very nearly to the Christian precept of not returning evil for evil, but of overcoming evil with good. So nearly indeed does the doctrine sometimes approach to our Saviour's precept, "Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also;" and "Sell that thou hast, and give to the poor;" as may well make Christians ashamed of their want of forbearance and animosities; their selfishness and avarice; and may, perhaps, convince them, that the strictest morality of the Gospel is more practicable than it appears to be. (EDITOR.)

estate: and we wish for nothing beyond these. Whether we have a modest and faithful, or a shameless and unfaithful will and choice, we make not the smallest difference, except only in the schools, as far as a few words go. Therefore all the improvement we make, reaches only to words; and beyond them is absolutely nothing.



## XIX.\*

*In what manner, upon every occasion, to preserve our character.*

§. 2. It happens that different things† are *reasonable* or *unreasonable* as well as good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, to different persons. On this account, chiefly, we stand in need of a liberal education, to teach us to adapt the preconceptions of reasonable and unreasonable to particular cases, conformably to nature. But to judge of reasonable and unreasonable, we make use not only of a due estimation of things without us, but of what relates to each person's particular character.

\* B. I. ch. 2.

† Ἄλλω δ' ἄλλο προσπίπτει το εὐλογον καὶ το ἀλογον.—  
*What is reasonable and unreasonable, good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, appears differently to different persons. (EDITOR.)*

§. 3. Hence Agrippinus, when Florus was considering whether he should go to Nero's shows, so as to perform some part in them himself, let him go.—But why do not *you* go then?" says Florus. "Because," replied Agrippinus, "*I* do not deliberate about it." For he who once sets himself about such considerations, and goes to calculate the worth of external things, approaches very near to those who forget their own character. For, why do you ask me whether death or life be the more eligible? I answer, Life. Pain or pleasure? I answer, Pleasure. "But if I do not act a part, I shall lose my head." Go and act it, then, but *I* will not. "Why?" Because you esteem yourself only as one thread of many, that make up the piece. "What then?" *You* have nothing to care for, but how to be like the rest of mankind, as one thread desires not to be distinguished from the others. But *I* would be the pur-

ple, that small and shining thing, which gives a lustre and beauty to the rest. Why do you bid me resemble the multitude, then? At that rate, how shall I be the purple?

§. 4. This Priscus Helvidius too saw, and acted accordingly: for when Vespasian had sent to forbid his going to the senate, he answered, "It is in your power to prevent my continuing a senator; but while I am one, I must go." "Well, then, at least, be silent there." "Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent." "But I must ask it." "And I must speak what appears to me to be right." "But if you do, I will put you to death." "Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your part, and I mine: it is yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish me, and mine to depart untroubled.

§. 5. What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single person? Why, what good does the purple do the gar-

ment? What, but the being a shining character in himself, and setting a good example to others? Another, perhaps, if in such circumstances Cæsar had forbidden his going to the senate, would have answered, "I am obliged to you for excusing me." But such a one he would not have forbidden to go, well knowing that he would either sit like a statue: or, if he spoke, he would say what he knew to be agreeable to Cæsar, and would overdo it, by adding still more.

§. 6. Thus acted even a wrestler, who was in danger of death, unless he consented to an ignominious amputation. His brother, who was a philosopher, coming to him, and saying, "Well, brother, what do you design to do? Let us cut away this morbid part, and return again to the field." He refused, and courageously died.

§. 7. When it was asked, whether he acted thus as a wrestler or a philosopher? I answer, as a man, said Epictetus; but.

as a man who had been proclaimed a champion at the Olympic games; who had been used to such places, and not exercised merely in the school of Bato. Another would have had his very head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that regard to character, so powerful to those who are accustomed to introduce it, from their own breasts, into their deliberations.

§. 8. "Come now, Epictetus, take off your beard." If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not take it off. "Then I will take off your head." If that will do you any good, take it off.

§. 9. It was asked, how should each of us perceive what belongs to his character? Whence, replied Epictetus, does a bull, when the lion approaches, perceive his own qualifications, and expose himself alone for the whole herd? It is evident, that with the qualifications occurs, at the same time, the consciousness of being indued with them. And in the same

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manner, whoever of us hath such qualifications, will not be ignorant of them. But neither is a bull, nor a gallant spirited man, formed at once. We are to exercise and qualify ourselves, and not to run rashly upon what doth not concern us.

§. 10. Only consider at what price you sell your will and choice, man: if for nothing else, that you may not sell it for a trifle. Greatness indeed, and excellence, perhaps, belong to others, to such as Socrates. Why, then, as we are born with a like nature, do not all, or the greater number, become such as he?

Why: are all horses swift? Are all dogs sagacious? What, then, because Nature hath not befriended me, shall I neglect all care of myself? Heaven forbid! Epictetus is inferior to Socrates, but if superior to—this is enough for me. I shall never be Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body: nor Cræsus, and yet I do not

neglect my property : nor, in general, do we omit the care of any thing belonging to us, from a despair of arriving at the highest degree of perfection.

## XX.\*

*That some advantage may be gained from every external circumstance.*

§. 1. IN appearances that are merely objects of contemplation,† almost all persons have allowed good and evil to be in ourselves, and not in externals. No one says, It is good to be day; evil, to be night; and the greatest evil that three should be four; but what? That knowledge is good, and error evil. So that concerning falsehood itself, there exists one good thing; the knowledge, that it is falsehood. Thus, then, should it be in life also. Health is a good; sickness an evil. No, sir. But what? A right use of health is a good, a wrong one, an evil. So that in truth it is possible to be a gainer, even by sickness. And is it not possible by death too? By mutilation? Do you think Menæceus an inconsiderable

\* B. III. ch. 20.

† Φαντασιαι διανοητικαι, *notiones theoreticae*. SCHWEIGHEUSER.



gainer by death? "May whoever talks thus be such a gainer as he was!" Why: pray, sir, did not he preserve his patriotism, his magnanimity, his fidelity, his gallant spirit? And, if he had lived long, would he not have lost all these? Would not cowardice, mean spiritedness, and hatred of his country, and a wretched love of life, have been his portion? Well, now: do not you think him a considerable gainer by dying? No, but I warrant you the father of Admetus was a great gainer, by living on in so mean spirited and wretched a way as he did! Why: did not he die at last? For heaven's sake, cease to be thus struck by the mere materials [of action].\* Cease to make yourselves slaves; first of things, and then upon their account, of the men who have the power either to bestow, or take them away. Is there any advantage, then, to be gained from these men? From all, even from a reviler. What

\* *Τας ἰλας, materias et res externis quascunque.*

advantage doth a wrestler gain from him, with whom he exercises himself, before he combat? The greatest. Why: must in the same manner I exercise myself with this man. He exercises me in patience, in gentleness, in meekness. No: but,\*I suppose, I gain an advantage from him who manages my neck, and sets my back and shoulders in order; and the best thing a master of exercise can say is, "Lift him up with both hands,"† and the heavier he is, the greater is my advantage: and yet, it is no advantage to me, when I am exercised in gentleness of temper! This is not knowing how to gain an advantage from men. Is my neighbour a bad one? He is so, to himself; but a good one to me. He exercises

\* Ου αλλ', perhaps, is equivalent to ου μὴν αλλ', that is, *verum*, or *veruntamen*; or it should be so read. (ED.)

† The Greek says simply, *Lift*, without *him*. Perhaps instead of βαρύτερος ἰκνῶς, *the heavier he is*, it should be βαρύτερον ἰκνῶ, (sc. *pondus*) *the heavier it is*. The heavier the weight, the greater is the exercise of strength, and the greater my advantage. (EDITOR.)

my good temper, my moderation. Is my father bad? To himself; but not to me. "This is the rod of Hermes. Touch with it whatever you please, and it will become gold." Bring sickness, death, want, reproach, capital trial. All these by the rod of Hermes, shall turn to advantage. "What will you make of death?" Why: what but an ornament to you? what but a means of your shewing, by action, what the man is, who knows and follows the will of nature. What will you make of sickness? I will shew its nature. I will make a good figure in it; I will be composed and happy. I will not flatter my physician. I will not wish to die. What need you ask further? Whatever you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, respectable and eligible. No. "But take care not to be sick." Just as if one should say, "Take care that the appearance of three being four doth not present itself to you." "It is an evil." How an evil, man? If I think as I ought about it, what hurt will it any longer do

ne? Will it not rather be even an advantage to me? If, then, I think as I ought, of poverty, of sickness, of being out of power, is not that enough for me? Why, then, must I seek any longer good or evil in externals? But what is the state of the case? These things are allowed here; but nobody carries them home; but immediately every one is in a state of war with his servant, his neighbours, with those who sneer and ridicule him. Well fare Lesbius,\* for proving every day, that I know nothing.

\* *Nomen servi sive scurræ alicujus.* Upton.

## XXI.\*

*Proficiency in philosophy not to be expected without devoting the whole mind to the study of it.—Philosophy and conformity to the world incompatible.*

§. 1. In every affair consider what precedes and follows; and then undertake it. Otherwise you will begin with spirit; but not having thought of the consequences, when some of them appear, you will shamefully desist. "I would conquer at the Olympic games." But consider what precedes and follows, and then, if it be for your advantage, engage in the affair. You must conform to rules; submit to a diet; refrain from dainties; exercise your body, whether you chuse it or not, at a stated hour, in heat or cold; you must drink no cold water; nor, sometimes, even wine. In a word, you must give yourself up to your

\* B. III. ch. 15.

master, as to a physician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate your arm, turn your ankle, swallow abundance of dust, be whipt; and, after all, lose the victory. When you have reckoned up all this, if your inclination still holds, set about the combat. Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children, who sometimes play wrestlers, sometimes gladiators, sometimes blow a trumpet, and sometimes act a tragedy; when they happen to have seen and admired these shews. Thus you too will be, at one time, a wrestler; at another, a gladiator; now a philosopher; then an orator: but with your whole soul, nothing at all. Like an ape you mimic all you see; and one thing after another is sure to please you; but it is out of favour, as soon as it becomes familiar. For you never entered upon any thing considerably, nor after having viewed the whole matter on all sides, or made any scrutiny into it; but rashly, and with a cold inclination. Thus some, when they

have seen a philosopher, and heard a man speak like Euphrates, (though indeed, who can speak like him?) have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider your shoulders, your back, your thighs : for different persons are made for different things. Do you think that you can act as you do, and be a philosopher? That you can eat, and drink, and be angry, and discontented, as you are now? You must watch; you must labour; you must get the better of certain appetites : must quit your acquaintance; be despised by your servant; be laughed at by those you meet; come off worse than others in every thing; in magistracies; in honours; in courts of judicature. When you have considered all these things round, approach, if you please: if, by parting with them, you have a mind to purchase apathy, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, do not come hither: do not,

like children, be one while a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Cæsar's officers. These things are not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must cultivate either your own ruling faculty, or externals; and apply yourself either to things within or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the vulgar.\*

\* There is no situation in life, which requires so much preparation of *mind* to ensure success in it, as the Ministry of the Church. Because there is no situation, in which a mind divided between the world and the Gospel, is thereby so unfitted for its duties. The discipline of the Church has made the wisest provision for the happiest success in it, by the previous examination, which it requires, into the competency and disposition and character of Candidates for Orders. Nothing can exceed the solemnity and strictness of the engagements, into which the Candidate enters, to devote, as far as possible, his whole mind and talents to the duties, which he undertakes. If these engagements are afterwards forgotten or neglected, it must be owing to the *mind* not being prepared by previous habits and appropriate studies to receive the impressions, which those engagements ought to make on him, nor for the restraints, which the office requires, the,



responsibility, which it entails, the difficulties and danger, which it involves, the singleness of heart, the disinterestedness, and unworldly-mindedness, which it enjoins, with an unremitting solicitude for the salvation of the souls committed to his charge.


The preparation of the heart is the great requisite for success in the Christian ministry. The language of the Son of Sirach is very applicable to the moral discipline of Epictetus in this Section: My Son, if thou comest to serve the Lord, prepare thy soul for temptation, [for difficulties and trials.] Set thy heart aright, and constantly endure." (Ch. ii. 1, 2.) Learning, especially professional learning, must be diligently cultivated; but that will be insufficient without a due cultivation of the spirit, the temper, the affections. "Son, give me thine heart," is the language of divine wisdom. The love, which God requires of us, is that of the whole heart.

Of the various talents necessary for the due discharge of the Christian ministry, and of the caution, with which it should be undertaken, Bishop BULL has discoursed most impressively in his Sermon on *the difficulty and danger of the Priestly office*. (Sermons, Vol. 1. p. 223. ed. 1713.) The following passage is an extract from it. "I have sometimes, not without wonder and indignation, observed the strange confidence of empiricks in Physick, that dare venture on the practice of that noble art, which they do not at all understand; considering how for a little paltry gain

they shrewdly [probably] hazard, or rather certainly destroy the health and lives of men, and have judged them worthy of as capital and ignominious a punishment, as those that kill men on the high ways. But I have soon exchanged my meditation into another of more concernment to myself; and my indignation hath quickly returned into my own bosom, when I consider how much bolder and more hazardous an attempt it is for a man to venture on the Priestly Office, to minister to the eternal health and salvation of souls. How much skill is requisite to qualify a man for such an undertaking? how great care in the discharge of it? what a sad thing it would be, if through my unskilfulness, or negligence, any one soul should miscarry under my hands, or die and perish eternally?"

(EDITOR.)

— — —  
THE END.  
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## APPENDIX

TO THE NOTE TO SECT. IX. p. 36—41.

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LIPSII MANUDUCT. AD STOICAM PHILOS.  
LIB. III. DISS. XXIII.

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*Decretum hoc [de morte voluntaria] rejectum, et  
ostensum non licere, non debere, mixtis rationi-  
bus testibusque.*

AVD. Heus tu, an non aliquid inclinas [ad Stoicum  
dogma]? LIPS. Absit: respuo. Quod accuratius  
dixerim, candide et magno a me animo factum. Causæ  
prævaricari numquid debui? et pleraque omnia igitur  
attuli, nec dicta iis subduxi: quia vincere constitui,  
non circumscribere. Ecce enim omnes istos aliosque  
colores una Veritatis spongia jam ibo detersum. Audi,  
et intende. Aio plerisque omnibus priscæ et veræ sa-  
pientiæ, sententiam hanc damnatam. Homero in pri-  
mis: apud quem hoc votum exprimitur.

Βουλοίμην κ' ἐπαρῶρες εἶναι θητεῦμαι ἄλλῳ  
Ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὃ μὴ βίωτος πολὺς ἐστίν,  
ἢ πᾶσι κενύσει καταφθιμότητι ἀμύσειν.

*Eligam ego, vel in agris vivens inservire  
 Pauperem apud dominum, cui nec sit copia victus,  
 Quam functus functis dare jura, atque imperitare.*

Item magno Pythagoræ, qui *vetat* (ait Cicero) *injussu Imperatoris, id est Dei, de præsidio et statione vila discedere*. Quid Platoni et asseclis? communis hæc assertio, *Piis omnibus retinendum esse animum in custodia Corporis, nec injussu ejus, a quo ille est datus, ex hominum vita migrandum esse: ne munus humanum, adsignatum a Deo, defugisse videamur*. Et Apuleius inter illius dogmata: *Sapiens corpus non relinquet invito Deo. Nam etsi in ejus manu est mortis facultas, et quamvis sciat se terrenis relictis consequuturum esse meliora; nisi perpetiendum istud lex divina decreverit, accersire tamen eum mortem non debere*. Sicut enim quos magistratus in carcerem aut custodiam dedit, nisi ejus venia non exeunt: si faciunt, pœnam sibi adaugent: ita si quis velut furtiva discessione e vita abit, non vitari miseriam, sed cumulari. Talis enim anima metu, dolore, odio fecisse id videtur: quas passiones secum aufert, et his velut sordibus infecta non venit ad liberos purosque illos locos. Virgilius Platonissans:

*Proxima deinde tenent mæsti loca, qui sibi letum  
 Insones peperere manu, lucemque perosi  
 Projecere animas. Quam vellent æthere in alto  
 Nunc et pauperiem et duros perferre labores!*

Una duntaxat mors licita, atque adeo laudata; illa, cum

anima corporas illecebras, adhuc in copore constituta, contemnit, et soluta illis vinculis cælo et sideribus meditatione infertur: de qua sentimus, cum dicimus, *Philosophiam mortis studium esse*. Talia, et plura, Platonici: jam Aristoteles palam hanc spontaneam mortem damnat: atque id ratione. Ait enim tantum abesse, ut viri fortis aut magnanimi talis exitio sit, ut contra timidi et ignavi. Verba ejus: Το δὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φυγοντα πεινᾷ, ἢ ἔρωτα, ἢ τι λυπηρὸν, οὐκ ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλὰ μάλ' ὅλων δούλω· μαλακία γάρ, το φυγεῖν τα πτωχονα' καὶ οὐχ' ὅτι κρλον, ὑπομῖναι, ἀλλὰ φυγων κακόν: *Mori ob inopiam, aut amorem, aut aliud molestum, non est fortis viri, sed timidi. Mollities enim, fugere difficilia et aspera, neque mortem, ut bonum sustinet, sed malum fugiens.* Euripides Herculem loqui consimiliter facit:

Ἐσκεψάμην δι, καί ποτε ἐν κακοῖσιν ὄν,  
Μὴ δειδῶν ὀφλῶ τιν', ἐκλίπων φόος.  
Ταῖς συμφοραῖς γὰρ ὅστις οὐχ' ὑφίσταται,  
Οὐδ' ἄνδρος αἰ δύταισθ' ὑποσθῆναι βίλος:

*Consideravi ego, malis etsi obrutus,  
Nequis timorem, vita abire, censeat:  
Nam qui malis subsistere haudquaquam est potis,  
Nec ille contra tela subsistat viri.*

Et apud Curtium pulchre: *Fortium virorum est, magis mortem contemnere, quam odisse vitam. Saepetudio laboris, ad vilitatem sui, compelluntur ignavi: ut virtus nihil inexpertum omittit. Itaque ultimum omnium mors est, ad quam non figere ire satis est.*

Est ergo ignaviæ: quid, quod sævitæ etiam est!  
Immergis in te ferrum, aut venenum: et id quod alteri  
factum horreas; in te prompte usurpas. Varro ad  
hos tales:

*Quannum te dicam esse feram,  
Qui manu corporis fervidos  
Aperis lucus sanguinis,  
Atque vita te levas  
Ferreo ense?*

Adde injustitiam. Quæ enim lex divina aut humana  
permittit innocentem tollere? quæ indemnatum tollere?  
Si tu alium, culpæ et pœnæ, vel te iudice, esset: qui  
magis te poteris? Egregie Augustinus: *Iloc fecit  
illa, illa sic prædicata Lucretia. innocentem, castam,  
vim perpassam Lucretiam Lucretia insuper interemit.  
Proferte sententiam leges, iudicesque Romani.* Deni-  
que dicam et stultitiæ esse. Quis enim nescit, impetu  
hoc sæpius et furore quodam, et fervida impatientia,  
quam consilio aut deliberato fieri? Quinctilianus at-  
testabitur: *Non fiunt ista, nisi subito: nec quisquam  
(præsertim nulla gravi præcedente causa) spiritum  
ratione deposuit.* Postremo, an non contra naturam  
est? nec ipse Zeno dissitebitur, Mortem esse inter ea  
quæ illa rejicit et adversatur. Est, inquam, ita *Indiffe-  
rens*, ut tamen inter *Apoproegmena* sive *Rejectanea*  
sit. Ne sit mala, tamen habet mali speciem: et *sui  
cuique amor est, et conservandi se permanendique in-  
sita voluntas, atque aspernatio dissolutionis.* Cur igi-

tur, quod aspernandum erat, sumis? Cur tantum momenti in aliis illis *Indifferentibus* ponis, ut ad hoc tam triste decurras? Augustinus belle vobis hic insultat: *Quæ mala, Stoici, inquit, miror qua fronte mala non esse contendant; quibus fatentur, si tanta fuerint, ut Sapiens ea vel non possit, vel non debeat sustinere, cogi eum mortem sibi inferre, atque ex hac vita emigrare. Misera Beatitudo, quæ desinere et extingui ob Indifferens aliquid debeat! Itaque ipsi Stoici, modestiores sæpe et sapientiores voces spargunt, a Vero adacti. Epictetus alibi fervidorum istorum vota aut tædia commemorat: Epictete, nos corpusculi hujus vinculis adstringi diutius non possumus: cibum potumque dando, dormiendo, lassi sumus. Nonne Mors mala non est? nonne cognati deorum sumus, atque inde venimus? Sine tandem liberari compedibus istis, atque illuc redire. Illic latrones, fures, iudicia sunt, et quos tyrannos vocant: qui potestatem sibi in nos sumunt ob hoc corpusculum, et quæ adhærent. Sine ostendamus eis, quam nihil in nos habeant juris. Libet, libet abire. Hæc isti: quid autem ipse? Mihi vero dicendum est, inquit: Ἀνθρώποι ἐκδέξασθε τοὺς Θεοὺς, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος σημήνη καὶ ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας. τοτ' ἀπολυσιθεὶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος ἀνασχισθεὶς τοῖς αὐτοῦ τῇ χωρᾷ, εἰς ἣν ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς σταξῇ· ὀλίγος ἀεὶ χρόνος οὗτος ὃ τῆς οἰκισίας, καὶ ῥάδιος τοῖς αὐτῶν διακείμενοις: Homines sustinete, Deum expectate, donec ille signum dederit, et solverit vos hoc ministerio: tunc ad eum redite. Nunc autem in præsentis*



*tolerate æquo animo, et incolite regionem istam, in qua vos collocavit. Enim vero EXIGUUM TEMPUS HUIUS INCOLATUS, et facile nec grave tuis, qui sic sunt affecti. O vere hic Epicteteum! id est, divinum. Sed et Seneca noster sæpe temperat: Vides quosdam, inquit, optantes mortem, et quidem magis quam rogari vult vitam. Nescio utros existimem majorem nobis animum dare: qui deposcunt mortem, an qui hilares eam quietique opperiantur, quoniam illud ex rabie interdum ac repentina indignatione fit; hæc ex judicio certo tranquillitas est. Alibi talia notes: sed etiam alia: neque in unâ parte constiterunt. Sed quid laboriosa hæc tela spargo? decretoriis opus est. Deus, Deus, inquam, vetat injussu suo abire: quid disputamus, aut nugamur? Vox ejus Sacris nostris prodita, Non occides: quem? non te, non alium: et scito illum vitæ dominum tantum, qui dedit. Itaque patientiæ exempla infinita apud nos sunt: et vita in molestiis transacta; et tormenta tolerata; et mors ipsa ob pietatem obita; sed obita, non sumpta. Atqui exempla etiam alia, dicet quispiam. Sampson ille, per quem mira Deus operatus, non se ruina domus, cum aliis oppressit? Razias Judæus, gladio percussit, ne in hostium potestatem veniret, et mox de muro deiecit, denique et intestina manibus suis sparsit? quod Sacra ita narrant, ut speciem probantium habere videantur. Respondeo, de Sampson, nihil sine Deo, imo jussione ejus factum. Instinctus hic fuit: et spiritus latenter hoc jusserat (Augustini verba) qui per illum miracula*

*faciebat.* Simile idem ille Doctor in virginibus censet, quæ mortem sumpsisse, ne violarentur, leguntur. Ut in Sophronia, quæ Maxentii libidinem repulit, gladium in se admisit : ut in Pelagia, quæ flumine ultro mergi, quam a milite pollui, elegit. Monitum aut jussio Dei hic quoque præsumenda : et *quis obedientiam in crimen vocet ? quis obsequium pietatis accuset ?* De Razia, haud æque promptum definire est. Factum ejus probum ? ambigitur, neque Sacra dicunt, nisi *Nobiliter et Viriliter* fecisse : *Bene* aut *Laudabiliter* non dicunt. Et fatendum est, Judæos posteriores a moribus gentium paullatim aliquid sumpsisse, a quibus certe fuit, quod tam crebræ illæ sui cædes leguntur in excidio Judææ atque urbis, quod Josephus descripsit. Enimvero cum Augustino tuto definimus : *his exceptis, quos vel Lex justa, vel ipse fons justitiæ Deus jubet occidi ; quisquis hominem, vel seipsum, vel quemlibet occiderit, Homicidii crimine innecti.* Et nulla tamen, inquires, exceptio est ? Quid igitur si Magistratus aut Princeps mortem mihi indicat, non possim aut debeam exsequi ? Fuere enim, et sunt tempora aut regiones, quibus id fiat. Sub Tiberio, Nerone, Domitiano, commune mittere Tribunum aut Centurionem, et *extremam necessitatem denunciare.* Siquis pareret, et mortem occuparet ; manebant testamenta, *justa funeris, pretium (ait Tacitus) festinandi.* Sin autem ; ecce carcer, carnifex, laqueus, Gemoniæ, fiscus. Apud Japanes etiam hodie usitari aiunt, ut Rex offensus nobilium alicui mandet, *Abi, ventrem tibi scinde : et ille*

pareat, faciatque. In his igitur talibus, ecquid dicendum? Primum, quid Stoici, videamus: nam et illi hic aliquid decernunt. Seneca: *Aliquando, etiamsi certa mors instabit, et destinatum sibi SUPPLICIUM sciet, non commodabit Sapiens PÆNÆ suæ manum. Stultitia est, timore mortis mori. Veniet, qui occidat: expecta; quid occupas alienum negotium?* Propior neganti hic videtur: sed statim, cum distinctione tamen aliqua, etiam admittit. *Non possis, inquit, de re IN UNIVERSUM pronunciare. Multa enim sunt, quæ in utramque partem possunt trahere. Si altera mors cum tormento, altera simplex et facilis: quidni huic injicienda sit manus? Quemadmodum navim eligam navigaturus, domum habitaturus; ita mortem utique, qua sum e vita exiturus meliorem.* Definit ecce, eligi posse et debere viam ejus mitiorem: et ipse a Nerone mori jussus, fecit. Quid autem nostri hic Theologi? firmiter nescio, et audio in Scholis dissentire. Si tamen vere dicimus Legem et Magistratum posse occidere: cur non etiam tali et tali modo, vel manu? Cum mihi jubent, cur non paream? Jubeant, dico; nam aliud fortasse, si tantum permittant. Enimvero et hoc evenit, ac quæri potest. Ecce Massiliæ olim, cicutæ venenum publice custodiebatur, quod daretur ei, qui causas Sexcentis (id enim Senatus ejus nomen erat) exhibuisset, propter quas mors esset illi expectanda. Illi audiebant, cognoscebant, definiebant. Idem in Græcia alibi, et insula Cœo. Quid igitur? an illis approbantibus, qui jus vitæ necisque in me

habent, licebit? Non opinor, nec enim ipsi adigunt, sed euntem te ultro non sistunt. Decreto tuo comites, non auctores se præbent. Sed omitto, et satis habeo universe docuisse, Mortem arbitrii nostri non esse: nec Stoicis me, hac parte, suffragium dare.

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GATAKERI NOTA AD M. ANTONIN.

L. III. §. 1. P. 84. ed. Lond.

—— Hanc autem sententiam, quæ et Chrysippea est, exagitat Plut. *de commun. notit.* c. 10, et c. 29. Quod pro fundamento substernitur, ita Stob. expressit. *Τοις καθηκουσι και τοις περι το καθηκον, μετρησθαι την τε ζην και τον θανατον.* Vide *infr. lib. 5. §. 29.* Sed et Lipsius *Manuduct. l. 3. cap. 22.* Dogma ipsum exagitavit et Ter. Varro in *Satyra Menippeæ*, cui titulus *Περὶ εξαγωγῆς*, unde paucula adhuc supersunt fragmina, quæ argumenti totius gustum dent allquem. Refutavit feliciter satis Alexander Aphoodis. in *libello*, quo disserit *εἰ αὐταρκῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*, ostenditque ex ipsorum principiis *αλογοὶ τε καὶ ἀποκοι ὧς, τὴν εὐλογὸν ονομαζομένην τὴν εξαγωγήν.* Πῶς εὐλογος, inquit, *εξαγωγή τῇ τῇ ἀρετῇ ἔχοντι, εἰ μακροῖα βίωσιν;* ὥς γὰρ ἀποκοι το λῆγειν τοῦ Δια θάλειν ἀποθανεῖν· οὕτως ἀποκοι καὶ τῇ ἐπιστῇ τούτῃ μακροῖα ζῶνται (audis fastus Stoici verba; de quo *ad §. 7.*) *ἵαυτοι εξαγίν εὐλογῶς τούτου τοῦ βίου.* το γὰρ μήτε *παρέρτος* τίς κακοῦ, μήτε *προσδεκομένου*, τῆς τε ἀκέραι εὐδαιμο-

νας περι' αὐτοὺς οὐσης, τοὺς βίον ἀπολιπεῖν, καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν,
 βουλοσθαι, θαυμάσιον, καὶ τῇ κατὰ λόγον μαχομένοι. πῶς γὰρ
 εὐλογοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦθ' ὑποβάλλειν τῇ σοφίᾳ; οὐδὲ γὰρ ὥσπερ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινος, αὐτῶν δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονίας εὐλογῶν αἷς ἔχον·
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ κορὸς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀρετῆς. εἰς ἀπειροὺς γὰρ τῶν τιλῶν
 ορεῖξίς· καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι αὐτῶν ἡ ἀναρχία. Ita absurdum
 esse dogma contendit; utpote quos nec rationi ipsi,
 nec ipsorum etiam principiis consentaneum existat,
 estque revera pietati veræ religionique sensus prorsus
 adversum. Agnoscunt hoc et exteri. Socrates apud Pla-
 tonem *Phædone*: ὅς ἐν τῇ φρεσὶ ἵσμεν οἱ ἀθανάτων· καὶ ἐὰν δὲ
 αὐτοὺς ἐκ ταύτης ἐξαγῶν, οὐδὲ ἀποδιδρασκίην. Et tanquam ex
 Africani persona Cicerō *de repub. l. 6.* apud Macro-
 b. *in Scip. somn. l. 1. c. 13.* *Pitis omnibus retinendus
 animus est in custodia corporis; nec injussu ejus
 quo ille est vobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum
 est; ne manus assignatum a Deo defugisse videantur.*
 Idem ipse *Tusc. l. 1.* *Vetat dominans ille in nobis
 Deus, injussu hinc nos suo discedere.* Et in *Caton.*
*Vetat Pythagoras injussu imperatoris, id est, Dei, de
 præsidio et statione vitæ decedere.* Apul. *de philo-
 soph.* *Sapiens corpus non relinquet invito Deo. Nam
 etsi in ejus manu est mortis facultas, et quamvis sciat
 se terrenis relictis consecuturum esse meliora, nisi
 perpetiendum istud lex divina decreverit, accersere
 tamen eum mortem non debere.* Plura habes apud
 Lips. *manuduct. lib. 3. c. 23.* et in *Tacit. hist. lib. 2.*
 E nostris eleganter Lactant. *institut. l. 3. cap. 18.* Si
 homicida nefarius est, quia hominis extinctor est:

eidem sceleri obstrictus est, qui se necat ; quia hominem necat : imo vero majus esse id facinus existimandum est, cujus ultio Deo soli subjacet. Nam, sicut in hanc villam non nostra sponte venimus ; ita rursus ex hoc domicilio corporis, quod tuendum nobis assignatum est, ejusdem jussu recedendum est, qui nos in hoc corpus induxit, tam diu habitaturos, donec jubeat emitte. Et si vis aliqua inferatur, æqua mente id ferendum est, cum extincta innocentis anima inulta esse non possit : habeamusque judicem magnum, cui soli vindicta integra semper est. Pie item admodum disertæque August. de Civit. Dei, lib. 1. cap. 27. Hoc dicimus, hoc asserimus, hoc modis omnibus comprobamus, neminem spontaneam mortem sibi inferre debere, velut fugiendo molestias temporales, ne incidat in perpetuas : neminem propter aliena peccata ; ne hoc ipso incipiat habere gravissimum proprium, quem non pollubat alienum : neminem propter sua peccata præterita, propter quæ magis hac vita opus est, ut possint pœnitendo sanari : neminem velut desidioso vitæ molipris, quæ post mortem speratur, quia reos suæ mortis post mortem vita non suscipit. Restat una causa, propter quam se quis occidat ; ne in peccatum irruat, vel blandiente voluptate, vel sævientie dolore. Hanc si admittimus, cur non baptizatis suademus, se illico interimant ? tunc enim tempus est cavendi omnia futura peccata, cum omnia sint deleta præterita. Porro hoc si quis putat, non dico, desipit, sed insanit. Hoc ergo quia nefas est dicere, nefas est profecto se

occidere. Nam si hoc sponte faciendi ulla justa causa esse posset, proculdubio justior quam illa non esset. Quia vero nec illa est, ergo nulla est. Videndus idem in epist. 61. et sub ejusdem nomine, nisi Erasmus fefellerit, Hugo Victor. de patient. c. 13. qui his verbis concludit: si parricida eo sceleratior, quam quilibet homicida, quia non tantum hominem, verum etiam propinquum necat; et in ipsis parricidis, quanto propinquiorem quisque peremerit, tanto judicatur immatior; sine dubio peior est, qui se occidit, quia nemo est homini seipso propinquior. Et quomodo innocens judicabitur, cui dictum est, Diliges proximum tuum, tanquam te, si homicidium committit in seipso, quod prohibetur in proximo? Vide Epictetum, et nostrum ipsum, l. 5. §. 10. et l. 9. §. 3. (GATAKER.)

Huc etiam accedit, nos tanquam *homines*, et Dei creaturas, illius esse, et non nostri juris; quin alio etiam nomine, tanquam *Christianos*, nos Dei opus esse, (Eph. ii. 10.) atque adeo alieni juris; denique tanquam *pretio emptos*, (1 Cor. vi. 19.) nos Redemptoris esse, et non nostri juris. (EDITOR.)

FINIS.

SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE SELECTIONS FROM ARRIAN.

THESE Extracts from Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus having been selected as materials of instruction in a septennial course of studies for young men intended for Holy Orders, the xxi. of these Selections, and the note which accompanies it, and the additions contained in this Supplement, are addressed to *their* particular attention. The admonitions of Epictetus are applicable, with a singular coincidence and aptitude, to candidates for the Christian Ministry. His most general positions are of very great importance,—that success in the profession and teaching of philosophy, that is, of religion, (for their philosophy was their religion,) depends on the *views and motives*, with which it is undertaken and pursued;—and that proficiency in philosophy is not to be expected without devoting the *whole mind* to it; and is incompatible with *conformity to the world*.

His observations and advice respecting the necessary preparations for this profession, are strongly marked with that Christian character, which Jerome noticed in the

philosophy of the Stoics. He says, in the xxiv. of these Selections, which relates to those, who "rashly set up for teachers of "philosophy," (the original of which is printed in this Supplement, page 201,) that a teacher of philosophy should prepare himself for his office by sacrifices and prayers; and should enter on it with a mind purified, and affected with a deep sense that he is approaching ancient and sacred rites; that the office is a great and mysterious duty, and not to be given to any one casually and indifferently; that mere wisdom is not a sufficient qualification for it; that a certain age and suitable habits of life are necessary preparatives; and above all things, the *counsel of God moving him to undertake it*, προ παντων του θεου ΣΤΜΒΟΤΑΕΤΕΙΝ ταυτην την χωραν κατασχειν. We have here a very near approach to that serious question:—"Do you trust, that you are inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost, to take upon you this office and ministration?"

For any one to enter on the office without such preparation; with a mind *not* actuated by such views and motives,—*not* purified and chastened by suitable habits of

life,—not under the guidance of God, *θεον ἡγεμονα*, not moved by his directing influence, *τον θεον συμβουλευσιν*,—was, in the opinion of Epictetus, to enter upon it *without God*, which he condemns in terms that are calculated to excite feelings corresponding with Gataker's humiliating compunctions. “He who attempts so great a matter, *without God*, (*ὁ διχα θεου τῷ τηλικαυτῷ πραγματι ἐπιβαλλομενος*,) is an object of divine wrath, and would only bring public dishonour on himself.”

FAS EST ET AB ETHNICO DOCERI.

In the xxiv. Section, the language of Epictetus respecting the *change*, which ought to have taken place in the mind of a person *teaching or professing Philosophy*, may not unaptly be compared with the Christian doctrine of *conversion*; and with the Rev. C. Wilks's Essay on the Signs of Conversion in *Ministers of Religion*.

The Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans, and the Hymn of Cleanthes, are so congenial with the Philosophy of Epictetus, that they are subjoined to the Extracts from Arrian, as mutual illustrations of each other.

SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE SELECTIONS.

XXII.*

*In what Manner we ought to bear
Sickness.*

§. 1. **WE** should have all our principles ready, to make use of, on every occasion; at dinner, such as relate to dinner; in the bath, such as relate to the bath; in the bed, such as relate to the bed.

“ Let not the stealing god of sleep surprise,
Nor creep in slumbers on thy weary eyes,
Ere ev’ry action of the former day
Strictly thou dost, and righteously survey,
What have I done? In what have I transgress’d?
What good, or ill, has this day’s life express’d?
Where have I fail’d, in what I ought to do?
If evil were thy deeds, repent and mourn,
If good, rejoice——”.

ROWE’S PYTHAGORAS.

* Disc. B. III. ch. 10.

We should retain these verses, so as to apply them to our use: not merely to repeat them aloud, as we do the verses in honour of Apollo, [without minding what we are about] *.

§. 2. Again: In a fever, we should have such principles ready, as relate to a fever; and not, as soon as we are taken ill, to lose and forget all. Provided I do but act like a philosopher, let what will happen. Some way or other depart I must from this frail body, whether a fever comes, or not†. What is it to be a philosopher? Is it not to be prepared against events? Do not you comprehend, that you say, in effect, if I am but prepared to bear all events with calm-

* This place is either corrupt; as Mr. Upton thinks; or alludes to some ancient custom not sufficiently understood now.

† This is a corrupt passage, and the translation conjectural. Perhaps the true reading might be *που ποτ' ἀπελθόντα του σωματιου διαι ἀπειλόηει με*; and it is so translated. There is a similar turn of expression in the fifth chapter of the second book, which seems to favour this notion. See page 189. l. 1. of Mr. Upton's edition.

ness, let what will happen; otherwise, you are like a Pancratiast, who, after receiving a blow, should quit the combat. In that case indeed you may allowably leave off, and not [run the hazard] of being whipt*. But what shall we get by leaving off philosophy? What then ought each of us to say upon every difficult occasion? "It was for this, that I exercised: it was for this, that I prepared myself." God says to you, give me a proof if you have gone through the preparatory combats, according to rule†: if you have followed a proper diet; and proper exercise; if you have obeyed your master: and, after this, do you faint, at the very time of action? Now is the proper time for a fever; bear it well: for thirst: bear it well:

* Which was the punishment of those, who presented themselves, as candidates at the Olympic Games, and did not comply with the rules, which were to be observed, upon that occasion. Epictetus is here speaking of the preparatory exercises, which lasted for ten months before the combat.

† S. Paul has made use of this very expression, *τομὴν αὐτοῦ*, 2 Tim. ii. 5.

for hunger: bear it well. Is it not in your power? Who shall restrain you? A physician may restrain you from drinking; but he cannot restrain you from bearing your thirst well. He may restrain you from eating; but he cannot restrain you from bearing your hunger well.—But I cannot follow my studies.—And for what end do you follow them, Wretch? Is it not that you may be prosperous? That you may be constant? That you may think and act conformably to nature? What restrains you, but that in a fever, you may preserve your ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the proof of the matter. Here is the trial of the philosopher: for a fever is a part of life, just as a walk, a voyage, or a journey. Do you read, when you are walking? No: nor in a fever. But when you walk well, you have every thing belonging to a walker: so, if you bear a fever well, you have every thing belonging to one in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame either God

or man: not to be afflicted at what happens: to expect death in a right and becoming manner; and to do what is to be done; when the physician enters, not to dread what he may say; nor, if he should tell you, that you are in a fair way, to be too much rejoiced: (for what good hath he told you? When you were in health, what good did it do you?) not to be dejected when he tells you, that you are very ill: for what is it to be very ill? To be near the separation of soul and body. What harm is there in this, then? If you are not near it now, will you not be near it hereafter? What, will the world be quite upset when you die? Why then, do you flatter your physician? Why do you say, "If you please, Sir, I shall do well?"* Why do you furnish an occasion to his pride? Why do not you treat a physician, with regard to an insignificant body, which is not yours, but by nature mortal, as you do a shoemaker, about

* See Matth. viii. 2. *Κυριε, εις θαλας δυνασαι με καθαρισαι.*
 UPTON.

your foot; or a carpenter, about a house? These are the things necessary to one in a fever. If he fulfils these, he hath what belongs to him. For it is not the business of a philosopher to take care of these mere externals; of his wine, his oil, or his body; but his ruling faculty: And how, with regard to externals? So as not to behave inconsiderately about them. What occasion then, is there for fear? What occasion for anger,† about what belongs to others, and what is of no value? For, two rules we should always have ready: That nothing is Good or Evil, but Choice: and, That we are not to lead events, but to follow them. “My brother ought not to have treated me so.” Very true; but *he* must see to that. However he treats me, I am to act right, with regard to him: for the one is my own concern; the other is not: the one cannot be restrained; the other may.

† Φεβου, in the Greek, seems to have crept from the preceding φεβουσαι: Therefore it is omitted in the translation.

Of Ascetic Exercise.

§ 1. **WE** are not to carry our Exercises beyond Nature; nor merely to attract Admiration: for thus we, who call ourselves Philosophers, shall not differ from Jugglers. For it is difficult too, to walk upon a Rope; and not only difficult, but dangerous. Ought *we* too, for that reason, to make it our study to walk upon a Rope, or set up a Palm-Tree†, or grasp

* Disc. B. III. ch. 12.

† A Tree remarkable for its being strait and high. I should imagine therefore, that to *set up the Palm-Tree* meant some act of dexterity, not unlike, perhaps, to that of our modern Balance-masters: and that the artists not only set up, but ascended to its top, and there exhibited himself in various attitudes. What confirms me in this notion is, that the Palm-Tree Artists are joined with the Rope dancers; their professions being alike formed on the difficulty and danger. In **LUCIAN'S** *Treatise de Syria Dea*, we meet with these men, under the name of *Φαινυλιῶται*; who, it seems, were frequent in Arabia in Syria; countries where the Palm is known to flourish. See the new edition of **Lucian**. Tom. III. p. 475. I am obliged to Mr. **Harris**.

a Statue? * By no means. It is not every thing difficult, or dangerous, that is a proper Exercise; but such things as are conducive to what lies before us to do.

§ 2. And, because Habit hath a powerful Influence, and we are habituated to apply our Desire and Aversion to Externals only, we must oppose one Habit to another; and, where the Appearances are most slippery, there oppose Exercise. I am inclinable to pleasure. I will *bend myself beyond a due Proportion to the other Side, for the sake of Exercise. I am averse to Pain. I will break and ex-

* Diogenes used, in winter, to grasp statues, when they were covered with snow, as an exercise, to inure himself to hardship. DIODEGENES LAERTIUS.

* *Ἀν' ἀντοίχῃ* is variously read. Perhaps the right word, may be *ἀνατοίχῃ* derived from *τοιχος*; which signifies, among other things, the side of a ship, or boat. It appears from Julius Pollux, and Phrynicius, in Stephens's Lexicon, and Scot's Appendix, that *ἀνατοίχῃ* is a word used by the vulgar, to signify being sometimes on one vessel, and sometimes on the other; which agrees very well here: *I will lean on the opposite side, &c.* i. e. to keep the vessel even. I am obliged for this note to a friend.

ercise the Appearances [which strike my mind,] that I may withdraw my Aversion, from every such Object.

If you are hasty, Man, let it be your Exercise, to bear ill Language patiently; and, when you are affronted, not be angry. Thus, at length, you may arrive at such a proficiency, as, when any one strikes you, to say to yourself, "Let me suppose this to be grasping a Statue."

§ 5. In short, whatever things are applied to the Body, by those who exercise it, if they any way affect Desire or Aversion, they may be used in Ascetic Exercise. But, if this be done for mere Ostentation, it belongs to one who looks out and hunts for something external, and seeks for spectators to exclaim, "What a great Man!" Hence Apollonius said well, "If you have a mind to exercise yourself, for your own Benefit, when you are choking with Heat, take a little cold Water in your Mouth, and spit it out again, and tell nobody."

XXIV.*

Concerning those who rashly set up for Teachers of Philosophy.

§. 1.† **THEY** who have received bare Propositions, are presently inclined to throw them up, as a sick stomach doth its food. First concoct it, and then you will not throw it up; otherwise it will be crude and impure, and unfit for nourishment. But show us, from what you have digested, some Change in your ruling Faculty; as Wrestlers do in their Shoulders, from their Exercise, and their Diet:

* Disc. B. III. ch. 21.

† The translation follows the conjecture of Wolfius, *αναθαρσυν*.

There are other difficulties in the text, as it now stands. *Εξιμησης*, perhaps, should be *εξιμησης*; or, probably, there should be no *μη* before *εξιμησης*: and then the meaning of Epictetus will be, That the persons of whom he is speaking, ought first to concoct propositions for their own use, and then throw them up (*i. e.* utter them in discourse) for the use of others. But the figure he makes use of is so dirty, that it is not to be enlarged upon, though taken from the practice of the Greek and Roman Physicians.

as Artificers, in their Skill, from what they have learnt. A Carpenter doth not come and say, "Hear me discourse on the Art of Building:" but he hires a House, and fits it up, and shows himself a Master of his Trade. Let it be your Business likewise to do something like this: eat like a Man; drink, dress, marry, have Children, perform the Duty of a Citizen; bear Reproach; bear with an unreasonable Brother; bear with a Father; bear with a Son, a Neighbour, a Companion; as becomes a Man. Show us these things, that we may see that you have really learnt somewhat from the Philosophers. No: "But come and hear me repeat Commentaries." Get you gone, and seek somebody else, to throw them out upon. "Nay, but I will explain the Doctrines of Chrysippus to you, so as no other Person can: I will elucidate his Diction, in the clearest manner." And is it for this then, that young Men leave their Country, and the own Parents,

that they may come and hear you explain *Words*? Ought they not to return patient, active, free from Passion, free from Perturbation; furnished with such a provision for life, that, setting out with it, they will be able to bear all Events well, and derive Ornament from them? But how should you impart what you have not? For have you yourself done any thing else, from the beginning, but spent your time in solving Syllogisms, and convertible Propositions, and interrogatory Arguments.—“But such a one hath a School, and why should not I have one?”—Wretch, these things are not effected, in a careless and fortuitous manner. But there must be Age, and a Method of Life, and a guiding God. Is it not so? No one quits the Port, or sets sail, till he hath sacrificed to the gods, and implored their Assistance: nor do Men sow, without first invoking Ceres. And shall any one who hath undertaken so great a work, undertake it safely, without the gods? And shall they, who

apply to such a one, apply to him with Success? What are you doing else, Man, but divulging the mysteries? And you say, "There is a Temple at Eleusis; "and here is one too. *There* is a *Priest; "and *I* will make a Priest *here*: *there* is "a Herald; and *I* will appoint a Herald "too: *there* is a Torch-bearer; and *I* "will have a Torch-bearer: *there* are "Torches; and so shall there be *here*. "The Words said, the Things done, are "the same. Where is the difference be- "twixt one and the other?" Most im- pious man! is there no Difference? Are these things of use out of Place, and out of Time? A Man should come with Sa- crifices and Prayers, previously purified,

* The Priest who presided over the Eleusinian Mys- teries was called Hierophantes; *i. e.* a Revealer of sacred things. He was obliged to devote himself to Divine Service, and lead a chaste and single life. He was attended by three Officers; a Torch-bearer, a Herald, and one who assisted at the Altar. For a fuller Account of the Eleusinian Mysteries, see POR- TANUS Grecian Antiquities, Vol. I. c. 20.

and his Mind affected with a Sense, that he is approaching to sacred and ancient Rites. Thus the Mysteries become useful: thus we come to have an Idea, that all these things were appointed by the Antients, for the Instruction and Correction of Life. But you divulge and publish them, without regard to Time and Place; without Sacrifices; without Purity: you have not the Garment that is necessary for a Priest, nor the Hair, or the Girdle,* that is necessary; nor the Voice, nor the Age: nor have you purified yourself, like him. But, when you have got the Words by Heart, you say, "The Words are sacred of themselves." These things are to be approached in another manner. It is a great, it is a mystical Affair; not given by Chance, or to every one indifferently. Nay, mere Wisdom, perhaps, is not a sufficient Qualification for the Care of Youth.

* The Girdle is mentioned among the holy Garments of the Levitical Priests. Exod. xxviii. 4, 39, 40, &c.

There ought to be likewise a certain readiness and aptitude for this, and indeed a particular Constitution of Body; and, above all, a Counsel from God to undertake this Office, as he counselled Socrates to undertake the Office of Confutation; Diogenes, that of authoritative Reproof; Zeno, that of dogmatical Instruction. But *you* set up for a Physician, provided with nothing but Medicines, and without knowing, or having studied, where or how they are to be applied. “Why: “such a one had Medicines for the Eyes; “and I have the same.” Have you then, a Faculty too of making use of them? Do you, at all, know when, and how, and to whom, they will be of Service? Why then do you act at Hazard? Why are you careless, in things of the greatest Importance? Why do you attempt a Matter unsuitable to you? Leave it to those who can perform it, and do it honour. Do not you too bring a scandal upon Philosophy, by your means; nor be one of those, who cause the Thing it-

self to be calumniated. But, if Theorems delight you, sit quiet, and turn them every way by yourself; but never call yourself a Philosopher; nor suffer another to call you so; but say, "He is mistaken: "for my Desires are not different from "what they were; nor my Pursuits directed to other Objects; nor my Assent otherwise given; nor have I at all made "any Change in the Use of the Appearances, from my former Condition." Think and speak thus of yourself, if you would think as you ought: if not, act at all Hazards, and do as you do; for it becomes you.

XXV.*

Of the Cynic Philosophy.†

§. 1. **WHEN** one of his Scholars, who seemed inclined to the Cynic Philosophy,

* Disc. B. III. ch. 22.

† The Cynics owed their original to Antisthenes, a disciple of Socrates. They held virtue to be the

asked him, what a Cynic must be, and what was the general Plan of that Sect? Let us examine it, says he, at our leisure. But thus much I can tell you now, that

highest good, and the end of life; and treated riches, honours, and power, with great contempt. They were enemies to science, and polite literature; and applied themselves wholly to the study of morality. There was, in many respects, great conformity between them and the Stoics: but the Stoics selected what seemed laudable, in their principles, without imitating the roughness of their address, and the detestable indecency of their external behaviour. The Stoics were indeed a reformed branch of the Cynics, and thence, perhaps, spoke of them somewhat more favourably, than they might otherwise have done. The Cynics are said to have derived their name from Cynosarges, a Gymnasium, without the walls of Athens, where Antisthenes taught; and which was so called from the accident of a white dog stealing part of a victim, which Diomus was sacrificing to Hercules: and their barking at every body, and their want of shame, helped to confirm the appellation. In this Cynosarges, was a celebrated temple of Hercules; which, very possibly, gave the Cynics the original hint of comparing themselves to that hero; which they so much affected.

he who† attempts so great an affair without God, is an Object of divine Wrath, and would only bring public Dishonour upon himself.

XXVI.*

Concerning Those who earnestly desire a Life of Repose.

§. 1. **REMEMBER**, that it is not only the Desire of Riches and Power, that renders us mean, and subject to others, but even of Quiet, and Leisure, and Learning, and Travelling. For, in general, valuing any external thing whatever, subjects us to another. Where is the Difference then, whether you desire to be a Senator, or not to be a Senator? Where is the difference whether you desire Power, or to be out of Power? Where

† *And no man taketh this honour unto himself, but he that is called of God.*—Heb. v. 4.

* Disc. B. IV. ch. 4.

is the Difference, whether you say, "I am in a wretched way, I have nothing to do; but am tied down to Books, as inactive as if I were dead;—or, "I am in a wretched way, I have no Leisure to read? For as Levees and Power are among things external, and independent on Choice, so likewise is a Book. For what Purpose would you read? Tell me.* For if you rest merely in being amused, and learning something, you are insignificant and miserable. But if you refer it to what you ought, what is that but a prosperous Life? And if Reading doth not procure you a prosperous Life, of what Use is it? "But it doth procure a prosperous Life (say you,) and therefore I am uneasy at being deprived of it."—And what sort of Prosperity is that, which every thing, I do not say Cæsar, or the Friend of Cæsar, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, ten thousand other Things, can hinder? But nothing is so essential to

* See Arist. Eth. 10. 5.

Prosperity, as the being perpetual, and unhindered. I am now called to do something. I now go therefore, and will be attentive to the Bounds and Measures, which ought to be observed; that I may act modestly, steadily, and without Desire or Aversion with regard to Externals.* In the next place, I am attentive to other Men; what they say, and how

* The readers, perhaps, may grow tired, with being so often told, what they will find it very difficult to believe, That, because Externals are not in our own Power, they are nothing to us. But, in excuse for this frequent repetition, it must be considered, that the Stoics had reduced themselves to a necessity of dwelling on this consequence, extravagant as it is, by rejecting stronger aids. One cannot indeed avoid highly admiring the very few, who attempted to amend and exalt themselves, on this foundation. No one, perhaps, ever carried the attempt so far in practice; and no one ever spoke so well in support of the argument, as Epictetus. Yet, notwithstanding his great abilities, and the force of his example, one finds him strongly complaining of the want of success: and one sees from this circumstance, as well as from many others in the Stoic writings, That virtue cannot be maintained in the world, without the hope of a future reward.

they are moved ; and that, not from Ill-nature, nor that I may have an Opportunity for Censure or Ridicule: but I turn to myself, [and ask] “Am I also guilty of the same Faults ; and how then shall I leave them off?” * Once I too was faulty ; but, God be thanked, not now. Well: when you have done thus, and been employed in this manner, have not you done as good a Work, as if you had read a thousand Lines, or written as many? For are you uneasy at not reading while you are eating, or bathing, or exercising? Are not you satisfied with performing these Actions conformably to what you have read? Why then do you not think uniformly about every thing? When you approach Cæsar, or any other Person, if you preserve yourself unpassioned, unalarmed, sedate ; if you are rather an Observer of what is done, than [yourself] observed ; if you do not envy those who are preferred to you ; if

* *Tote*, perhaps, should be *more* ; and is so translated.

the Materials of Action do not strike you; what do you want? Books? How, or to what end? For is not this a kind of Preparation for Living, but living itself, made up of Things different? Just as if a Champion, when he enters the Lists, should fall a crying, because he is not exercising without. It was for this, that you used to be exercised. For this, were the Poisers, the Dust,* the young Fellows, your Antagonists. And do you now seek for these, when it is the Time for Business? This is just as if, in the Topic of Assent, when we are presented with Appearances, of which some are evidently true, others not, instead of distinguishing them, we should want to read Dissertations on Evidence.

§. 2. What then is the Cause of this? That we have neither read nor written,

* The Olympic Champions used to rub themselves with dust and sand: which, as they were anointed, was necessary to give them the better hold on each other. See Mr. Upton's Note on L. III. c. 15. p. 419. l. 10.

in order to treat the Appearances that occur to us, conformably to Nature, in our Behaviour. But we stop at learning what is said, and being able to explain it to others; at solving Syllogisms, and ranging hypothetical Arguments. Hence, where the Study is, there too is the Hindrance. Do you desire absolutely what is out of your Power? Be restrained then, be hindered, be disappointed. But if we read Dissertations about the Exertion of the Efforts, not merely to see what is said about the Efforts, but to exert them well: on Desire and Aversion, that we may not be disappointed of our Desires, nor incur our Aversions: on the Duties of Life, that, mindful of our Relations, we may do nothing irrationally, nor contrary to them: we should not be provoked at being hindered in our Reading; but should be contented with the Performance of Actions suitable to us, and should not compute as we have hitherto been accustomed to compute. "To day I have read so many Lines; I have writ-

ten so many ;” but, “ To day I have used my Efforts as the Philosophers direct. I have restrained my Desires absolutely ; I have applied my Aversion only to things dependent on Choice. I have not been terrified by such a one, nor put out of Countenance by such another. I have exercised my Patience, my Abstinence, my Beneficence.” And thus we should thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we resemble the Vulgar in another way also, and do not know it. One is afraid, that he shall not be in Power ; *you*,* that you shall. By no means be afraid of it, Man ; but as you laugh at *him*, laugh at *yourself*. For there is no Difference, whether you thirst, like one in a Fever, or dread Water, like him who is bit by a mad Dog. Else, how can you say, like Socrates, “ If it so pleases God, so let it be ?” Do you think that Socrates, if he had fixed his Desires on the Leisure of the Lyceum, or the

* The translation follows the conjecture of Wolfius.

Academy, or the Conversation of the Youth there, day after day, would have made so many Campaigns as he did so readily? Would not he have lamented and groaned; "How wretched am I! now must I be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum?" Was that your Business in Life then, to sun yourself? Was it not to be prosperous? To be unrestrained? Unhindered? And how could he have been Socrates, if he had lamented thus? How could he, after that, have written Pæans in a Prison?

§. 3. In short, then, remember this, that whatever external to your own Choice you esteem, you destroy that Choice. And not only Power is external to it, but the being out of Power too: not only Business, but Leisure too.—"Then, must I live in this Tumult now?"—What do you call a Tumult?—"A Multitude of People."—And where is the Hardship? Suppose it to be the Olympic Games. Think it a public Assembly.

There too some bawl out one thing, some do another: some push the rest. The Baths are crowded. Yet who of us is not pleased with these Assemblies, and doth not grieve to leave them? Do not be hard to please, and squeamish at what happens. "Vinegar is disagreeable, [says one;] for it is sour. Honey is disagreeable, says a second; for it disorders my Constitution. I do not like Vegetables, says a third. Thus too [say others] I do not like Retirement; it is a Desert: I do not like a Crowd; it is a Tumult."—Why, if things are so disposed, that you are to live alone, or with few, call this Condition a Repose; and make use of it, as you ought. Talk with yourself: exercise the Appearances presented to your Mind: work up your Preconceptions to Accuracy. But if you light on a Crowd, call it one of the public Games, a grand Assembly, a Festival. Endeavour to share in the Festival with the rest of the World. For what Sight is more pleasant to a

Lover of Mankind, than a great number of Men? We see Companies of Oxen, or Horses, with Pleasure. We are highly delighted to see a great many Ships. Who is sorry to see a great many Men? "But they stun me with their noise."—Then your Hearing is hindered; and what is that to *you*? Is your Faculty of making a right Use of the Appearances of Things hindered too? Or who can restrain you from using your Desire and Aversion, your powers of pursuit and avoidance conformably to Nature? What Tumult is sufficient for this? Do but remember the general Rules. *What is mine? What not mine? What is allotted me? What is the Will of God, that I should do now? What is not his Will?* A little while ago it was His Will, that you should be at leisure, should talk with yourself, write about these things, read, hear, prepare yourself. You have had sufficient Time for this. At present He says to you, "Come now to the Combat. Show us what you have learned; how

you have wrestled." How long would you exercise by yourself? It is now the Time to show, whether you are of the Number of those Champions who merit Victory, or of those who go about the World, conquered in all the Games round. Why then are you out of Humour? There is no Combat without a Tumult. There must be many preparatory Exercises, many Acclamations, many Masters, many Spectators.—"But I would live in quiet."—Why then, lament and groan, as you deserve. For what greater Punishment is there to the Uninstructed, and Disobedient to the Orders of God, than to grieve, to mourn, to envy; in short, to be disappointed, and unhappy? Are not you willing to deliver yourself from all this?—And how shall I deliver myself?—Have not you heard, that you must absolutely withhold Desire, and apply Aversion to such Things only, as are dependent on Choice? That you must give up all, Body, Possessions, Fame, Books, Tumults, Power, Ex-

emption from Power? For to which soever your Propension is, you are a Slave; you are under Subjection; you are made liable to Restraint, to Compulsion; you are altogether the Property of others. But have that of Cleanthes always ready,

Conduct me Jove; and Thou, O Destiny.

Is it Your Will, that I should go to Rome? Conduct me to Rome. To Gyaros?—To Gyaros. To Athens?—To Athens. To Prison?—To Prison. If you once say, “When is one to go to Athens?” you are undone. This Desire, if it be unaccomplished, must necessarily render you disappointed; and, if fulfilled, vain on what ought not to elate you: on the contrary, if you are hindered, wretched, by incurring what you do not like. Therefore give up all these things. “Athens is a fine place.”—But it is a much finer thing to be happy, impassive, tranquil, not to have what concerns you dependent on others.—“Rome

is full of Tumults and Visits.”—But Prosperity is worth all Difficulties. If then it be a proper Time for these, why do not you withdraw your Aversion from them? (What Necessity is there for you to be made to carry your Burden, and to be cudgelled like an Ass?) Otherwise consider, that you must always be a Slave to him, who hath the Power to procure your Discharge, to every one who hath the Power of hindering you; and must worship him, like your evil Genius.

§. 4. The only Way to real Prosperity (let this Rule be at hand Morning, Noon, and Night,) is, a Resignation of things independent on Choice; to esteem nothing as a Property; to deliver up all things to our tutelar Genius, and to Fortune; to make those the Governors of them, whom Jupiter hath made so; to be ourselves devoted to that only, which is our Property; to that which is incapable of Restraint; and whatever we read, or write, or hear, to refer all to this.

§. 5. Therefore I cannot call any one industrious, if I hear only that he reads, or writes ; nor even if he adds the whole Night to the Day, do I call him so, unless I know to what he refers it. If he doth it for Fame, I call him ambitious ; if for Money, avaricious ; if from Desire of Learning, bookish ; but not industrious. But, if he refers his Labour to his ruling Faculty, in order to treat and regulate it conformably to Nature, then only I call him industrious. For never either praise or blame any Person ; on account of outward Actions that are common to all ; but on the account of Principles. These are the peculiar Property of each Individual, and the things which make Actions good or bad.

§. 6. Mindful of this, be pleased with the present, and contented with whatever it is the Season for. If you perceive any of those Things, which you have learned and studied, occurring to you in Action, rejoice in them. If you have

laid aside Ill-nature and Reviling; if you have lessened your Harshness, indecent Language, Inconsiderateness, Effeminacy; if you are not moved by the same things as formerly; if not in the same manner as formerly; you may keep a perpetual Festival: To-day, because you have behaved well in one Affair: To-morrow, because in another. How much better a Reason for Sacrifice is this, than obtaining a Consulship, or a Government? These things you have from yourself, and from the gods. Remember this, Who it is that gave them, and to whom, and for what Purpose. Habituated once to these Reasonings, can you still think there is any Difference, in what Place you are to please God? Are not the gods every where at the same Distance? Do not they every where equally see what is doing.

THE
GOLDEN VERSES
OF
THE PYTHAGOREANS.

ΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΠΙΘΑΓΟΡΕΙΩΝ

ΕΠΗ ΧΡΤΣΑ.

Αθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα Θεούς, νομῶ ὡς διακταί,
Τίμα· καὶ σεβοῦ Ὀρκον· ἐπειδ' Ἡρώας ἀγαυούς·
Τοὺς τε κατὰχθονίους σεβε Δαίμονας ἐνταρὰ ῥέξαν.
Τοὺς τε γονας τίμα, τοὺς τ' ἀγχιστ' ἐκγεγαυτάς.
Τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀρετῇ ποιεὺ Φίλον ὅστις ἀριστός. 5
Πραεσι δ' ἔκε λόγους, ἐγγόισι τ' ἀποφαινοίσι.

PARAPHRASE.

LET your great principle be, respect for the *religion* of your country, the religion by *law* established; and, therefore, in the first place, honour the immortal Gods, as it is ordained by law; and strictly observed thy oath. In the next place, honour the illustrious heroes and demi-gods; and, lastly, the spirits of good men deceased, doing as you are required by law.

4. Honour your parents and nearest relatives. But of others choose the best for your friend. Yield to mild words, and kind actions. And be not alienated

THE GOLDEN VERSES OF THE PYTHAGOREANS.

TRANSLATED BY N. ROWE.

- 1 First to the Gods thy humble homage pay ;
The greatest this, and first of laws, obey :
- 2 Perform thy vows. observe thy plighted troth,
And let Religion bind thee to thy oath.
The heroes next demand thy just regard,
Renown'd on earth, and to the stars preferr'd,
To light and endless life, their virtue's sure reward.
- 3 Due rights perform and honours to the dead,
To ev'ry wise, to ev'ry pious shade.
- 4 With lowly duty to thy parents bow,
And grace and favour to thy kindred show :
- 5 For what concerns the rest of human kind,
Choose out the man to virtue best inclined ;
Him to thy arms receive, him to thy bosom bind.
Possess of such a friend, preserve him still ;
Nor thwart his counsels with thy stubborn will ;

Μὴδ' ἐχθαίρει Φίλον σου ἁμαρτανδὸς εἵνεκα μικρῆς,
 Οὐδ' ἀδύνη· δύναμις γὰρ ἀναγκῆς ἐγγυθὶ ναίει.
 Ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἰσθί· κράταν δ' ἀθίζεο τῶνδε·
 Γαστρος μὲν πρῶτιστά, καὶ ὕπνου, λαγναῆς τε, 10
 Καὶ θυμοῦ. Πρῆξας δ' αἰσχροῦ ποτε μῆτε μετ' ἄλλου,
 Μῆτ' ἰδίῃ παντῶν δὲ μαλίστ' αἰσχυνεὸ σ' αὐτόν.
 Εἰτα δικαιοσύνην ἀσκήν ἐργῶ τε, λόγῳ τε.
 Μὴδ' ἀλογιστῶς σ' αὐτόν ἔχων περὶ μῆδεν ἐβίξε·
 Ἀλλὰ γινώθι μὲν ὡς θανεῖν πεπρωται ἅπασι· 15
 Χρήματα δ' ἄλλοτε μὲν κτασθῆαι Φίγα, ἄλλοτ' ὀλεσθῆαι.

PARAPHRASE.

from your friend for a trifling fault, if possible ; (and remember that) what is necessary, is almost always possible. These are the primary *active* duties.

9. The duties of *temperance* are these : to subdue the sensual appetite, and the irascible passions, by abstaining from gluttony, and restraining your sleep, and lust, and anger. Do nothing base either with others, or alone. But above all things reverence yourself.

13. In the next place, exercise *justice* in deed and word ; and accustom yourself to do nothing *inconsiderately*. Learn *fortitude* by reflecting, that all men are doomed to die ; and that riches are very precarious,

- 6 Pliant to all his admonitions prove,
And yield to all his offices of love :
- 7 Him from thy heart, so true, so justly dear,
Let no rash word nor light offences tear ;
- 8 Bear all thou canst, still with his feeling strive,
And to the utmost still, and still forgive ;
For strong necessity alone explores
The secret vigour of our latent pow'rs,
Rouses and urges on the lazy heart.
Force, to itself unknown before, t' exert.
- 9 By use thy stronger appetites assuage,
10 Thy gluttony, thy sloth, thy lust, thy rage :
11 From each dishonest act of shame forbear ;
Of others, and thyself, alike beware.
- 12 Let rev'rence of thyself thy thought control,
And guard the sacred temple of thy soul.
- 13 Let justice o'er thy word and deed preside,
14 And reason ev'n thy meanest actions guide :
- 15 For know that Death is man's appointed doom,
Know that the day of great account will come,
When thy past life shall strictly be survey'd,
Each word, each deed, be in the balance laid,
And all the good and all the ill most justly be repaid.
- 16 For wealth, the perishing, uncertain good,
Ebbing and flowing like the fickle flood,
That knows no sure, no fix'd abiding place,
But wand'ring loves from hand to hand to pass ;
Revels the getter's joy and loser's pain,
And thing if it be worth thy while to gain.

Οσσα τε δαιμονίησι τύχαις βροτοὶ ἀλγέ' εἰχουσιν,
 ὣν ἂν μοῖραν εἴης, πρῶτος Φερε, μὴδ' ἀγανάκτα.
 Ἰασθαι δὲ πρὸς καθόσον δύνη· Ὡδὲ δὲ Φραζέου·
 Οὐ πανυ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τούτων πολὺ μοῖρα δίδωσι. 20
 Πολλοὶ δ' ἀνθρώποισι λόγοι δαλοὶ τε καὶ ἐσθλοὶ
 Προσπίπτουσ', ὧν μὴτ' ἐκπλήσσει, μὴτ' ἀρ' εἰσῆς
 Εἰργεοθαι σ' αὐτον· Ψευδὸς δ' ἦν περ τι λεγῆται,
 Πρῶτος ἀχ'. Ο δὲ τοι ἐρεω, ἐπὶ παντὶ τελασθῶ·
 Μήδεις μῆτε λογῶσε παρακῆ, μῆτε τι ἐργῶ 25
 Πρὴξαι, μὴδ' ἀπαν, ὅ, τι τοι μὴ βέλτερον ἐστί.

 PARAPHRASE.

sometimes possessed and sometimes lost. Whatever evils happen to you by divine appointment, bear your lot meekly and patiently; but remedy them, as far as you can, and consider thus with yourself: "Fate does not send many misfortunes to persons eminently good."

21. In your intercourse with men, you will hear much discourse that is good, and much that is bad. But you must not on this account be disturbed or disgusted with society. And even the falsehoods and calumnies, that you may hear, you must learn to bear with temper. But what I am now going to advise, observe on all occasions.

25. Let no man seduce you, either by word or deed, to day or say what is not right. And before you under-

- 17 Of all those sorrows that attend mankind,
 18 With patience bear the lot to thee assign'd;
 Nor think it chance, nor murmur at the load;
 For know what man calls fortune is from God.
 19 In what thou may'st from wisdom seek relief,
 And let her healing hand assuage the grief,
 Yet still whate'er the righteous doom ordains,
 What cause soever multiplies thy pains,
 Let not those pains as ills be understood;
 20 For God delights not to afflict the good.
- 21 The reas'ning art to various ends apply'd,
 Is oft a sure, but oft an erring guide.
 22 Thy judgement therefore sound and cool preserve,
 Nor lightly from thy resolution swerve,
 The dazzling pomp of words does oft deceive,
 And sweet persuasion wins the easy to believe.
- 23 When fools and liars labour to persuade,
 Be dumb, and let the babblers vainly plead.
- 24 This above all, this precept chiefly learn,
 This nearly does, and first, thyself concern;
 25 Let not example, let no soothing tongue,
 Prevail upon thee with a *Siren's* song,
 26 To do thy soul's immortal essence wrong.
 Of good and ill by words or deeds exprest,
 Choose forthyself, and always choose the b

Βουλευου δε προ εργου, όπως μη μωρα τεληται
 (Δαλου τοι πρησσαν τε λεγαν τ' ανοητα προς ανδρας)
 Αλλα ταδ' εκτελειειν, & σε μη μετεπατ' ανιση.
 Πρησσε δε μηδεν των μη πιστασαι, αλλα διδασκεν 30
 Οσσα χρεων, και τερπνοεατον βιον ωδε διαξας.
 Ουδ' υγιαης της περι σωμ' αμολααν εχαν χρηνη
 Αλλα ποτου τε μετρον, και διτου, γυμνασιων τε
 Ποιασθαι μετρον δε λεγω τοδ' ο μη σ' ανιησα.

PARAPHRASE.

take any thing consider it well, that you may not be
 guilty of any folly; (for he is a miserable man, who
 does or says senseless and inconsiderate things;) and
 let your actions be such, that you may not repent of
 them hereafter. Attempt nothing, of which you are
 ignorant; but learn whatever is necessary; and you
 will pass a happy life.

32 But while you thus attend to the cultivation of
 your mind, you must not neglect the health of your
 body; but be moderate in what you drink and eat, and
 in your exercise; I call that a moderate use of these
 things, which will do you no injury.

- 27 Let wary thought each enterprize forerun,
 And ponder on thy task before begun.
 Lest folly should the wretched work deface,
 And mock thy fruitless labours with disgrace.
- 28 Fools huddle on and always are in haste,
 Act without thought, and thoughtless words they
 waste.
- 29 But thou, in all thou dost, with early cares
 Strive to prevent at first a fate like their's ;
 That sorrow on the end may never wait,
 Nor sharp repentance make thee wise too late.
- 30 Beware thy meddling hand in ought to try,
 That does beyond thy reach of knowledge lie ;
 But seek to know, and bend thy serious thought
- 31 To search the profitable knowledge out.
 So joys on joys for ever shall increase,
 Wisdom shall crown thy labours, and shall bless
 Thy life with pleasure, and thy end with peace.
- 32 Nor let the body want its part, but share
 A just proportion of thy tender care :
 For health and welfare prudently provide,
 And let its lawful wants be all supplied.
- 33 Let sober draughts refresh, and wholesome fare
 Decaying Nature's wasted force repair ;
 And sprightly exercise the duller spirits cheer.
- 34 In all things still which to this care belong,
 Observe this rule, to guard thy soul from wrong.

Εἰθίζου δε διαίταν εἶχαν καθαρεῖον, ἀβρυπτον. 35
 Καὶ πεφυλαξο γέ ταῦτα ποίαν, ὅποσα Φθονον ἰσχε.
 Μὴ δαπανᾷν παρὰ καιρὸν, ὅτοια καλῶν ἀδελήμων·
 Μὴδ' ἀνελευθερὸς ἰσθί· μετρον δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀρίστον.
 Πρῆσσε δὲ ταυθ', ἃ σε μὴ βλαψή· λογισαὶ δὲ προ ἐργου.
 Μὴδ' ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπ' οἰμασί προδεξασθαι, 40
 Πρὶν τῶν ἡμερινῶν ἐργῶν λογισασθαι ἑκάστον·
 Πῇ παρεβῆν; τί δ' ἐρεῖα; τί μοι δεῖν οὐκ ἐτελεσθῇ;

PARAPHRASE.

35 Accustom yourself to a neat, and not luxurious mode of life; and be careful to avoid the extremes, which excite envy or censure. Be not guilty of unbecoming profusion, like one, who is ignorant of the value of things excellent; nor be illiberally penurious.

39. Do nothing, of which you may repent; and reflect before you act.

40. Let not sleep close your eyes, till you have thrice reviewed the actions of the past day. In what have I

- 35 By virtuous use thy life and manners frame,
Manly and simply pure, and free from blame.
- 36 Provoke not Envy's deadly rage, but fly
The glancing curse of her malicious eye.
- 37 Seek not in needless luxury to waste
Thy wealth and substance, with a spendthrift's
haste;
- 38 Yet flying these, be watchful, lest thy mind,
Prone to extremes, an equal danger find,
And be to sordid avarice inclined.
Distant alike from each, to neither lean,
But ever happy keep the GOLDEN MEAN.
- 39 Be careful still to guard thy soul from wrong,
And let thy thought prevent thy hand and tongue.
- 40 Let not the stealing God of Sleep surprise,
Nor creep in slumbers on thy weary eyes,
- 41 Ere every action of the former day
Strictly thou dost and righteously survey.
With reverence at thy own tribunal stand,
And answer justly to thy own demand.
- 42 Where have I been? In what have I transgress'd?
What good or ill has this day's life express'd?
Where have I fail'd in what I ought to do?
In what to God, to man, or to myself I owe?

Αρξάμενος δ' ἀπο πρώτου ἐπεξίθι· καὶ μετεπάτα
 Δαυα μὲν ἐκπρήξας ἐπιπλήσσο· χρηστὰ δὲ, τέρπει.
 Ταῦτα ποιε' ταυτ' ἐκμελετὰ· τούτων χρηεραν σε· 45
 Ταῦτα σε τῆς θαῆς ἀρετῆς εἰς ἰχυνία θῆσα,
 Ναι μὰ τον ἀμετερά ψυχὰ παρῶνδοντα τετρακτύν,
 Παγὰν ἀενάου Φύσεως. Ἀλλ' ἐρχεῦ ἐπ' ἐργον
 Θεοῖσιν ἐπευξάμενος τελεῖσαι. Τούτων δὲ κρατήσας
 Γνωσκαὶ ἀθανάτων τε Θεῶν θνητῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων 50
 Συστάσιν, ἥ τε ἕκαστα διέρχεται, ἥ τε κρατᾷ.

PARAPHRASE.

transgressed? What have I done? What duty have I left undone? If you have done any wrong, take blame to yourself; in any good, rejoice.

45. Let these principles of exercise be your study; meditate on these things; on these set your affections; these will conduct you in the path of divine virtue; of this you may be assured on his authority, * who first instructed us in the knowledge of the mysterious Four, the fountain of eternal nature.

48. But let your endeavours be accompanied with prayer to the gods to perfect you in duty and knowledge. If you succeed in your endeavours, you shall know the constitution of the universe, the relation in which gods and men stand to each other; the extent

* Αυτοῖς εἶπα.

- 43 Inquire severe whate'er from first to last,
From morning's dawn 'till ev'ning's gloom has
past.
- 44 If evil were thy deeds, repenting mourn,
And let thy soul with strong remorse be torn.
If good, the good with peace of mind repay,
And to thy secret self with pleasure say,
Rejoice, my heart, for all went well to-day.
- 45 These thoughts and chiefly these thy mind should
move,
Employ thy study, and engage thy love.
- 46 These are the rules which will to virtue lead,
And teach thy feet her heavenly paths to tread.
- 47 This by his name I swear, whose sacred lore
First to mankind explain'd the mystic FOUR,
Source of eternal nature and Almighty pow'r.
- 48 In all thou dost first let thy prayers ascend,
And to the Gods thy labours first commend,
From them implore success, and hope a prosp'rous
end.
- 49 So shall thy abler mind be taught to soar,
And wisdom in her secret ways explore ;
- 50 To range through heav'n above and earth below,
Immortal Gods, and mortal men to know.
- 51 So shalt thou learn what power does all control,
What bounds the parts, and what unites the whole :

Γνωσὴ δ' ἡ θεμὶς ἐστὶ, Φύσιν περὶ πάντος ὁμοῖον,
 Ὄστε σε μὴτε ἀελπτ' ἐλπίζαν, μὴτε τι λήθαν.
 Γνωσὴ δ' ἀνθρώπους κυδαίρετα πῆματ' ἐχόντας
 Τλημόνας, οἱ τ' ἀγαθὴν πέλας ὄντων οὐτ' ἐσορῶσιν,
 Θυτὲ κλυοῦσι· λυσὶν δὲ κακῶν παυροὶ συνίσασι. 56.
 Τοιῇ μοιρα βροτῶν βλαπτὰ Φρενας· ὥς δὲ κυλινδροὶ
 Ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλα φερόνται ἀπαρὼν πῆματ' ἐχόντες·
 Λυγρὴ γὰρ συνοπαδὸς ἐρὶς βλαπτουσα λελήθε
 Συμφυτοῖς ἦν οὐδ' ἀπροσάγαν, ἀκόντα δὲ Φεύγαν· 60

PARAPHRASE.

and boundaries of all things; and shall perceive the regularity and analogy, which pervade the whole: so that you shall not ignorantly place your affections on things hopeless and unattainable.

54. You shall know too, that men are involved in evils of their own choice. Unhappy mortals! who neither see nor know the blessings, with which they are surrounded. And few are they who are able to deliver themselves from the evils, which beset them. (57.) Such is the fate that oppresses them. They are carried on from one thing to another, without rule or direction, like Fortune on her cylinder, through an endless succession of calamities. For their minds are insensibly perverted by an inborn principle of contention, which it should be their concern not to excite, but to avoid.

- 52 And rightly judge, in all this wond'rous frame,
How universal Nature is the same ;
- 53 So shalt thou ne'er thy vain affections place
On hopes of what shall never come to pass.
- 54 Man, wretched man, thou shalt be taught to
know,
Who bears within himself the inborn cause of woe.
- 55 Unhappy race! that never yet could tell,
How near their good and happiness they dwell.
Deprived of sense, they neither hear nor see ;
- 56 Fetter'd in vice, they seek not to be free,
But stupid, to their own sad fate agree :
- 57 Like pond'rous rolling-stones, oppress'd with ill,
58 The weight that loads 'em makes 'em roll on still,
Bereft of choice and freedom of the will.
- 59 For native strife in every bosom reigns,
And secretly an impious war maintains :
60. Provoke not THIS, but let the passion cease,
And every yielding passion sue for peace.

Ζευ πατερ. ἡ πολλῶν γε κακῶν λυσῆας ἄπαντας,
 Εἰ πασιν δαΐαις οἷψ' τῷ δαίμονι χράνται.
 Ἀλλὰ σὺ θάρσα' ἐπεὶ θῶπον γένος ἐστὶ βροτοῖσιν,
 Οἷς ἱέρα προφέρουσ' αὖτις δακνυσὶν ἕκαστα.
 Ὡν αἰ σοὶ τι μετέσθι, κράτησας ὧν σε κελεύω, 65
 Εἰς ἀκέραιαν ψυχὴν δὲ πόνων ἀπο τῶνδε σκώσας.
 Ἀλλ' εἰργου βρωτῶν, ὧν εἰπομεν, ἐν τε καθαρμοῖς,
 Ἐν τε λυσεὶ ψυχῆς κρίνων' καὶ φράζου ἕκαστα,
 Ἡνιοχὸν γυμνὴν στήσας καθυτερθεὶν ἀριστην,
 Ἦν δ' ἀπολείψας σῶμα εἰς κῆθερ' ἐλευθερὸν ἐλθῆς, 70
 Ἔσσεαι ἀθάνατος, θεὸς ἀμβροτός, οὐκ ἐτι θνήσκεις.

 PARAPHRASE.

61. O! Father Jupiter! from innumerable evils thou wouldst free mankind, if thou wouldst teach them to know their own genius and nature.

63. But let this console you, that men are of divine origin, to whom nature readily imparts such knowledge as is sufficient, if you partake of it, to accomplish all that I enjoin you, and to deliver you from the troubles which commonly afflict mankind.

67. But remember to abstain from those meats which are prohibited in institutes relative to expiations, and to abstraction of the mind from the body. And deliberately weigh these things under the supreme direction of reason. And when you leave the body and take your flight to heaven, you shall be immortal, divine, and no longer subject to death.

61 Wouldst thou, great *Jove*, thou father of man-
kind,

62 Reveal the *Demon* for that task assign'd,
The wretched race an end of woes would find.

63 And yet be bold, O man, divine thou art,
And of the God's celestial essence part.

64 Nor sacred Nature is from thee conceal'd,
But to thy race her mystic rule's reveal'd.

65 These if to know thou happily attain,
Soon shalt thou perfect be in all that I ordain.

66 Thy wounded soul to health thou shalt restore,
And free from ev'ry pain she felt before.

67 Abstain, I warn, from meats unclean and foul.
So keep thy body pure so free thy soul;

68 So rightly judge; thy reason so maintain;

69 Reason which heav'n did for thy guide ordain,
Let that best reason ever hold the rein.

70 Then if this mortal body thou forsake,
And thy glad flight to the pure æther take,

71 Among the Gods exalted thou shalt shine,
Immortal, incorruptible, divine:

The tyrant Death securely shalt thou brave,
And scorn the dark dominion of the Grave.

AUREA PYTHAGOREORUM CARMINA.

*LATINE REDDITA.**

IMMORTALES primum Deos, sicuti lege dispositi sunt,
Honora: et cole Jusjurandum; deinde Heroes illustres;

Cole etiam terrenos Dæmonas legitima faciens.

Honore otiam Parentes prosequere, et eos qui proximi
cognati sunt.

Ex aliis verò pro rationis virtutis amicum facias, quilibet
quis sit optimus. 5

Lenibus verbis obtemperes, atque utilibus factis.

Neque oderis amicum tuum propter leve peccatum,
Quantum possibile; potestas enim prope necessitatem
habitat.

Illa quidem ita scias: sed his semper imperes;

Ventri primum, et somno, dein libidini 10

Iræque. Nihil vero turpe unquam committe, neque
alio præsentè,

Neque privatim: sed maximè omnium teipsum verere.

* Ex Editione Londinensi, 1742.

Deinde justitiam exerce factis atque verbis.

Nec ulla in re te sine ratione gerere assuescas :

Sed nōris esse in fatis omnes morituros ; 15

Divitias autem aliquando quidem possideri solere, aliquando perire.

Quibuscunque porro infortuniis divinitus anguntur homines,

Sortem tuam patienter et sine indignatione feras.

Remedium vero decet afferre, quantum possis ; et tecum reputes ;

Fatam non immittere, bonis plurima infortunia. 20

Multi vero inter homines tam mali quam boni sermones

Incidunt, quibus nec percellaris, nec ab iis sinas

Teipsum excludi : si quid autem falsi dicatur,

Leniter cede. Quod verò tibi nunc dicam, semper observetur ;

Nemo te aut verbis aut factis adducat, ut quicquam

Facias aut dicas, quod tibi non sit commodum. 25

Consilium verò adhibe priusquam res geratur, ne stulta fiant ;

(Hominis enim miseri est ea facere et dicere quæ stulta sunt)

Atque ea tantum agas, quæ tibi postea non sint molestæ.

Nihil facias eorum, quæ nescis, sed discito 30

Quæcunque officium postulat ; atque ita vitam transiges jucundissimam.

Neque cura valetudinis est negligenda ;

Sed modus in potu, cibo, et exercitiis

Adhibendus : modum autem voco hunc, qui tibi dolorem non pariet.

Mundo verò virtutis uti assuescas, non delicato. 35

Et cave facias ea, quæ invidiæ sunt obnoxia.

Nec sumptus importune effundas, ut qui honesti ignarus est ;

Neque sis illiberalis : modus enim in omnibus erit optimus.

Fac ea, quæ tibi non noceant ; et delibera priusquam facias.

Nec molles oculi somnum prius admittant, 40

Quàm singula diurna opera recensueris :

Qua sum transgressus ? quid feci ? quid omisi quod fieri debuit ?

A primo incipiens singula percurras ; et postea,

Malis admissis, te ipsum coargue ; bonis autem, lætare.

In his tibi elaborandum est ; hæc meditare ; hæc amanda sunt : 45

Hæc te in divinæ virtutis viâ sistent.

Per eum certè qui nobis quaternarium tradidit,

Fontem perennis naturæ. Sed operi te accinge

Faustum a Diis precatus exitum. Si veram ista teneas,

Cognosces et immortalium Deorum et hominum mortalium

institutionem, quatenus singula differunt, et quatenus
conveniunt.

agnosces etiam, quatenus fas est, naturam in universo
similem;

t nec speres quæ speranda non sunt, nec te quicquam
lateat.

agnosces autem homines malis ultro accersitis obrui
liseros, qui bona cum prope sint nec vident, 55

ec audiunt: paucique norunt sese malis expedire.

ale fatum lædit mortalium mentes; illi vero cylin-
drorum instar

uc illuc volvuntur, infinitis malis oppressi.

ravis enim comes latentér nocet contentio

ongenita; quam provocare non decet, sed cedendo
evitare. 60

upiter Pater, multis certé malis omnes liberares,

o omnibus indicares quali Genio utantur.

u autem bono sis animo; cum divinum genus sit mor-
talibus,

uibis Sacra Natura singula pandens ostendit.

uorum si fueris particeps, mea tenebis jussa, 65

remedioque adhibito istis ærumnis liberabis animum.

abstine verò cibis iis, quos diximus, cum in purgatio-
nibus,

um in solutione animi dijudicans: Et considera sin-
gula,

Ratione, optimo aurigâ, superiori in loco constituta.

**Quod si, relicto corpore, ad liberum æthera commi-
gres,**

70

**Eris immortalis Deus, incorruptibilis, nec ampliùs
morti obnoxius.**

NOTE

TO THE GOLDEN VERSES, P. 184.

Ver. 1. *νομῶς διακονταί.*] *Ut lege constitutum est.* Religion was in all countries guarded by the *lex civitatis*. The charge alleged against Socrates, was that he did not observe this public law. Ἀδίκας Σωκράτης, εἰς μὴ νόμῳ NOMIZEI, νομομίζειν (Xenoph. Mem. initio.) That this public law was the meaning of νόμος in the text, is evident, not only from the third verse, *νομομα εἰζόν*, but from the general sense of antiquity, Πάλλη ἀναγκή ΣΕΒΕΙΝ τοὺς ΠΑΤΡΙΟΥΣ Θεοὺς τοῖς αἰεθῶν NOMIMOIS. (Dionysius Hal. 11, 19.) Το μὴ θεοὶ πρώτη πρώτης αὐτοῖσι σέβου κατὰ τὰ ποτρία καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀναγκαζὶ τιμᾶν. (Dio Cassius.) Νῆμψ δ' ἦν τοῦτο τοῖς Ἀτταῖς (Atteniensibus) καὶ τιμῶν κατὰ τὸν ξῆνος ἱστοροῦνθι θεῶν ἀριστοῦ θάνατος. (Josephus c. Apion. 11, 37.) Of the common reading, *νομῶς διακονταί*, there could have been no question, if Hierocles in his commentary on the passage had not read *διακονταί*, instead of *διακονταί*, and interpreted νόμος not of the public law, but of the law of the universe, the divine law by which the universe was constituted. The reason however of this deviation from the literal meaning of the passage is obvious. The *public law* of Pythagoras's time was not the public law of the fifth century, in which Hierocles lived. The worship of the ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΙ ΘΕΟΙ, which was the law of the former period, was abolished in the latter. The old law of the Empire was extinct, and a new law was introduced, which Hierocles, as a *Heathen* Philosopher, did not acknowledge. He therefore gave this passage a mystical interpretation.

κασθαι is a term very commonly applied to *positive* laws, as may be seen in the observations of Elsner, Raphelius, Alberti, Wetstein, and others, on i Tim. i. 9, and Marcellius's note on our passage. The compound term *δασκασθαι* is used by Hesiod with a similar construction to our text. Ὡς γὰρ οἰδύκετο, *Ita enim ipsi constitutum erat.* (Herculis Scut. ve. 20.)

NOTES

TO THE HYMN OF CLEANTHES, P. 186—188.

The poetical and moral excellencies of this celebrated Hymn are noticed by West in the first Note to his Translation; and are detailed more at large by Lowth, in his *Pœlections*, (xxix, p. 338,) and by Rhode in his *Poetarum veterum Sapientia Gnomica*, (p. 287—292. Havniæ, 1800.)

Ver. 3. Σε γὰρ καὶ πασι θεμὶς ὁπτοισι προσώδων] Vulgo *πασι* without *καὶ*. Scaliger, to supply the metre, proposed to read *τατισσι*, which Brunck adopted. Mosheim edited *γὰρ καὶ τασι*. In the absence of all MS. authority, I should prefer *γὰρ τοι, τοι* being a common associate of *γὰρ* in *γὰρ τοι τοι γὰρ τοιγαυτοῦ, τοιγαυτε*. Examples in the poets as well as prose writers may be seen in Hoogeveen's *Doctrina Particularum*.

Ver. 4. *ινος μῆμημα*] Vulgo *ηχου μῆμημα*, contrary to metre. Instead of *ηχου* Scaliger conjectured *αχου* Brunck *ινος*, which he inserted in the text; and so Heeren in his edition of the *Eclogæ Physica* of Stobæus. *Ἰν* is an ancient term for *φωνη*, voice or speech. *Ηχου* is therefore a synonymn, and was, probably, a gloss of *ινος*, and as such crept into the text. Hesychi-

αἱ : ιη, φων, βον. Morrell in his *Thesaurus* : *Id. Syn.* *ἔχει, φων, βον.* *Mouri* in the next verse serves to determine both the sense and reading in this.

Ver. 5. *Mouri*.] So Heerin in his *Stobæus* from *eqd.* V. and before him, the editor of *Daniel secundum Septuag.* Romæ 1773. *Man alone* possesses the faculty of articulate speech. Vulgo *μouros*. And so it is translated by Duport, West, Bougainville. Pompei, the Italian Translator, follows both the new readings, *ιη* and *μouri*.

—————Solo noi, fra quanti
Vivon mortali e muevon su la terra,
Lo imatur de la vocz abbiám sortito.

The reading of *ιη* appears to be confirmed by the sixth verse. *Τη σι καθύμνησω, και σου κρατος αιει αισω :* "I will therefore [with this faculty] celebrate thee with hymns and will ever sing thy power."

Ver. 7. *Σοι δη*] So corrected by Scaliger. Vulgo *δι*.

Ver. 9. *ιη χησιν*] So Brunck Vulgo *ιη*.

Ver. 11. *φουσις τα άπαρ' ερειγι*] Vulgo *παρ' ερειγασιν*, a verb plural after a neuter noun. A critic in the *Monthly Review*, (Jan. 1798) conjectured *φουσι παρ' ερειγι*. Another reading has occurred to me, which I have ventured to introduce into the text, as a slighter alteration of the text : *φουσις τα άπαρ' ερειγι—ερειγι* in the preterite form, as in the common text, and without the elision of *τα* before *τι άπαρ'*, like *τα ακοσμα* in v. 19. and *τεροισα αξιυντα*. Ver. 10.

Ver. 13. *μεγαλοις μικροις τι φαισσι* So Brunck] Vulgo *μεγαλοι μικροισι φαισσι*.

Ver. 13. Ὡς τωσος.] So Heeren from Codices V.A
 Vulgo Ὡς τωσος. This verse should be separated from
 the following not by a colon, but a comma. Ὡς τωσος
 γαυωις—"Being thus so mighty a sovereign over the
 universe, Οὐδὲ τι γιγνεται—Nothing happens upon earth
 without Thee, O God—Οὐδὲ τι is as οὐδὲ εἴ or οὐδὲ, *nihil*
 the particle δὲ having not a copulative, but an intensive
 signification; nor is there any hiatus, as Brunck sup-
 posed.

Ver. 18. Ἀλλὰ οὐ καὶ τὰ περισσεῖ πιστάσῃς ἀρετῇς θύμῃ.]
 This verse was first published from MS. by the editor
 of Daniel secundum sept. before mentioned.

V. 20. ὀκτατα.] So Brunck Vulgo πῦρτα.

V. 21. ιστα.] So Brunck Vulgo ιστῆς.

V. 32. Ἀδραμπος ρουα.] *Pense* is Brunck's correction.
 Vulgo ρουα, claudicante metro. Scaliger proposed to
 read μιν ρουα: Dr. Butler δὲ ρουα, which is a preferable
 reading.

Ver. 37. Ἄλλο τι.] So Brunck Vulgo ἄλλοτε.

THE
YMN OF CLEANTHES.

Superest ejus Hymnus, valde Stoicus.

(Bruckeri Hist. Phil.

CLEANTHIS HYMNUS.

Κυδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυονυμε, παγκράτες αἰεῖ,
Ζεῦ, Φυσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμῳ μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν,
Χαίρε. Σε γὰρ καὶ πᾶσι θεμὶς θνητοῖσι προσαυδαί·
Ἐκ σου γὰρ γένος ἐσμεν, ἡς μιμητὰ λαχόντες
Μουνοί, ὅσα ζῶετε καὶ ἔρπει θνητ' ἐπὶ γαίαν.
Τῷ σε καθυμνήσω, καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν αἰεῖω.
Σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὁδὲ κόσμος ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαίαν
Πεῖζεται, ἢ κεν ἀγῆς, καὶ ἔκων ὑπὸ σείῳ κρατεῖται.
Τοῖον εἷχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνίκητοῖς ἐνὶ χερσὶν
Ἀμφιῆκῃ, πυροεντὰ, αἰζῶνόντα κεραυνόν·
Τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῆς Φυσεως τὰ ἅπαντ' ἐρρίγη·
Ὡς συ κατεψύδυνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
Φοῖτα, μίγνυμενος μεγάλῳις μικροῖς τε Φαεσσίν.
Ὡς τοσσὸς γεγάως ὑπάτος βασιλεὺς διὰ πάντος·
Οὐδὲ τι γίγνεται ἐργὸν ἐπὶ χθονὶ σὲ δίχα, δαίμων,
Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὐτ' ἐπὶ πόντῃ,
Πλήν ὅποσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετερήσιν ἀνομίαις.
Ἀλλὰ συ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπιστάσαι ἀρτία θέναι,
Καὶ κοσμεῖς τὰ ἀκόσμητα, καὶ οὐ Φίλα σοὶ Φίλα ἐστίν.
Ὡδὲ γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα συνηρμόκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὡςθ' ἓνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν εὐόντα,
Ὅν Φευγόντες ἐώσιν ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοὶ εἰσίν.
Δυσμόροι, διτ' ἀγαθῶν μὲν αἰεὶ κτήσιν ποθεόντες,
Οὐτ' ἐσορῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον, οὔτε κλυοῦσιν·
Ὡς κεν πειδομένοι σὺν νῷ βίον ἐσθλὸν ἐχόρην·

Ver. 4, 5. Μουσῶν—*Soli sermone præditi.*

LATINE REDDITUS A DUPORTO.

**Magne Pater Divum, cui nomina multa, sed una
Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter auctor
Naturæ, certa qui singula lege gubernas,
Rex, salve ! Te nempe licet mortalibus ægris
Cunctis compellare : omnes tua namque propago
Nos sumus, æternæ quasi imago vocis et echo
Tantum, quotquot lunni spirantes repimus. Ergo
Te cantabo, tuum et robur sine fine celebrans.
Quippe tuo hic totus, terram quæ circum, orbis
Paret, quoquo agis, imperio, atque obtem perauit
Invictis telum manibus tibi tale ministrum,
Anceps, ignitum, haud moriturum denique fulmen :
Ictu etenim illius tota et natura tremiscit :
Illo et communem rationem dirigis, et quæ
Mundi agitat molem. magno se corpore miscens.
Tantus tu rerum dominus, rectorque supremus :
Nec sine te factum in terris, Deus, aut opus ullum,
Æthere nec dio fit, nec per coerulea ponti,
Errore acta suo nisi quæ gens impia patrat .
Confusa in sese tu dirigis ordine certo :
Auspice te ingratis et inest sua gratia rebus
Felice harmonia. Tu scilicet omnia in unum
Sic bona mista malis compingis, ut una resurgat
Cunctorum ratio communis et usque perennans,
Quam refugit spernitque hominum mens læva ma-
lorum. [tant
Heu miseri ! bona qui quærunt sibi semper et op-
Divinam tamen hanc communem et denique legem
Nec spectare oculis, nec fando attendere curant :
Cui si parerent, poterant traducere vitam,**

Αυτοὶ δ' αὖ ὄρμωσιν ἀνεὺ καλοῦ ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα,
 Οἱ μὲν ὑπερδοξῆς σπουδὴν δυσερίστον ἐχόντες,
 Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι οὐδενὶ κοσμή,
 Ἄλλοι δ' εἰς ἀνεσίην, καὶ σώματος ἡδὲ ἐργα,
 Σπυεδόντε μαλα παμπαν ἐναντία τῶνδε γενέσθαι.
 Ἄλλα, Ζεὺ πάνδωρε, κελαινεφές, ἀρχικεραυνε,
 Ἀνθρώπους ῥυοιο ἀπειροσύνης ἀπο λυγρῆς,
 Ἦν σὺ, πατέρ, σκεδάσων ψυχῆς ἀπο, δός δὲ κυρῆσαι
 Γνωμῆς, ἢ πεισυνός σὺ δίκῃς μετὰ πάντα κυβερνᾷς.
 Ὅφρ' ἂν τιμῆθεντες ἀμειψόμεσθαι σε τιμῇ,
 Τμνούντες τὰ σά ἐργα διηγέμεας, ὥς ἐπεοικε
 Θνήτον ἐόντ'· ἐκεῖ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μᾶζον.
 Οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοῖνον αἰε νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὕμνειν.

Cum ratione et mente bonam: nunc sponte ferantur
 In mala præcipites, trahit et sua quemque voluptas.
 Hunc agit ambitio laudisque immensa cupido;
 Illum et avirities et amor vesanus habendi;
 Blanda libido alium, Venerisque licentia dulcis;
 Sic alii tendunt alio in diversa ruentes.

At tu, Jupiter alme. tonans in nubibus atris,
 Da sapere, et mentem miseris mortalibus anser
 Insanam: hanc tu pelle, pater; da apprehendere
 posse

Consilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite gubernas:
 Nos ut honorati pariter tibi demus honorem,
 Perpetuis tua facta hymnis præclara canentes,
 Ut fas est homini: nec enim mortalibus ullum
 Nec superis maius poterit contingere donum,
 Quam canere æterno communem carmine legem.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION,

By the EDITOR of the SELECTIONS.

Most glorious of Immortals, adored under many names, omnipotent and eternal Jove, the author and governor of nature, who with justice rulest the universe, all hail ! for it is lawful for all men to address thee ; for we are thy offspring, and alone of all thy mortal creatures, that are on the earth, enjoy the imitative faculty of speech. Thee therefore will I celebrate with hymns, and will ever sing thy power. To thee this world, rolling round the earth, is obedient, as thou directest, and is willingly subject to thy sway : such an instrument of power thou holdest in thy almighty hands, the all-penetrating, flaming, and ever-living thunder ! For struck by it, all Nature trembles ; and by it thou directest the common reason and law, which pervades all things, and is mingled with all the splendid orbs of this system, both great and small. Such is thy supreme and universal dominion, O God, nothing happens without thee upon the earth, nor in the ethereal sky, nor in the sea, except what impious men commit in their wickedness and folly. But inequalities and ~~excesses~~ thou canst compose ; and things disordered thou restorest to order, and hostilities to concord. For thus thou combinest good

with evil, so as to make one uniform and eternal system of all things, which wicked mortals neglect and shun. Unhappy men, who though always in pursuit of good, neither see nor attend to the universal law of God, by the wise observance of which, they might live a life of virtue and happiness. But instead of this, they run, devoid of all good, into various excesses; some contending for glory, some in the dishonest pursuit of gain, others sunk in indolence and sensual pleasure, precipitating themselves into the contrary of all they seek.

But, O Jupiter, the giver of all things, thou that controullest the clouds, and rulest the thunder, do thou deliver men from baleful ignorance; disperse it from the soul, and enable it to acquire that reason, through which thou governest all things with justice: so that being honoured by thee we may in return honour thee by continually singing and praising thy works, as becomes a mortal; for what greater honour can there be to men or gods, than to be employed in singing justly the universal law of God.*

* Ver. 38. *Κοινὸν νόμον*] ver. 24. *Θεὸν κοινὸν νόμον*, the law of God, which governs the universe.

THE
HYMN OF CLEANTHES.*

Translated by Mr. West.

O, under various sacred Names adored
Divinity supreme ! all-potent Lord !
Author of Nature ! whose unbounded sway
And Legislative Power all things obey !
Majestic *Jove* ! all hail ! To thee belong
The suppliant Prayer, and tributary Song;
To thee from all thy mortal Offspring due.
From Thee we came, from Thee our being drew :
Whatever lives and moves, great Sire ! is Thine,
† Embodied Portions of the Soul divine.

* *Cleanthes*, the Author of this Hymn was a Stoic Philosopher, a Disciple of *Zeno*. He wrote many Pieces; none of which are come down to us, but this, and a few Fragments, which are printed by *H. Stephens*, in a Collection of Philosophical Poems. This Hymn was translated at the Request of a very learned and ingenious Friend of mine, who was pleased to find such just Sentiments of the Deity in a Heathen, and so much Poetry in a Philosopher. (*West.*)

† The original Reading was *πᾶσι μέρεσσι λαχόντες*

Therefore to Thee will I attune my String,
 And of thy wond'rous Power for ever sing,
 The wheeling Orbs, the wand'ring Fires above,
 That round this earthly Sphere incessant move,
 Through all this boundless World admit thy sway,
 And roll spontaneous where thou point'st the way.
 Such is the Awe imprest on Nature round,
 When through the World thy dreadful thunders
 sound,

Those flaming Agents of thy matchless Power,
 Astonish'd Worlds hear, tremble, and adore.
 'Thus paramount to All, by all obeyed,
 Ruling that Reason, which thro' All conveyed,
 Informs this general Mass, Thou reign'st ador'd,
 Supreme, unbounded, universal Lord.
 For nor in Earth, nor Earth-encircling Floods,
 Nor yon æthereal Pole, the Seat of Gods
 Is aught performed without thy Aid divine ;
 Strength, Wisdom, Virtue, mighty *Jove*, are
 Thine!

Echus imitationem sortiti, which not standing in the Verse, Stephens [Scaliger] changed the word *ἵκχου* to *ἵχου*, which signifies a Vehicle, such as some of the Philosophers looked upon the Body to be to the Soul, which they esteemed to be a Portion of the Deity, the great Soul of the Universe. This Reading I have followed, not being able to make any sense of the former.—
West's Pindar. Lond. 1753.

Vice is the Act of Man, by Passion tost,
 And in the shoreless Sea of Folly lost.
 But Thou, what Vice disorders, canst compose ;
 And profit by the Malice of thy Foes ;
 So blending Good with Evil, Fair with Foul,
 As thence to model one harmonious whole :
 One universal Law of Truth and Right.
 But wretched Mortals shun the heavenly Light ;
 And, tho' to Bliss directing still their choice,
 Hear not, or heed not Reason's sacred Voice,
 That common Guide ordain'd to point the Road
 That leads obedient Man to solid good.
 Thence quitting virtue's lovely Paths they rove,
 As various objects various Passions move.
 Some thro' opposing Crowds, and threat'ning War,
 Seek Power's bright Throne, and Fame's tri-
 umphal Car,
 Some, bent on Wealth, pursue with endless Pain
 Oppressive, sordid, and dishonest Gain ;
 While others to soft Indolence resign'd,
 Drown in corporeal sweets the immortal Mind.
 But, O great Father, Thunder-ruling God !
 Who in thick Darkness mak'st thy dread abode !
 Thou, from whose Bounty all good gifts descend,
 Do Thou from Ignorance Mankind defend !
 The Clouds of Vice and Folly, O controul ;
 And shed the Beams of Wisdom on the Soul !
 Those radiant Beams, by whose all-piercing
 Flame,
 Thy Justice rules this universal Frame,

That honoured with a Portion of thy Light,
We may essay thy Goodness to requite
With honorary Songs and grateful lays,
And hymn thy glorious Works with ceaseless
Praise,

The proper Task of Man ; and, sure, to sing
Of Nature's Law's, and Nature's mighty King,
Is Bliss supreme ; let Gods with Mortals join !
The Subject may transport a Breast divine.



INNO DI CLEANTE

TRADOTTO DA GIROLAMO POMPEL

O glorioso fra gli eterni, in guise
Molte nomato, onnipossente ognora,
Tu che, tutto con legge governando,
De la natura sei principio e duce,
Salve, o Giove ; però che gli uomin tutti
Dritto è ben, che a te volgan le parole ;
Che siam tua stirpe, e solo noi, fra quanti
Vivon mortali e muovon su la terra,
Lo imitar de la voce abbiám sortito.
Quindi con inni io loderotti, e sempre
Canterò tua possanza. Obbediente
A te rendesi già, dovunque il traggi,
Questo ciel tutto, che al suol gira intorno,
E volentieri governar si lascia
Da la tua forza : tal ministro, aguzzo
D' ambo le parti, ardente, e sempre vivo
Il fulmin hai ne l' invincibil mano ;

Però che tutte inorridiscon sotto
 De' colpi suoi le cose di natura,
 E una favella, che da ognun s' intende,
 Tu con esso indirizzi, ed esso scorre
 Pur fra le cose tutte, a grandi misto
 E a piccioli fulgori. Un tanto e sommo
 Sendo tu regnator per ogni loco,
 Nè in terra, o Nume, senza te, nè sopra
 De l' etereo divin polo, nè in mare
 Opra fassi veruna, eccetto quante
 Di propria insania lor fanno i malvagi.
 Ma tu comporre ciò ben anche sai
 Che troppo eccede, e ciò che d' ornamento
 E privo, adorno rendi, e torni amico
 Ciò che amico non è; che in tal concerto
 Tutte unisti a le ree cose le buoue;
 Onde di tutte un ordine si forma,
 Che sempre dura, e che lascian, fuggendo,
 Quanti sono malvagi in fra i mortali.
 Miseri! che pur sempre desiosi
 D' acquistar beni, la comun di Dio
 Legge nè ascoltan nè guardano, a cui
 Rispondendo con senno, aver felice
 Potrebber vita: ma, scevri dal bello,
 Curron essi chi ad un chi ad altro oggetto,
 Quai per la gloria da un ardor portati
 Che mal soffre contrasto, e quali, senza
 Onesto modo alcun, volti a le frodi,
 E quali pure a l' ozio ed a soavi
 Piacer del corpo; ed a gran passi in vece

S' affrettano a produr contrari effetti.
Ma tu, che aduni gli atri nemi, o Giove,
E il fulmin tratti, ed ogni don dispensi,
Gli nomin libera tu da la funesta
Trista ignoranza, e la disperdi, o padre,
Da l' alme, e loro di trovar concedi
Quel consiglio, in cui tu fidando, reggi
Con giustizia ogni cosa ; onde onorati
Fia che a vicenda ti rendiamo onore,
L' opere tue sempre laudando, come
A chi mortale sia far si conviene;
Che a gli nomini, e a gli Dei verun più grande
Onore altro non v' ha, che giustamente
L' ordin sempre laudar de l' Universo.



L'HYMNE DE CLEANTHE


TRADUIT PAR MR. DE BOUGAINVILLE.

PERE et maître des Dieux, auteur de la Nature,
Jupiter, ô sagesse ! ô loi sublime et pure !
Unité souveraine à qui tous les mortels
Sou mille noms divers élèvent des autels ; s
Je t'adore, nos coeurs te doivent leur hommage,
Nous sommes tes enfans, ton ombre, ton image :
Et tout ce qui respire animé par tes mains,
A célébrer ta gloire invite les humains.
Béni sois à jamais ! ma voix reconnoissante
Consacre ses accens à ta bonté puissante :
Tu régis l'Univers. Ce tout illimité
Qui renferme la terre en son immensité,
Ce tout harmonieux, émané de toi-même,
S'applaudit d'obéir à ton ordre suprême ;
Ton souffle intelligent circule en ce grand corps,
En féconde la masse, en meut tous les ressorts ;
La foudre étincillante en ta main redoutable
Porte un effroi vengeur dans l'âme du coupable.
Présent à tous les tems, tu remplis tous les lieux,
La Terre, l'Océan, le Ciel t'offre à mes yeux.
Tout dérive de toi, j'en excepte nos vices,
Nos injustes projets, nos fureurs, nos caprices ;
Par toi l'ordre naquit du Chaos étonné ;
Chaque être tient le rang par toi seul assigné ;

Par toi des elemens la discorde èst bannie,
 Et des biens et des maux la constante harmonie,
 Les enchainant entre eux par un secret lien,
 Forme de leur accord un monde ou tout est bien.
 L'homme insensé, qu' avengle un jour perfide et
 sombre,

Cherche par tout ce bien et n'en saisit que l'om-
 bre ;

Ta loi seule, ta loi urai flambeau des humains,
 De la felicité leur montre les chemins.
 Mais l'un dort inutile au sein de la paresse,
 L'autre boit de Venus la coupe enchanteresse,
 De la soif des grandeurs cet autre est dévoré,
 Ou seche auprès de l'or dont il est alteré.
 Grand Dieu, pere de jour et maître du tonnerre,
 Du crime et de l'erreur daigne purger la terre,
 Affranchis la raison du jòng de ses tyrans,
 Parle, laisse entrevoir aux mortels ignorants,
 Des éternelles loix le plan sage et sublime.
 Puisse alors de nos cœurs le concert unanime
 Te rendre un pur hommage égal à tes bienfaits,
 Et digne enfin de toi, s'il peut l'être jamais,
 Ame de l'Univers, Dieu, par qui tout respire,
 Qu'à celebrer ton nom le monde entier conspire,
 Que la terre à l'envi s'unisse avec les cieux :
 C'est le devoir de l'homme et le bonheur des Dieux.



THE
TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER
OF THE
THIRD BOOK
OF
ARRIAN'S DISCOURSES
OF
EPICTETUS.

~~~~~  
ADDRESSED  
TO STUDENTS IN DIVINITY.

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## ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΡΙΑΝΟΤ ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΩΝ,

Βιβλ. iii. Κεφ. xxi.

Προς τους ευκολως επι το σοφιστευειν ερχομενους.

ΟΙ τα θεωρηματα αναλαβοντες ψιλα, ευθως  
αυτα εξεμεσαι θελουσιν, ως οι ρωμαχιχοι την τροφην.  
Πρωτον αυτα πεψον, ειθ' ούτω μη εξεμεσης· ει δε μη,  
εμετος τω οντι γινεται πραγμα καθαρον και αβρωτον.  
Αλλ απ' αυτων αναδοθεντων δειξον τινα ἡμιν με-  
ταβολην του ἡγεμονικου του σεαυτου, ως οί αθληται  
τους ωμους αφ' ὧν εγυμνασθησαν και εφαγον, ως οί  
τας τεχνους αναλαβοντες αφ' ὧν εμαθον. Ουκ ερχε-  
ται ὁ τεκτων και λεγει, ακουετε με διαλεγομενε περι  
των τεκτονικων· αλλ' εκμισθωσαμενος οικιαν, ταυ-  
την κατασκευασας, δεικνυσιν οτι εχει την τεχνην.  
Τοιοτον τι και συ ποιησον. Φαγε ως ανθρωπος, πие  
ως ανθρωπος, κοσμηθητι, γαμησον, παιδοποιησον,  
πολιτευσαι, ανασχε λαιδοριας, ενεγκαι αδελφον αγ-  
νωμονα, ενεγκαι πατερα, ενεγκαι υιον, γειτονα, συν-  
οδον. ταυτα ἡμιν δειξον, ἵν' ιδωμεν οτι μεμαθηκας  
ταις ἀληθειαις τι των φιλοσοφων. Ου. αλλ' ἔλθοντες  
ἀκουσατε μου σχολια λεγοντ<sup>ς</sup>. Ὑπαγε, ζητει τι-

## ARRIANI DISSERTATIONUM,

### LIB. 3. CAP. 21.\*

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*De iis, qui temere ad docendum accedunt.*

**QUI** nuda præcepta acceperunt, statim ea evomere volunt: ut qui e stomacho laborant cibum. Prius illa concoquito, deinde non ita evomes. Alioqui omnino vomitus erit res impura, et non esculenta. Quin potius iis concoctis et digestis, mutationem aliquam ostendito in mente tua factam: quemadmodum pugiles humeris suis declarant, ut exercitati fuerint, et cibum ceperint: quemadmodum artifices quid didicerint. Faber non dicit: Audite me disserentem de re fabril: sed conducta domo, extractisque omnibus, se arte esse præditum ostendit. Tale quoddam et tu facito: edito ut homo, bibito ut

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\* See the English translation of this Chapter in the 24th of the Selections, page 140.



νων κατεξερσσεις. Και μην εγω ὑμιν ἐξηγησομαι  
 τα Χρυσιππεια, ὡς ὕδεις. την λεξιν διαλυσω καθαρω-  
 τата· προσθισω αν που και Αντιπατρς και Αρχεδη-  
 μου Φοραν. Ειτα τῆτε ἐνεκα απολιπῶσιν οἱ νεοι τας  
 πατριδας, και τῆς γονεις τῆς αυτων, ἰν' ελθοντες λε-  
 ξεις δια σε ἐξηγημενς ακρωσιν; Ου δει αυτῆς  
 ὑποσρεψαι ανεκτικῆς, συνεργητικῆς, απαθεις, ατα-  
 ραχῆς, εχοντας τι εφοδιον τῶιστον εις τον βιον, αφ'  
 οὗ ὀρμωμενοι Φερειν δυνησονται τα συμπιπτοντα  
 καλῶς, και κοσμεισθαι ὑπ' αυτων; Και ποθεν σοι με-  
 παδιδοναι τῆτων, ὧν ουκ εχεις; αυτος γαρ αλλο τι  
 εποιησας ἐξ αρχης, η περι ταυτα κατετριβης, πως  
 οἱ συλλογισμοι αναλυθησονται, πως οἱ μεταπιπτοντες,  
 πως οἱ τῶ ηρωτησθαι περαινοντες; Αλλ' ὃ δεινα σχο-  
 λην εχει. δια τι μὴ καγω σχω; Ουκ εινη ταυτα γινεται,  
 ανδραποδον, εδ' ὡς ετυχεν· αλλα και ἡλικιαν ειναι  
 δει, και βιον, και θεον ἡγεμονα. β. αλλ' απολιπο-  
 μεν<sup>Θ</sup> μεν ὕδεις αναγεται, μη θυσας τοις θεοις, και  
 παρακαλεσας αυτῆς βοηθους· ουδε σπειρῃσιν αλλως  
 οἱ ἀνθρωποι, ει μη την Δημητῆραν επικαλεσαμενοι.  
 Τηλικουτου δ' εργου ἀψαμενος τις, ανευ θεων ασ-  
 Φαλῶς αψεται; Και οἱ τουτῶ προσιοντες ευτυχως  
 προσελευσονται; Τι αλλο ποιεις, ανθρωπε, η τα  
 μυστηρια εξορχει; Και λεγεις, Οικημα εστι και εν  
 Ελευσινι· ιδου και ενθαδε. ἐκει ἱεροΦαντης· και εγω

homo, ornator, matrimonium contrahito, liberos procreato, Remp. gerito, convitium tolerato, ferto fratrem iniquum, ferto patrem, ferto filium, viciuum, comitem. Hæc nobis ostendito, ut cognoscamus te vere philosophicum aliquid didicisse. Non. Sed venite, meque audite Commentaria dictantem. Abis quærito in quos ista evomas. Atqui ego vobis Chrysippi libros ita enarrabo, ut nemo alius: dictionem quam verissime declarabo. Aliquando etiam Antipatri et Archedemi impetum adjungam. Haccine ergo de causa patriam adolescentes et parentes relinquent, ut huc profecti te verba explicantem audiant? Non eis domum redeundum est tolerantibus, officiosis, perturbatione vacuis, tranquillis, tali viatico ad degendam vitam instructis, ut casus humanos pulcre ferre norint, atque inde ornari? Unde autem tu illa impertias quæ non habes? Nunquid ipse quicquam aliud egisti ab initio, nisi quod in eo versatus es, quemadmodum syllogismi resolvantur, quemadmodum inversiones, quemadmodum interrogationum conclusiones? At iste ludum aperuit. Quid

ποιήσῃ ἱεροφάντην. ἐκεῖ κηρυξ· κήρυκ κηρυκὰ κα-  
 ταστήσῃ. ἐκεῖ δαδουχος· κήρυκ δαδουχόν. ἐκεῖ  
 δαδές· καὶ ἐνθάδε. Αἱ Φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί, τὰ γινόμε-  
 να τι διαφέρει ταῦτα ἐκείνων; Ἀσεβέστατε ἀνδρῶ-  
 νε, οὐδὲν διαφέρει; καὶ παρὰ τόπων ταῦτα ὠφείλει,  
 καὶ παρὰ καιρῶν; Καὶ μετὰ θύσιας δέ, καὶ μετ'  
 εὐχῶν, καὶ προηγνευκότα, καὶ προδιακείμενον τῇ  
 γυνάμῃ, ὅτι ἱεροῖς προσελεύσεται καὶ ἱεροῖς παλαιοῖς.  
 Οὕτως ὠφελίμα γίνεται τὰ μυστήρια, οὕτως εἰς  
 φαντασίαν ἐρχομεῖθα, ὅτι ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ ἐπανορ-  
 θώσει τοῦ βίου κατεστάνη πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν πα-  
 λαιῶν. Σὺ δ' ἐξαγγέλλεις αὐτά, καὶ ἐξορχή, τα-  
 ρα καιρῶν, παρὰ τόπων, ἀνευ θυμάτων, ἀνευ ἀγνείας.  
 Οὐκ ἐσθῆτα ἔχεις ἣν δει τὸν ἱεροφάντην, ἢ κομὴν, ἢ  
 ἐροφίον οἷον δει, ἢ Φωνήν, ἢ ἡλικίαν. ἢ ἡγνεύμας,  
 ὡς ἐκεῖνος· Ἀλλ' αὐτὰς μόνας τὰς Φωνὰς ἀνείληφας,  
 λέγεις, ἱερὰ εἰσὶν αἱ Φωναί, αὐταὶ καθ' αὐτάς. Ἀλ-  
 λὸν τρόπον δει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐλθεῖν· μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ πρᾶ-  
 γμα· μουσικόν ἐστιν, ἢ ὡς ἐτύχεν, οὐδὲ τῇ τύχῃ  
 δεδωμένον. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σοφὸν εἶναι τύχῃ ἐξαρ-  
 κει, πρὸς τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι νέων. Δει δὲ καὶ προ-  
 χειροτῆτα εἶναι τίνα, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοιτῃ πρὸς  
 τοῦτο, νῆ τὸν Δία, καὶ σῶμα ποῖον, καὶ πρὸ πάν-  
 των τὸν θεὸν συμβουλευεῖν ταύτην τὴν χῶραν κα-  
 τασχεῖν· ὡς Σωκράτει συνεβούλευε τὴν ἐλεγκτικὴν

ni aperiā et ipse? Non temere ista fiunt, mancipium, neque forte fortuna : sed et ætate opus est, et certa vitæ ratione, et Deo duce. Non. At nemo e portu soluit nisi sacra Diis fecerit, eorumque opem imploravit: neque aliter serunt agricolæ, nisi Cere re invocata. Tantam autem rem qui neglecto numine aggreditur, num tuto aggreditur? Num qui illum adeunt, feliciter adibunt? Quid aliud, homo, nisi Cereris initia divulgas? Domicilium, inquis, est Eleusine. Ecce et hic. Illic sacrorum antistes. Et ego faciam antistitem. Illic præco. Et ego præconem instituam. Illic facifer. Et ego faciferum. Illic faces. Et hic. Voces eædem, eadem rei gerendæ ratio. Quid hæc ab istis differunt? Homo impiissime, nihilne differunt? vel sine ratione loci et temporis prosunt? Et adhibito sacrificio, et adhibitis precibus, castitate, animoque sic affecto, quod sit ad sacra accessurus, vetustasque ceremonias, oportet accedere. Sic initia fiunt utilia, si eam præbeant opinionem, quod erudiendæ et corrigendæ vitæ causa hæc ab antiquis omnia fuerint instituta. Tu vero ea

χερσιν εχειν, ὡς διογενει την βασιλικην και επω-  
 πληκτικην, ὡς Ζημνυι την διδασκαλικην και δογματι-  
 κην. Συ δ' Ιατρειον ανοιγεις, ἄλλο οὐδεν εχων η Φερ-  
 μακα· Που δε, η πως επιτιθεται ταυτα, μητε  
 ειδως, μητε πολυπραγμονησας. Ιδου εκειν<sup>Θ</sup> ταυτα.  
 πολλυρια πραγμ εχμ. Μη τι ουν και την δυναμιν την  
 χρησικικην αυτοις; μη τι οιδας και ποτε και πως  
 ωφελησει, και πινας; τι ουν κυδευεις εν τοις μεγα-  
 ροις; τι ραδιοουργεις; τι επιχειρεις πραγματι μηδεν  
 σοι προσηκοντι; Αφες αυτο τοις δυναμενοις, τοις κοσ-  
 μοις. Μη προστριβου και αυτος εισχ<sup>Θ</sup> Φιλοσοφια  
 δια σκυτε, μηδε γινου μερ<sup>Θ</sup> των διαβαλλοντων το  
 εργον. Αλλα ει σε ψυχαινωγει τα θεσμηματα, κα-  
 θημενος αυτα στρεφε αυτος επι σεαυτου· Φιλο-  
 σοφον δε μηδεποτ' εσπης σεαυτον. μη δ' αλλου  
 ανισχη λεγοντος· αλλα λεγε, πεπλησνηται·  
 εγω γαρ ουτ' ορεγομαι αλλως η προτερον, ουδ'<sup>3</sup>  
 ἄρμν επ' αλλα, ουδε ευγκτατιδεμαι αλλοις, ουδ'<sup>3</sup>  
 ἄλως εν χρησει φαντασιων παρηλλαχα τι απο της  
 προτερον καταστασεως. Ταυτα φρονει, και λεγε  
 περι σεαυτου, ει θελεις τα κατ' αξιαν φρονειν· ει  
 δε μη, κυδευε, και ποιει ἃ ποιεις. Ταυτα χαρ-  
 σοι πρεπει.

enuntias et prodīs, alieno tempore, non in loco, sine sacrificiis, absque sana mente. Non ea tibi vestis est, quæ sacrorum antistitem deceat, non coma, non strophium quale requiritur, non vox, non ætas: non caste vixisti, ut ille, sed cum solas voces memoriæ manderis: dicis, Sacræ sunt illæ voces ipsæ per sese. Alio modo ad hæc accedendum est: magna res est: arcanum est, non pervulgatum, nec ejus generis quod cuivis communicetur. Fortassis etiam sapientem esse non est satis ad regendam adolescentiam; sed et alacritas quædam scilicet, ingeniique dexteritas requiritur, et certa corporis ratio, et, quod primum est omnium, ut Deus ipse manus istud capessere suadeat: quemadmodum Socrati auctor fuit coarguendi errores: quemadmodum Diogeni, ut regio more delinquentes objurgaret: quemadmodum Zenoni, ut doceret, decretaque sanciret. Tu vero tabernam medicam aperis, cum præter medicamenta nihil habeas: ubi autem et quomodo ea sint applicanda, neque noris, neque indagaris. Ecce ille ista habebat collyria, et ipse habeo. Nunquid etiam quo-

modo illis utendum sit nosti? Scisne quomodo et quando et quos iuvent? Quid ergo maximis in rebus aleam jadis? Quid temere facis? Quid rem aggredieris tibi prorsus alienam? Relinque illam iis qui sciunt, qui eam ornant. Noli tu quoque ignominiae maculam culpa tua philosophiae inustam: nec ex eorum numero esse velis, qui munus ipsum calumniantur. Quod si praecepta ipsa te deliniunt, ipse ea tecum tacitus animo volvito: philosophum autem nunquam te profitetor, nec ab alio nominari te sinito: sed dicito, versantur in errore. Ego enim nec aliter appeto quam prius, nec alias res aggredior, nec aliis assentior, denique in usu visorum prorsus nihil a veteri statu recessi. Hæc senti, et de te ipso dic, si ita ut decet sentire cupis: sin minus, aleam jacio, et ea facito quæ facis. Ea enim te decent.

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The following very interesting relic of ancient British Literature, I have great pleasure in adding to the preceding Selections, on account of its connection with the humbling, self-denying, tranquillizing, and pious principles of Epictetus. The Triads of St. Paul are of very great antiquity, and are found in some of the most ancient MSS. It was a maxim of the ancient Bards to prove everything by the authority of St. Paul.

## TRIOEDD PAWL.

FROM A GLAMORGANSHIRE MANUSCRIPT.

1. Tri dyn y sydd, dyn i Dduw, a wna dda dros ddrwg; dyn i ddyn a wna dda dros dda, a drwg dros ddrwg; a dyn i ddiawl a wna ddrwg dros dda.
2. Tri menwydigion Duw, gwar; heddgar; a thrugar:
3. Tri nodau plant Duw, ymddwyn difalch; cydwybod lân; a dyoddef camwedd yn amyneddgar.
4. Tri phrif ofynion Duw, cariad, cyfiawnder, ac udd-dod.
5. Tri lle y bydd y mwyaf o Dduw, lle mwyaf bo a'i cais; y mwyaf a'i câr; a lleiaf o'r hunan.
6. Tri chelwydd y sydd, celwydd gwedyd, celwydd taw, a chelwydd ymddwyn; a phob un a bair gredu nas dylit.
7. Tri pheth a gaiff dyn o gredu yn Nuw; a fo raid yn y byd; heddwch cydwybod; ac ymgyd â'r nefoedd.
8. Tri chyngor Lasar, cred yn Nuw a'th wnaeth; car Dduw a'th brynwys; ac ofna Dduw a'th farn.
9. Tri chosp Cristion ar ei elyn, madden iddo; tewi arno; a gwneuthur daioni iddo hyd eithaf gallu.
10. Tri gofal Cristion, rhag digio Duw; rhag tram-gwyddo dyn; a rhag ymwanhau o'i gariadoldeb at bob daioni.
11. Tri thyst dwyfolder, gomedd hunander; ymddwyn haelionus, a chynnorth pob daioni.
12. Tri moethineb Cristion; darpar Duw; a ellir gan a fo cyfiawn i bawb; ag a allo cariad at bawb ei harfer.
13. Tri dyn a safant yn hawl a baint brodyr a chwiorydd; ymddifad; gweddw, ac alltud.

---

## THE TRIADS OF ST. PAUL.

1. THERE are three sorts of men: the man of God, who renders good for evil; the man of man, who renders good for good, and evil for evil; and the man of the devil, who renders evil for good.




2. Three sorts of people are the delight of God : the meek ; the lovers of peace ; and the lovers of mercy.
3. There are three marks of the children of God : humble demeanour ; a pure conscience ; and the suffering of injuries patiently.
4. The three principal things required by God : love ; justice ; and humility.
5. In three places will be found the most of God : where he is mostly sought ; where mostly loved ; and where there is the least of self.
6. There are three sorts of lies : verbal lies ; the lies of silence ; and the lies of false appearances ; each inducing us to believe what we should not.
7. Three things shall a man obtain by a belief in God : what is necessary in this life ; a peaceable conscience ; and a communion with heaven.
8. The three advices given by Lazarus are ; "believe in God who made thee ; love God, who redeemed thee ; and fear God, who will judge thee."
9. Three ways a Christian punishes an enemy : by forgiving him ; by not divulging his wickedness ; and by doing him all the good that is possible.
10. The three great concerns of a Christian : lest he should offend God ; lest he should be a stumbling-block to man ; and lest his love towards all that is good, should fail.
11. The three evidences of holiness : self-denial ; a liberal disposition ; and the encouragement of all that is good.
12. The three dainties of Christian festivity : what God has prepared ; what can be obtained consistent with justice to all ; and what love to all can venture to use.
13. Three persons have the claims and privileges of brothers and sisters ; the orphan ; the widow ; and the alien.









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